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ChrisO
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1573962833049665538

The Russian economists Maxim Mironov (@mironov_fm) and Oleg @itskhoki (of IE University and UCLA respectively) have published an important thread estimating the likely demographic impacts of mobilisation on Russia. A translation follows./1

1. Over the next 6 months an attempt will be made to mobilise between 700,000 and 1 million people. /2

2. We estimate the target group for the first call-up to be 2-3 million people. In total, the probability of being drafted among members of this group exceeds 25%. /3

3. We estimate the expected casualties during the first 6 months among the conscripts at 60-70%. Of these we estimate 15-20% killed, 45-50% wounded. 4/

4. The demographic damage from the war in Ukraine to the Russian population will be many times greater than the damage from the COVID pandemic. 5/

5. We expect two waves of a spike in crime. The first wave will be among those returning from the war. The second wave will be among orphans who will grow up without fathers. 6/

6. Sabotage of conscription and all methods of evading military service is an optimal strategy at the individual level and makes it impossible to conscript significantly more young men. 7/

But this strategy does not significantly alter the number of conscripts in the first months of the campaign and thus avoid the loss of human life associated with it. 8/

Disclaimer 1. The authors of this article are not military men, but economists. Our military experience is limited to two years of training in a military department and one month of military training. 9/

Therefore, all conclusions of this article are based mainly on economic logic and expediency. 10/

Disclaimer 2. Objective figures on the size of the Russian grouping, losses, planned mobilization etc. have never been published. There are only estimates. We will rely on those figures that we believe to be the most reliable. 11/

1. At the beginning of the war the total grouping of Russian troops was estimated at 200,000. Beginning in the spring, the authorities actively recruited citizens to serve on short-term contracts to replace those killed and wounded. 12/

How many new contract servicemen were recruited, as well as how many were mobilised to the LNR/DPR, is not reliably known. In June, British intelligence estimated Russian army losses at 20,000. 13

It can be assumed that by the end of September this figure is in the order of 35,000-40,000. If we take the ratio of killed to wounded as 1 to 3, the total losses of the Russian grouping at the end of September are of the order of 150,000 men. 14/

If we assume that at least as many were brought in as were dropped out, we get a bottom line of 150,000 men for that time. Even surviving and healthy soldiers in the original grouping need to be replaced in the near future, because they cannot fight without rest. 15/

How many soldiers would have to be drafted to replace the 350,000? At the beginning of the war they sent mostly professional contract soldiers to Ukraine. Then there was contract recruitment of motivated people who wanted to serve. 16/

Mobilization implies the conscription of non-professionals who do not want to serve, which means that their efficiency will be several times lower than that of the professional military. 17/

To make up for the losses, two to three times as many people would have to be drafted as the original grouping, i.e. 700,000-1,000,000 people. 18/

There has been much debate on social media as to what figure was actually in the 7th “secret” clause of the decree. We believe there is no point in these arguments. 19/

The authorities will urge as much as they want to change the figure in the decree at any moment, to this or that side. We should not start from a formal figure in the decree, but from a demand. 20/

As we have shown, we estimate the demand to be much higher than the 300,000 that was officially announced. /21

2. We believe that conscription will target mainly young people between 20 and 30. Older citizens, firstly, are in worse physical shape. Secondly, they are more likely to have children and social ties. 22/

The potential cost of conscripting them to the government is much higher than that of the young. 23/

Because of the demographic hole of the 1990s and early 2000s, there are now only 7.3 million men aged 20-29 in Russia. Mobilization is more likely to target those who have served. In recent years some 250,000 men a year have been drafted. 24/

If we take into account that some of them remained to serve under the contract, some of them became ineligible for different reasons, we get a potential pool of draftees of 200.000 for each year, or about 2 million people among men of 20-29 years old. 25/

If we increase the target age to 35, we get a pool of about 3 million people. Based on an expected mobilisation of 700,000-1,000,000 men, we get a probability of conscription for those who meet the target criteria above 25% within half a year. 26/

This probability is not evenly distributed across the regions. Poor and remote regions will conscript more, rich cities less, to avoid protests. 27/

After the first days of mobilisation, we see that the authorities are following this tactic, so in poor regions there is a significant probability of people outside the target category being drafted as well. 28/

3. The expected casualties among the newly mobilised will be higher than those of the regular army, primarily because they have worse physical training, no motivation and extremely short training times. Training a military requires time and resources. 29

The Russian authorities currently do not have enough officers to train the mobilized, nor equipment, nor time. The mobilized will be sent to the front after a few months of training (possibly after a few weeks) essentially as cannon fodder. 30/

Losses will be comparable to those of DNR troops - British intelligence estimates that as of June (3.5 months into the war) they left 55% of their original strength. It can be assumed that in the next 6 months the losses among the Russian mobilised may amount to 60-70%. 31/

B. A. Friedman
https://twitter.com/BA_Friedman/status/1574137972621975554

This Russian mobilization is a pretty clear attempt to use mass to stem the metaphorical bleeding on the battlefield through mass, but this is very unlikely to work. A (short) thread on mass:

Mass or concentration is probably the most common principle of war. It’s commonly said quantity has a quality all its own. And it does, but that mass has to be used somehow.

Throwing every able-bodied male in uniform and shipping them out can get you units, but they can’t get your capable units. Especially in modern warfare where physically-massing ground forces isn’t a strength but a liability.

It used to be you could get away with this. For example in 1793 the French Revolutionary armies were faltering, so France launched the first levée en masse, putting 800,000 men into uniform within a year. That worked.

But that was a time when units still literally fought in massed formations. Mass indeed had a quality all its own because mass and combat power had a direct relationship.

That direct relationship no longer exists. These days, it’s more about the quality of the troops and the planning, coordination, and sustainment of the tactics they employ over time. The operational art.

It’s in the operational art where Russia has truly failed, ironic since it was Russian theorists who absolutely pioneered operational theory. But its Ukraine that has mastered this art, and matched it with the professional officer, SNCO, and NCO corps that really fuel it.

I really don’t expect these 300,000 hastily trained replacements to give the Ukrainians much trouble. It’s going to be tragic but they’re headed for a meatgrinder. Russians have always deserved better leaders than they’ve had, whether tsars, chairmen, or presidents.