Posted on 01/12/2023 8:10:42 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Small arms, ATGMs, MANPADS, loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles, trailers and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it is not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
RuZZia about to take the important city of Kyiv. Oh wait, about to take the important city of Soledar.
“#BREAKING Taylor Dudley, US navy veteran who was detained in Russia for a year, was released: CNN”
https://twitter.com/guyelster/status/1613550244725198850
Key takeaway:
“As for view in Beijing that Moscow will emerge from this war weakened, truth is that a weakened 🇷🇺 will be dependent on 🇨🇳, and it will be an asset in Beijing’s quest for regional and global power.”
In a RuZZia – China alliance, RuZZia is the junior partner and must carry toilet paper for when Xi needs to go.
Alexander Gabuev
Does China distance itself from Russia because of war against Ukraine? A terrific @FT piece helps to understand how Beijing wants its policy towards Moscow to be seen in Western capitals. Spoiler alert: the real policy might be very different. Let me help to unpack it. 1/
This excellent piece in @FT by @JKynge, @sunyu1117, Liu Xinning, @HenryJFoy, @rwmcmorrow is well worth your time. Bottom line: after securing his third term, Xi does a course correction on foreign policy and tries to win back friends in Europe. 2/
This includes efforts to distance China from Russia (or at least tell the West that Beijing is doing so), because 🇨🇳 leadership sees that China’s reluctance to criticize the Kremlin and join Western sanctions is viewed in Europe as tacit support for Putin’s brutal war effort. 3/
“Several 🇨🇳 officials in private conversations with the @FT strove to put clear daylight between Beijing and Moscow on the issue of 🇺🇦 — a message that has been repeated to some 🇪🇺 diplomats.” “Putin is crazy,” says one 🇨🇳 official, who declined to be identified. 4/
Other 🇨🇳 talking points on Russia policy include:
1) Putin didn’t tell Xi about his plans to invade 🇺🇦 during 2/4 summit in Beijing, and thus an idea still so popular in the West that Putin must have told Xi something because of “no limits partnership” is wrong. 5/
2) Demotion of vice-minister Le Yucheng 乐玉成, @MFA_China’s top 🇷🇺 expert, happened because he was held responsible for the intelligence failure on 🇷🇺 invasion. In 2023 he was a likely successor to Wang Yi as head of MFA, but the job went to 🇨🇳ambo in 🇺🇸 @AmbQinGang instead. 6/
3) China is willing to use the closeness of its relationship with Moscow to restrain Putin from resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and readouts of Xi’s meetings with @Bundeskanzler, @POTUS, @EmmanuelMacron attest to that (in 🇩🇪,🇺🇸,🇫🇷 versions though, not 🇨🇳) 7/
4) Finally, “🇨🇳 now perceives a likelihood that 🇷🇺 will fail to prevail against 🇺🇦 and emerge from the conflict a “minor power”, much diminished economically and diplomatically on the world stage.” Thus 🇪🇺 should think that China will prioritize ties with EU over ties with 🇷🇺 8/
Let’s look at the merit and novelty of these 🇨🇳 talking points before trying to unpack what China’s actual policy towards Russia is now, nearly a year into horrors of this war, and why Chinese diplomats want to spin it the way they do in talking to 🇪🇺 audiences. 9/
The “Putin is crazy” quote shouldn’t shock as it reflects a pretty widespread attitude towards Putin’s impulsiveness and emotionality among many 🇨🇳 officials including people working on 🇷🇺 in MFA, MSS, NDRC, MofCom, expert community at least since 2014 annexation of Crimea 10/
This attitude builds on a degree of disrespect towards Russia that’s common among some members of 🇨🇳 elite (”🇷🇺 was USSR 苏联大哥, but now it’s a third world country with nukes run by crooks”). But to think that this attitude dictates Beijing’s policy towards 🇷🇺 is a mistake. 11/
Chinese sources of @FT are right when they say Putin didn’t tell Xi anything, and China was not aware of the invasion. Well. He didn’t tell his PM and governor of the Central Bank. Why would he tell a foreign leader? “Partnership without limits” are just words... 12/
... that some observers and officials in the West have taken much more serious than the Chinese and the Russians, who are pretty cynical about those pompous phrases. The most significant proof that 🇨🇳 was not aware of 🇷🇺 plans was failure to evacuate 🇨🇳citizens before the war 13/
As for Le Yucheng’s demotion, it looks like an attempt to put blame on someone who was hardly in charge given his rank and MFA’s low role in managing the relationship with and intelligence on Russia. 🇨🇳 system simply got Putin wrong - like many other governments, by the way 14/
A reminder: for quite some time before the war Team Biden tried to work with 🇨🇳 through @AmbQinGang, as @ewong reported in @nytimes, sharing intel about upcoming 🇷🇺 invasion of 🇺🇦 (@CIA was super protective of sources&methods for obvious reasons) /15
And then... “After one diplomatic exchange in December, U.S. officials got intelligence showing Beijing had shared the information with Moscow, telling 🇷🇺 that 🇺🇸 was trying to sow discord.” Not sure this could have happened without a nod from Xi or at least Yang Jiechi. 16/
As for 🇨🇳 claims that Beijing works behind the scenes to convince Putin to seek peaceful resolution or at least not use nukes in 🇺🇦 if he feels that he is losing the war and it might be the end of his regime and him... we don’t have any evidence that China actually does it. 17/
On the record, even in readouts of Western leaders’ meetings with Xi, the Chinese leader doesn’t go beyond banalities like “sky is blue, peace is better than war, nuclear weapons are terrifying and shouldn’t be used.” Neither do other Chinese officials. 18/
As for view in Beijing that Moscow will emerge from this war weakened, truth is that a weakened 🇷🇺 will be dependent on 🇨🇳, and it will be an asset in Beijing’s quest for regional and global power. Look for some nuance in this @ForeignAffairs piece 19/
Russia’s economic and tech dependency on China is growing day by day, and so is 🇨🇳 leverage. @JKynge and I have talked about it back in March, just 30 days into this ugly war, and unfortunately, major takeaways from this conversation remain relevant. 20/
For the quantitative metrics of 🇨🇳🇷🇺, we see an across-the-board growth in 2022: more trade, more military exercises, more deals in RMB etc. I’ve summed it up in this thread. There is nothing to suggest that China changes course on Russia. 21/
In fact, Beijing’s strategy on Russia was pretty consistent long before 2/24. It’s about deepening engagement on China’s terms while managing Western red lines carefully. My colleague @EvanFeigenbaum got it explained on the day the war started. 22/
China knows that its problems with the West are not rooted in Xi’s bromance with Putin, but in issues like 🇨🇳🇺🇸 rivalry, Taiwan, tech etc. Even if Xi drops Putin under the bus, ties with the U.S. will not structurally improve absent China’s fundamental change to 🇺🇸 liking 23/
However, 🇪🇺 is somewhat different. Having survived crash course in decoupling from 🇷🇺, major EU economies don’t want to go that road with China, at least for now. Amid fears of recession in eurozone, 🇩🇪🇫🇷🇮🇹 leaders rush to Beijing to secure market access, new deals etc. 24/
This gives 🇨🇳 a slight opening to drive a wedge between 🇺🇸 and 🇪🇺, capitalizing on other disputes between them, and delay cementation of anti-China tech coalition led by the U.S. thus buying Beijing the precious time of having access to European tech&money&markets 25/
In order to create additional reasons for 🇪🇺 leaders to go to China and strike deals there, Beijing is using the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 card. It wants to create an impression that with a little bit of accommodation of 🇨🇳 by Europe, China is actually willing to do more to restrain Putin. 26/
And it seems to be working! @Bundeskanzler went to China in November, declining @EmmanuelMacron’s idea to go together in order to speak in one 🇪🇺 voice. Berlin then framed the trip as effort to bring China on board addressing 🇷🇺 aggression against 🇺🇦. 27/
Now @EmmanuelMacron & @GiorgiaMeloni will follow this pattern, and Beijing’s subtle hints that it might be ready to put pressure on Putin help to frame these trips not as self-interested steps that affects Transatlantic unity on 🇨🇳, but as part of a noble cause of helping 🇺🇦 28/
Bottom line: it’s clear why Beijing wants to portray itself distancing from Moscow, and why 🇨🇳 officials are ready to talk about it. Facts and figures, however, don’t suggest there is any real U-turn of Chinese policy towards Russia. Штош. 29/END
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1612891083419095053.html
“Today Shoygu and Gerasimov demoted Surovikin, and put Gerasimov in charge of the operation in Ukraine, demoting their most competent senior commander and replacing him with an incompetent one. This is a story that has it all: infighting, power struggles, jealousy /1
It’s hard to argue that Surovikin was demoted for cause. As commander, a “fixer” - he consolidated positions, used resources better, had Putin’s ear, is popular among the troops, milbloggers, Kadryov, Wagner/mercenaries, got a lot of attention./2
Surovikin has not made strategy blunders on the battlefield like so many other Russian generals have. I do not believe MOD’s rationale that it is to generate greater resources. They may need more resources, but such a step is unnecessary. On what grounds was he demoted? /3
Putin appeared to be getting more realistic assessments from Surovikin, a change from when he was getting some other version of events from Shoygu-Gerasimov early on. /4
Contrast with Gerasimov and Shoygu’s command record for this war: it’s a flunk. They flunked it. They signed off on a secret plan, multiple bad assumptions, didn’t tell the majority of their troops. led to big casualties and a partially broken force /5
Under Shoygu and Gerasimov’s command, a large percentage of the Ground Forces and Airborne forces (equipment and personnel) were destroyed. Thousands of both are gone. This leadership is so negligent that it should have been grounds for dismissal in any normal system.. /6
..But they are loyal to Putin and the system so they were kept on. Gerasimov and Shoygu for months now have been sidelined from the main command of the operation. As criticism of them mounted from some quarters. /7
Who can claim their leadership is competent after one year of this war? But, they are experienced players in Moscow. With this change, I view this as a power struggle that has resolved in favor of Shoygu/Gerasimov. So, where does this go from here? /8
With Gerasimov in charge, if this is indeed permanent, I think the possibly of the Russians asking their tired force to do something that it cannot handle rises exponentially. Gerasimov didn’t push back in Feb 2022 and won’t do it now. IDK if that is good or bad for Ukraine. /9
This move also puts pressure on Prigozhin and others who don’t trust the MOD leaders anymore. Or they get in line quickly. Wagner has been hurling major insults at the MOD leadership lately. /10.
I view this news like Shoygu’s speech announcing the return of more divisions. Seniors in Moscow are clingingly fiercely to the status quo and also soviet past. Important to keep in mind that they default to looking inwards and backwards even when it leds them to poor outcomes/11
@WarintheFuture has an interesting look at Russian forces under Surovikin here. Let’s see what Russian forces retain of these strategies, or if they try something else. /12
(And, as it turns out, the MOD Telegram was being shady a few weeks ago.) 12/
Russians demoted their “fixer” commander in favor of Gerasimov, who last year agreed to and oversaw a debacle invasion plan that resulted in the partial destruction of their army. What? /END
https://twitter.com/MassDara/status/1613249592287453194
“Video from Ukrainian SSO of artillery strikes on Russian forces in the Soledar area. Interestingly, they claim that Tochka-U are also being used.”
https://twitter.com/RALee85?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
“Ukrainian military says strike kills over 100 Russian solders in Soledar. More than a hundred Russian soldiers were killed in the battle of Soledar after Ukrainian forces launched a missile at a grouping of troops, the command of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces said.”
https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1613427713762811906
“Russian mobiks from 392nd regiment are asking the media to pay attention to the deplorable state of their positions and lack of supplies, apparently in the Luhansk region. They were moved from prepared positions into ice pits, while the command is blackmailing them.”
https://twitter.com/wartranslated?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
“the Russian pyder is slowly dying from the cold somewhere on the left bank of the Kherson region. Perhaps it is worth it to see Ukraine and freeze for the system and for Putin.”
https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1613298573109788676
“An overwhelming majority of 74% of EU citizens back the bloc’s continued support for Ukraine, the Eurobarometer poll released on 12 January shows, Politico reports.”
https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1613505067839066115
“Miss Ukraine Viktoriia Apanasenko is introduced at Miss Universe!”
https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/10a001z/miss_ukraine_viktoriia_apanasenko_is_introduced/
“Pakistan plans to transfer ammunition to Ukraine”
“According to the sources, Pakistani shipping and brokerage firm Project Shipping plans to deliver 159 containers of ammunition for Ukraine – from the port of Karachi to Gdansk, Poland, in the second half of Jan”
“The Economic Times noted that BBC Vesuvius ship will ferry crates full of 155mm artillery shells, M4A2 propelling bag charges, M82 primers, and PDM fuses – all vital supplies needed to sustain Ukrainian artillery units.
In exchange, Pakistan may receive Ukrainian assistance in the modernization of its Mi-17 helicopters, sources say.”
https://news.yahoo.com/pakistan-plans-transfer-ammunition-ukraine-225000883.html
For you guys on social media, this bust of Zelenskyy story may be much ado about nothing.
I think this bust issue may be about a Congressional area where some busts of foreign leaders are placed, if so, then this is another misleading effort by dishonest people.
“”Havel’s Bust Gets Place Among Greats in US Congress””
November 20, 2014
https://www.voanews.com/a/havels-bust-gets-place-among-greats-in-us-congress/2527328.html
Excerpt: “The bust of the late Czech president is placed alongside those of other eminent leaders in Statuary Hall — Britain’s Winston Churchill, Sweden’s Raoul Wallenberg, America’s Martin Luther King Jr. and others.”
55 posted on 1/12/2023, 9:21:24 AM by ansel12
Cheer up mate. RuZZians are dying by the thousands every month.
That is interesting. Thx for posting.
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