I don’t think the poster was referring to the atomic bomb. LeMay instituted the nighttime incendiary attacks against Japanese cities starting in March of 45. This tactic was completely contrary to US doctrine developed in the skies above Europe, and highly effective. By the time the atomic bombs were dropped, most Japanese cities had been reduced to ashes. A good book on the subject is “A torch to the enemy: The fire raid on Tokyo (Ballantine Books)
by Martin Caidin”. Another book of interest is “The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy
by Clark G. Reynolds”. One of the things discussed in the book is the strategic calculus used to decide whether to hit the Philippines or Formosa. American strategic thinking was still influenced by the civil war and the “Anaconda plan” They thought it necessary to divide the Japanese empire in two by capturing Formosa or the Philippines. That would separate Japan’s source of petroleum from the home islands and greatly hamper her war effort. As other have pointed out US submarines were taking a frightful toll on shipping already. But having a base in either place would allow the submarines to get on station much faster and allow aircraft to be used to seal the south China sea as well.
LeMay instituted the nighttime incendiary attacks against Japanese cities starting in March of 45.
I'm not sure I understand. If you are referring to one of several posts about the Philippines not being of military significance due to the B-29 and the campaign in the Central Pacific, I disagree.
Where else than Manila was a harbor capable of supporting the invasion of Japan? Okinawa has harbors but not world class like Manila.
Secondly, none of the generals knew about Manhattan but FDR did and therefore supported the Central Pacific campaigns. What FDR didn't know in 1944 was if the atomic bomb would work. Due to the chance that the atomic bomb was a dud, retaking the Philippines was a necessary step in the path towards an invasion of Japan.
One of the things discussed in the book is the strategic calculus used to decide whether to hit the Philippines or Formosa.
Formosa would have been an absolute bloodbath. The island was essentially Japan. It was Okinawa on steroids. Furthermore, before even reaching Formosa, an American attack force would have been flanked on both sides.
As other have pointed out US submarines were taking a frightful toll on shipping already.
Yes but the Japanese countered by using smaller draft vessels closer to shore with anti-submarine aircraft above.
But having a base in either place would allow the submarines to get on station much faster and allow aircraft to be used to seal the south China sea as well.
True but I again point out again that Formosa would have been a bloodbath.