Posted on 09/19/2022 8:21:23 AM PDT by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Small arms, ATGMs, MANPADS, loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles, trailers and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it is not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
RuZZian Tank losses RunningTotal: 1148
September 2022 - 154
August 2022 – 74
July 2022 – 108
June 2022 – 67
May 2022 – 148
April 2022 – 243
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 350
RuZZian Artillery losses Running Total: 300
September 2022 - 58
August 2022 – 21
July 2022 – 21
June 2022 – 18
May 2022 – 20
April 2022 – 52
Feb 24 - March 2022 – 110
“Ukraine has an advantage in:
-manpower
-learning lessons
-interior lines
-command and control/leadership
-clearer strategic goals
-precision fires
-morale
-ability to strike behind Russian lines (partisans)
-training volunteers
Many of these will grow over time. I’m optimistic.”
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1571810517466980352
-NATO/US intelligence How and when these advantages will translate into further successes on the battlefield is hard to say, and there is no guarantee of another rapid Kharkiv-like success. But Ukraine is militarily in a stronger position, and it will likely only become stronger.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1571814514001149952
There is a lot going on in #Ukraine at the moment. The macro story is that Russia appears to have lost the initiative at every level. But there is also an interesting story to be told about Ukrainian campaign planning. 1/24
2/ The Ukrainian offensive in the north east is continuing to exploit a bumbling and incoherent Russian defensive scheme to the east of Kharkiv. Thousands of square kilometres of Ukrainian territory have been recaptured, and many towns and their inhabitants have been liberated.
3/ Even the Oskil Rver defensive line, rapidly established by the Russians, appears to be crumbling. Deception and operational art have been central to Ukrainian preparations for their achieving surprise against the Russians in this new phase of the war.
4/ Deception. That it was able to exploit this opportunity indicates that Ukraine had an excellent plan to deceive Russian overhead collection assets as well as their tactical reconnaissance and surveillance.
5/ As one military interlocutor in Kyiv confirmed, Russian tactical reconnaissance in the east of Ukraine has been poor. It has generally consisted of ‘advance to contact’ with infantry and armour, rather than through the use of dedicated air and ground reconnaissance assets.
6/ This means that the environment is ripe for tactical and even operational surprise, something the Ukrainians clearly recognised in their planing for the Kharkiv offensive.
7/ Operational Design. While the Russian focus was primarily on its operations to defend its holdings in the south, and conduct small scale attacks in the Donbas, #Ukraine planned and launched an operation in the north.
8/ This is not to say that Ukraine’s operations in the south were a feint. They were not, and this was recently confirmed to me by a senior Ukrainian military planner during my visit to Kyiv. The north & south are mutually supporting offensives in a larger operational design.
9/ Operational design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good operational design, military commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions to meet desired strategic and political outcomes.
10/ Ironically, it was the Russians in the early 20th who were early advocates for such operational thinking about military operations. This is not obvious with the current Russian military performance, which has demonstrated historic levels of incompetence and stupidity.
11/ For the Ukrainians, their operational design for the concurrent south and north eastern campaigns will have considered the desired outcomes and worked backwards from there. These outcomes would have included political aims (both domestic and international) and military.
12/ The Ukrainians will have carefully wargamed the best times to conduct their offensives. It would have been based on intelligence on Russian defensive dispositions, the location and quantities of Russian forces held in reserve, as well as logistics and key supply routes.
13/ What might this mean for the moving days or weeks?
14/ First, the concurrent Ukrainian offensives have totally compromised the Russian operations in the Donbas. It compromises Russian supply routes and introduces a larger psychological issue with Russian soldiers and commanders fighting in the east.
15/ Second, it will be difficult for the Russians to continue to fight in the east without responding to the threat that Ukraine now poses to their rear areas and logistics. This problem will only get worse if the Ukrainians are able to continue their advance across the Oskil.
16/ To respond, the Russians will have to reorient their forces in the east, and possibly pull troops from the south. This effectively kills any Russian offensive capability across the east and south.
17/ It also creates other opportunities for Ukraine. Because of a Russian reinforcement ‘shell game’, it is possible that we could see cascading Russian tactical withdrawals and failures in various regions as a consequence.
18/ This, and the resulting losses in equipment and personnel, compromises Russia’s capacity to dictate the pace and location of operations henceforth. The Ukrainians have seized the initiative in this war.
19/ Having surprised the Russians, the Ukrainians have generated shock among Russian troops and commanders. This period of shock is generally a productive time for those on the offensive.
20/ It during this period of shock when Ukraine can seize the most ground, and destroy the largest number of enemy troops. And it is exactly what they are doing. The Ukrainians, using mission command, are operating inside the Russian tactical and operational decision loops.
21/ While like all offensives, exhaustion and outrunning supply lines will eventually slow the Ukrainian advance, this one probably has a little way to go. The Ukrainians seem to sense the potential for a larger Russian collapse in the east.
22/ Not only has this been a stunning feat of arms, it has answered the question many of us posed several months ago about Ukrainian offensive capacity. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have demonstrated emphatically in the last few weeks their offensive mindset and capability.
23/ We will be studying this campaign for decades into the future. But for now, we need to ensure the west continues to provide the equipment and munitions for this campaign, and for those that will inevitably follow. End.
“For the first time ever the most advanced Russian main battle tank T-90M was captured by the Ukrainian army - presumably in #Kharkiv Oblast. This tank is also covered with Nakidka radar-absorbent and heat-insulating material.”
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1571531776178245635
“1/5 Employees of Gazprom, Russian energy giant, are being forced to chip in at least RUB 1000 (17 US dollars) each to buy medications for Russian soldiers wounded in Ukraine – due to the “catastrophic lack of supplies in hospitals”.”
“2/5 The guy who sent me this screenshot (authenticity checked) says that this is not the first “crowdfunding” attempt of a kind, but the first mandatory one. Everyone in the chat is obliged to provide proofs that they’ve sent money.”
“3/5 This is the chat of Gazprom security guards branch in Lena, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). There are around 100 employees in the chat, there are several chats like this in every city where Gazprom is present.”
“4/5 This chat message says a lot not only about the huge number of those wounded in Ukraine, but also about the (in)ability of the Russian state to treat them properly.”
https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1571815974487183360
“The war is not going too well for Russia right now. So it’s incumbent upon all of us to maintain high states of readiness, alert,” U.S. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said after visiting a military base in Poland on Sept. 18, Reuters reports.
https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1571685836835655682
“Germany says it is delivering another 4 PzH 2000 howitzers to Ukraine.”
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1571870185895723010
“Due to anti-Russian rallies in Armenia, Russia stopped letting Armenian trucks into its territory through the Upper Lars checkpoint”
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1571537500992143360
“In Melitopol, partisans blew up another traitor - Denis Stefankov, the “chief of the State Police of the People’s Militia” The information is confirmed by the mayor of Melitopol - Ivan Fedorov”
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1571567430824087553
https://mobile.twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1571567219385024513
So here’s the thing:
Russia figured they could afford 1/3 of total armed forces and still massively numerically overwhelm Ukraine. Supposedly they used about 1,200 tanks in a force of 3,500 “in-service” tanks. They supposedly have some 20,000 out-of-commission tanks scattered across the country... but from seeing the condition of the “fighting-condition” tanks, they’re probably not worth considering.
So this means that Russia has expended about 1,200 out of 3,500 tanks in about six months. I have no idea how fast they can step up production, but quick math says they’ve been only producing a few hundred tanks per year. (20,000 over 80 years since WWII? My presumption is that they’re more likely producing them slower since the end of the codl war, rather than faster, but that’s all mere presumption.)
Any way, my point is that the defense of Russia starts getting severely hampered by any greater loss of tanks. The Black Sea fleet is gone. Armored Personnel carriers and amphibious assault vehicles are seeing somewhat proportional reduction in numbers. Senior ranking officers have been literally decimated.
The Russians were grossly misled about their reception in Ukraine, somehow believing they’d be welcomed as liberators. What they’ve found is a determined, motivated and well-equipped fighting force that now has the upper hand. Kind of makes one wonder how many of Putin’s inner circle have met an untimely demise for their failure.
I don’t think that tanks are the main thing in this war.
rather it will be something like HIMARS for rear supply disruption. HARM missles for anti radar. Baraktars for wide ranging bombing and guided artillery shelling. then massed personal drones to punch 10-20 mile holes in the russian line. (Tanks are just juicy targets for both sides.) So when all the prep work is done then all the armored vehicles can drive through and force the russians to retreat elsewhere.
Ukraine: military situation update with maps, Sept 16 - 18, 2022
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
———————————————————————————————————————
••First of all first of all I would like to apologize; I really needed just a personal break, so well starting today I’m resuming.
Corruption in Ukraine, Part 1:
I promised some information about the corruption in Ukraine, and this is actually was inspired by some of the emails from some of the viewers who want to help and are wondering who to help, where to help, and so on.
They were asking for advice and the advice is actually very simple, and its common sense advice to help ordinary people, and to do nothing with Ukrainian government. If you work with Ukraine government, it will be stolen, it will be totally misused and abused and not gonna go anywhere.
I understand for most people who are not in Ukraine, its probably hard to find specific individuals, a specific small group of individuals that need help, but that’s the only real way to actually deliver help.
We’re gonna look at specific case of corruption that was uncovered on August 30, 2022. There are those four ‘wonderful’ people on this slide; the key one is Alexander Starukh, head of the Zaporizhzhia Military Administration.
We’re talking about the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine; all of these four people Alexander Starukh, his help Zlata Nekrasova (edit: a hot looking babe), Deputy Head of Zaporizhzhia Military Administration, another helper is Anatoliy Kurtyev, Acting Zaporizhzhia Mayor, and Victor Shcherbyna, Member of Zaporizhzhia Regional Parliament.
Those few people were accused of stealing enormous number of international help for displaced people in Ukraine. This is really industrial level theft. This is how much they stole, starting from sometime end of March:
22 Sea containers - 20 foot or 40 foot containers;
389 railroad carriages - just for the reference: a railroad carriage in the former Soviet Union is about 65 metric tons;
220 semi-trailer trucks - those are at least 20 metric tons each;
240,000 free meals to be handed out at US$50 dollars each, but they ended up handing out only 25,000; the rest: 215,000 meals went into someone’s pocket.
These people pocketed probably 10s of millions of US dollars since the beginning of the invasion; there was investigation by national anti-corruption bureau of Ukraine, which is somewhat independent from Zelenski and from the other branches of Ukrainian government.
The only reason why this happened because local police, all of those authorities like attorney general, they were in the pocket with these four people. Let’s dig a little bit deeper, because I just scratched the surface. Its actually much more ugly than than they were stealing and nothing is happening to them. Zelenski didn’t even mention anything about them.
What happened at the beginning of the invasion of February 24th, these two people, Alexander Starukh and Zlata Nekrasova, fled Ukraine. They stayed for months, or at least we know that Zlata stayed for months, in a grand hotel in Vienna, Austria, a five-star hotel - a very nice place, I found a US$400 the price for The Grand Hotel Wien. WiU shows a picture of her with a railroad carriage (box car), its doors open, stuffed full, shaking hands with some guy - that’s what we’re talking - her at work.
Hotel prices start at least at US$400 normal price, but goes from US$500 to US$700 per night. They were nowhere to be seen for months; the situation somewhat stabilized end of March (at that time Russian troops decided to withdraw from their northern Ukraine and north eastern Ukraine due to the heavy losses).
Then some of these people decided to come back and, instead of being dismissed from their positions, they were awarded medals by Zelenski on March 24th. WiU shows Zelenski’s decree and you see highlighted Alexander and Zlata. They fled, abandoning everything, dumping everything behind. They should have been dismissed or should be something more than just dismissal, nevertheless, they were rewarded. They remained in power, and then they started looting at an industrial pace.
Let’s look at who appointed Alexander Starukh and this is Andrea Yermak (Edit: head of the unelected Presidential Administration which runs the country). He is a protege or an appointee of Andrea Yermak kind of Ukrainian president office on a daily basis he actually works with Kiril Timoshenko, Yermak’s deputy of head of Ukraine. He delegated authority to supervise this activity of this person to Kiril Timoshenko; that’s kind of how this whole scheme works; there is more to it as I said, it is just a can of worms.
There are direct connections to Russia, not to mention, Andrea Yermak: there is a lot of indirect evidence pointing that he is a Russian agent and working for the interest of Russia in Ukraine. Whether or not Zelenski works for them, you can make your own decision, that’s just up to you, but I think its pretty clear.
Tomorrow I’ll continue this ‘wonderful’ story so you’ll learn more about how things are happening, and just for those who think this is some exception or exception to the rule, this is, for the most part, the norm in Ukrainian government. That’s the part of the problem why Ukraine is struggling, why it was attacked by Russia in the first place, because Russian leadership saw this very clearly, everything is rottren and corrupt and so on.
It is true and we have evidence and something similar is happening in other regions, but to refute those accusations that this is Russian operation or anything, that I just want to explain the someone who really bares the cost of the war, is actually Ukrainian citizens; it is they who ensures Ukraine is still fighting, that still did not surrender, didn’t fall in one day, two or three as predicted - its thanks to Ukrainian citizens.
It has nothing to do with Ukrainian government, if anything Ukrainian government is big, big stone on the neck of Ukrainian society. I just wanna highlight that again: don’t donate or don’t give money to Ukrainian government, its going to be totally wasted, not going to go to help ordinary people on the ground, it will be misused, abused, stolen.
If you want to help anyone go find directly go to ordinary people, find some someone on the ground ;that’s the only true way to help - the rest is just a check mark and nothing more than that.
Russian Attacks:
Shows the energy infrastructure map of Ukraine - and I discussed that Russia, about five days ago or something like that, they destroyed Kharkiv’s power station. This one is destroyed, but it is unclear if they destroyed the turbine and transformer or box, but in any case, the damage is extremely heavy. They hit two other stations.
This is not going to be rebuilt anytime soon; this is kind of becoming bigger problem, because those two were relatively small in terms of how much they contribute to power generation in Ukraine. A destroyed transformer is not a cookie cutter, its not like a sausage that you can make; its custom made and fairly expensive, taking quite a bit of time to produce. Ukraine had production of transformers in Zaporizhzhia, but due to horrific economic policies of Ukraine government, that that facility stopped producing some time ago.
More dangerously is Russian forces attacked a nuclear power station, which is the second largest nuclear power station in Ukraine. The the goal of this attack this was first attack, or, as we believe, there is going to be the same kind of attacks that were done around the Zaporizhzhian nuclear power station, which lead to the shutdown of the power station; the goal is not to hit the power station, but to scare everyone to the point that Ukraine will be forced to shut it down, similar to how the Zaporizhzhia was shut down.
This is very calculated attack against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and, while it does not destroy, it significantly undermines Ukraine’s ability to continue the war, to defend itself. We’re pretty sure the Ukrainian population will carry on, but its as you can imagine the more problems, the bigger problem is, it really makes any kind of activity economic activity almost impossible, and because its pretty clear that after this one, they probably will go after another and so on. It is slow but sure step to de-power Ukraine, and undermine its ability to continue defense.
It will not change the course of the war, but things are gonna get much, much, much worse in Ukraine. This is somewhat ironic, and for whatever reason, we feel this is was triggered by Zelenski’s declaration that he’s gonna start exporting electricity to Poland or to the West.
That really that provoked Russian’s decision, because its obvious electricity costs a lot right now in Europe, and probably will cost even more in the winter. That is a significant source of income for for Ukraine; we’re not going to even discuss the current government and its inability to do anything, but nevertheless, its significant source of income and Russia very cognizant, very aware that economy is the basis of the war .
So Russia goes, in a very calculated way, after pillars of the economy, after the sources of the foreign currency to Ukrainian economy, because that’s what supports the Ukrainian economy. This again cuts off another potential source of revenue, not only that but also indirect effect is whatever industry is in Ukraine they will they its very clear writing on the wall, there will be interruptions with electricity, and you cannot plan your business, if you cannot rely on secure and reliable supply of electricity.
There is a news that Ukrainian government signed a contract with a company in Germany to purchase 18 units of RCH 155mm wheeled SPGs. The the first problem is the first delivery is in 2025; its probably totally irrelevant. Either Ukraine wins or Ukraine loses, but this is totally irrelevant. That’s the first problem. Let’s analyze this equipment in terms of how good it is or how bad it is ,or like how helpful. There is no question it has a very powerful canon; this is similar to those cannons that Krab & Panzer-2000 have all of the Caesars: a 52 calibers length of the barrel.
This is a great & excellent canon, but the problem starts when you look at the basics: its on wheels, and the widths of the wheels or the tires, they’re not that wide, and if you look at the weight of this of this SPG, its almost 40 metric tons. What this translates into that in the winter or spring, there is going to be a problem of mobility.
Its going to get stuck pretty much anywhere you can imagine. This can only be used along the roads with a hard surface, which again creates a lot of opportunities to destroy it. This is completely in the wrong direction for the conditions of the environment in Ukraine or in Russia doesn’t matter. That’s the first important part.
The second is looking at the turret it looks very tall and relative to the wheel base; it does feel it is not wide enough, there won’t be enough stabilization. The accuracy when a big question about it secures it not because of the of the cabin, but because of the center of the mass is way too high, west way to center towards the end of it towards the back end of it.
We believe that this may not be precise enough or there will be significant problems with accuracy. yes there is obviously there are guided shells and that’s fine, those will will hit, but those are more like rockets
Question: why not just shoot directly rockets without the need to have expensive cannon, the whole expensive system? If you at their just regular artillery shells, we have big questions about this, not to mention that its extremely tall, extremely in that makes it a perfect target on the battlefield. Summary it is a great canon, but the rest of it is horrific engineering, horrific design, and Ukrainian government doesn’t care that it is going to be delivered in 2025.
We are totally unclear why Ukrainian command is not exploring, exploiting opportunity on the North Luhansk’ section. Its still very soft on Russian side, and the Ukrainian side has also suffered enough losses that it’s ability to continue is diminished. That’s probably most likely explanation, otherwise its totally unclear, but things are super slow here.
Another key point is that the Wagner mercenaries continue attacking in the southern section of North Donbas front line just as if nothing else is happening; its very strange, so very strange.
We identified another Russian unit that’s operating on the Zaporizhzhian frontline its 336th NB. Another important information is that Russian command brought in 76th AD to the Kherson bridgehead; not the entire division as we discussed, it used to be on the Izyum bridgehead before; there, it suffered significant losses, so its not full strength division, its a consolidated unit. Nevertheless, it was put in here, so Russian command really wants to continue defending front at all costs.
Also, if you look at this Zaporizhzhian frontline, you see 4 Naval Infinity Brigades, which tend to be better in terms of spirit of the individual soldiers. Also, we can say this whole area (Kherson & Zaporizhzhian region) is most important to defend for Russian of command in Ukraine. In other words, they wouldn’t wanna give this away, but they’re still willing to trade that off.
The key importance here is actually this bridgehead which is a gateway to Crimea, and the same goes through for the Zaporizhzhian region because this is a land bridge to Crimea; this is the most critical, most important part for the Russian command, Russian government, for Russian leadership so far and, as we mentioned this before.
There is a canal that brings fresh water from the Dnipro River to Crimea, which makes possible economy and life the way it is right now. That’s another important point why these troops are still defending there and the Russian command is bringing in the most capable units; they’re not trying to concentrate them here, they’re not even concerted there its just whatever consolidated units, some with military police.
It is the fighting spirit which is really what matters, not the equipment, because airborne units and naval infantry units in the Russian army are pretty light on equipment, actually have pretty bad equipment, but they have pretty strong fighting spirit, and that’s really what matters and that’s what shows this is not about equipment, its about people, its about individual soldiers, and its about fighting spirit - that’s what really matters in this war.
Russian command is bringing and concentrating its most capable units on Kherson bridgehead and in this area to protect Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol’.
Ukrainian troops managed to capture or liberate eastern side of Kupyansk which is split into two halves western and eastern: western is more residential and they’re actually the original Kupyansk and then the eastern is more industrial where there’s a railroad hub all of that and its obviously was built more recently so this was also very important so Ukrainian troops secured created bridgehead on the other side of the river.
Russian front line along the on the eastern side of a Oskil River where essentially penetrated, broken, and you really need strong concentrated and focused push to completely destroy it, but does not present any significant impediment, if you want to continue attack.
Kherson bridgehead
Ukrainian command continues attacks against Russian supplies and specifically ferries and pontoons across the Dnipro River. Definitely problems on the Russian side in terms of artillery shells, generally supply. Russian command also attacked this artificial lake hydropower station that released a lot of water into Inhulets River, and it became barely fordable. The supply of Ukrainian troops on this bridgehead on the eastern side became somewhat difficult.
Ukraine was trying to put pressure where there was low-hanging fruit so they’re trying to kind of like expand this bridgehead in the width, not in the depth. They’re probably waiting out the water passing by to continue pushing.
Also Ukrainian attempts to attack straight towards Kherson city are futile because this is probably where the Russian defensive lines are the best shape possible. The 76th AB is operating where they had only the 20th division and probably that was not enough in terms of fighting spirit.
One of half a dozen or so we saw on video back in June(?) being shipped fresh from the factory by rail.
Most put the number of operational tanks before the war at 2,500 and the amount of professional troops at 160,000-180,000 committed of the 280,000 total professional troops in the RGF and Naval Infantry - not counting National Guard, as those numbers very too widely for any accuracy, moreover, most of those are needed where they are stationed to keep order.
I think your analysis is spot on.
While I post the ORYX numbers, losses are worse for both sides. I assume 80% of RuZZian losses are cataloged and 50% of Ukrainian losses.
That means ORYX losses of 1148 for RuZZia could be 1148/.8= 1435. So they are closing in on 1/2 of their tanks being lost. A Staggering number in 7 months of war.
RuZZia produced about 200-250 tanks per year before the war. But can they get the imported parts they need now with sanctions?
“they’d be welcomed as liberators”
Yes and equally important, RuZZia thought the Ukrainian army would fold. RuZZia took Crimea literally without a shot being fired. Little Pukin expected a repeat.
Drones. The Iranian suicide drones seem to be having an impact. I’m wondering if the U.S. has a counter measure that we are unwilling to share.
Thanks for the ping.
Watching You Tube this weekend I saw a lot of Ukrainian attacks on Russian cities and bases near the Ukrainian border. It’s been kind of funny how some of the Russians evacuating from Belgorod were complaining that it was unfair and wrong for Ukraine to attack they city.
But it was okay for Russia to attack Ukrainian cities.
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