Ukrainian Artillery losses Running Total: 109
RuZZian Tank losses RunningTotal: 1280
October 2022 - 69
September 2022 - 217
August 2022 – 74
July 2022 – 108
June 2022 – 67
May 2022 – 148
April 2022 – 243
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 350
RuZZian Artillery losses Running Total: 321
October 2022 - 6
September 2022 - 73
August 2022 – 21
July 2022 – 21
June 2022 – 18
May 2022 – 20
April 2022 – 52
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 110
RuZZia trying to get to 1300 as fast as possible.
They’re running up some serious tank losses for October. Maybe they’ll break the record.
It appears to me that Russia is baiting Ukraine to take territory and then face the task of trying to take a city Russia holds, such as Kherson. If Ukaine wishes to oust Russia from Kherson it will have to mass forces necessary to conduct the block to block fighting that Russia did when it captured Mariupol. Remember that?
Even if this is not a Russian plan (i.e., baiting the Ukrainians) the outcome will be the same. Ukraine will have to conduct a frontal assault on the city of Kherson and, in order to do this, will have to mass troops and equipment that will be easy targets for Russian artillery, missiles and bombs. Ukraine has no military power to counter what Russia can unleash. So, if your panties are in a knot over “Russia losing territory”, I suggest you take a nap on the fainting couch and calm down.
Artillery duels north of Kherson city have started.
Kherson City residents can hear them in the distance for the first time.
Ukraine: military situation update with maps, Oct 5, 2022
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
-—> Current to date and past MAPS: <——
https://militaryland.net/
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Extras:
-—> This Video Of Russians Surrendering To Ukrainian Troops Is Intense <——
This increasingly common scene is likely to be repeated even more frequently as thousands of Russian conscripts deploy to Ukraine.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/this-video-of-russians-surrendering-to-ukrainian-troops-is-intense
—
-—> Ukraine Situation Report: Advances Cripple Russian Efforts To Replenish Forces <——
More than 1,000 square kilometers of southern Ukraine have been liberated in the past five days as Russians continue to retreat.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-advances-cripple-russian-efforts-to-replenish-forces
—
-—> Next Generation AbramsX Tank Will Have Hybrid Power Plant <——
The next-generation Abrams tank is designed to be more fuel efficient, quieter, lighter, and have a smaller crew, among other features.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/next-generation-abramsx-tank-will-have-hybrid-powerplant
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Summary:
Quiet day as Ukrainian troops are slowly moving behind retreating Russian troops on Kherson bridgehead and regrouping on North Lugansk front.
Key areas:
- Oskil river area: no changes.
- North Donbass area: no changes.
- Central Donbass (Donetsk West): no changes.
- Zaporizhya: no changes.
- Kherson bridgehead:
Ukrainian troops are slowly advancing in northern and north-western sector.
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••There’s surprisingly very little was happening on the front lines; I would say pretty much nothing was happening we’ll discuss each of the active sections of the front, specifically north of Luhansk’ and Kherson Bridgehead. General Russian military news site reported that they drafted 200,000 conscripts or reservists; that’s just gonna give us an impression of the progress and that’s pretty slow, I would say so.
North Luhansk’:
On the October 3rd, Russian command decided to withdraw, trying to build the defensive line along the road that leads from Kupyansk to Kremina. However, Ukrainian forces, specifically commando units managed to cross the road in few places and prevent Russian troops from building continuous front line. Russian forces don’t simply don’t have enough troops, don’t have enough infantry, and that’s the root cause of all of the other failures that Russian forces are experiencing systemically in Ukraine.
Russian command decided to transfer 61st Naval Infantry Brigade here to this Svatove front or North Luhansk’ front line from the Zaporizhya region. This is super important. They’re trying to hold this front line; they want to prevent Svatove from falling. More importantly, they want to prevent Ukrainian troops from advancing towards the east and down the road towards south, creating really huge problems for the Russian command - while they wait for those reserve units.
The way Russian military system works is that airborne units and naval infantry units tend to attract the most driven people with the best fighting spirit, in general those units tend to be better quality in terms of fighting spirit. The problem with those units is that they are light on heavy equipment; that’s their negative.
Nevertheless, at this point the most important quality is the fighting spirit, and they do have that. At this point Ukrainian command is not moving fast enough, and Russian command is slowly being able to not quite to build the front line, but plug the most gapping holes. The 61st was essentially put here to build the link between Svatove and Kremina to prevent further advances of Ukrainian troops.
This is going to make it much harder for Ukrainian troops to advance further beyond there; no really meaningful updates Ukrainian forces which are moving very slow. This slowness is what I mentioned before in talking about the problems, lack of knowledge, experience, how to exploit weakness, or how to exploit initial success and leverage and magnify to achieving a much larger success.
This is not being done by Ukrainian troops here, and you will see the same picture in Kherson Bridgehead. Otherwise, things here on the 5th were pretty quiet. Russian side reports that Ukrainian command is regrouping, concentrating which is again is a mistake right now in this situation; nevertheless that’s what Ukrainian command is doing.
North Donbas:
Pretty much without change essentially Wagner mercenaries so they continue attacking in Bakhmut, Solidar, etc. I don’t want to be broken record, but that’s what’s going on here. The 61st Naval Infantry Brigade was pulled out of here; this weakens even more the attacking attacking forces. Its driven only by Wagner mercenaries who are also another pretty capable unit that has strong fighting spirit, and it’s size is probably division size or even larger. This is not some battalion that’s not even brigade, its not regiment, its a pretty big unit. The rest of the Russian units are the 90th Tank Division the 57th Brigade (15 / 31st); we don’t have confirmation that they are still around here. If they are, they are shadows of themselves. They are consolidated units that are not capable of much, even if they are still there. There is good chance they have been pulled for a refitting. There are some reports that Wagner mercenaries made some advances in Bakhmut ; we don’t have a details or another independent confirmation - once we have confirmation, I’ll update accordingly.
Central Donbas:
There are some reports also that the Russians made progress in a village next to Pisky; which is an advance of maybe a 100 meters or something like that, but honestly this is not meaningful for the big picture.
Kherson bridgehead
Ukrainian troops has the same problem; they are slowly advancing behind Russian troops which have already advanced much further south. They bought time for themselves to start building a defensive position; it may not be enough time, but at least they’re trying to dig in and create something. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops slowly move through all of the villages, clearing them up and which is, honestly, a useless activity, but the point is their move is extremely slow which gives time for the Russian side to rebuild their defenses.
The point of this retreat was to shorten the Russian front line, creating the ability to create contiguous front line; that was a big problem for the Russian side was the front line that’s built around strongholds and Ukrainian commando and reconnaissance units could easily penetrate between those strongholds; they were simply too far away from each other and attack Russian strongholds from the rear or attack even supply columns. This is attempt to create a contiguous frontline is not going to save Russian troops; its just gonna to be a guaranteed slow deaths by thousand cuts.
There is high potential that it will turn into a disorderly retreat, leading to a catastrophic result. It was on the verge of that on the 4th. But Russian command managed to gain control of the situation and stabilized it to a great degree, thanks to a Ukrainian side being slow and allowing that to happen.
I mentioned that there were some unconfirmed reports that Russian troops decided to evacuate Snigurivka; it didn’t look like that happened. Apparently, there was a change in the plan and Russian command decided to stand the ground and defend this this bridgehead for as long as possible.
How long this is going to be possible is impossible to predict, because we don’t have reports from Russian general staff. Even though its openly discussed in Russia, a lot of those reports are lies and that’s part of the problem. There is some recognition inside of the Russian society of this where they literally say, ‘we need to stop lying to ourselves and stop making up these reports that are completely bogus, complete lies because then decisions are being made based on those lies, and those decisions lead to catastrophic results because they are based on lies’.
There is some recognition the problem is a lying culture deeply embedded in Russian society, and in general, in the Soviet society. Changing that is going to be almost redoing their DNA. The situation needs to be truly catastrophic to change that, and its not there yet; its definitely not catastrophic, its painful for the Russian side, but its clearly not catastrophic. There’s still no that feeling this is sink or swim moment. This is still, ‘we just lost a little bit, but that’s okay; we’ll regain it later’ approach.
Ukrainian command is continuing attacks against the Russian logistics across the Dnipro river and that guarantees eventual outcome in favor of Ukrainian troops. Ukrainian troops will liberate this bridgehead sooner or later.
There are reports that Russian command is building smaller defensive positions, a tiny bridgeheads to around this dam near Nova Kakhovka and another one around Kherson and the Antonioski Bridge. What this means is those are not truly long-term, it doesn’t mean that the Russian command is trying to hold those two tiny bridgeheads for long term, because that’s going to be nearly impossible; what this means is that will help an orderly withdraw of troops on the other side of the Dnipro river, because rear guard units will prevent Ukrainian troops from overrunning the Russian troops that will be exiting. That’s the plan; how its going to get be get carried out, nobody knows.
We will find out in the near future. The situation here is: Ukrainian command is regrouping, rethinking, preparing the troops for continuing pressure, and in more blatant ways Ukrainian command is behind the curve, doesn’t understand the importance of pushing and not relieving the pressure and continuing pressure. That’s where the problem is, nevertheless, even with all of these failures, success here is virtually guaranteed; its just the question how soon its gonna happen, and how bad the outcome is going to be for the Russians. That’s the only two big questions.
Update on Russian operations in Ukraine for October 5, 2022
- Latest US aid package falls far short of replacing steep Ukrainian losses amid continued offensives;
- Ukraine’s offensive has limited capabilities, will not achieve “victory” over Russian forces in territory deemed “Ukrainian” by Kiev;
- Ukrainian offensive is an “all-or-nothing” proposition, hoping to achieve psychological and political gains toward ending the conflict in ways Ukrainian military force cannot;
- Western analysts celebrate the psychological impact the offensive is having on pro-Russian media, pundits, and even prominent members of Russian society;
- In reality, Ukraine will be left overextended and vulnerable just as Russia’s 300,000-strong mobilization begins shaping the battlefield.
In Ukrainian channels, information about the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine appeared. They refer to the data of the General Staff.
Here is what the military-political leadership of Ukraine hides:
- the staffing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remains at the level of 43-48%;
- losses among military personnel - more than 191 thousand killed and wounded;
- statistics on missing persons are not maintained; - medicine is working at its limit, the seriously wounded are taken through Poland for treatment in European countries (Germany, France, Italy);
- an acute shortage of small arms and body armor;
- the resource of some samples of equipment transferred by the allies is ending (the first batches of American M777, M109, new Panzerhaubitse 2000 and MARS II);
- the lack of qualified specialists in the operation of Western weapons, so the equipment is operated by people without a deep understanding of the materiel;
- a problem with consumables, especially hydraulics and liquid nitrogen, necessary for M777 howitzers;
- in the field, an automated fire control system does not last long, fragments and dust are killed quickly enough; there are no opportunities for repairs on the spot, we have to send them to Poland, where there are spare parts and specialists.
In addition, the MPS of Ukrainian military personnel remains at a low level, despite the recent information campaign to distribute “encouraging” materials on social networks and organized concerts.
Such a deplorable state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can only testify to one thing - they do not have long to exist.