Ukraine: military situation update with maps, August 6, 2022
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
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Extras:
Ukraine Situation Report: Army Of North Korean ‘Volunteers’ Said To Be Ready To Help Russia
Russian state TV floats a report that 100,000 North Koreans could backfill mounting losses and rebuild occupied territory.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-army-of-north-korean-volunteers-reportedly-ready-to-help-russia
Excerpts:
Just how effective North Korean troops, workers, or whatever you want to call them, would be on the frontlines in Ukraine isn’t clear. What the Korean People’s Army (KPA) lacks in technology it makes up for in size and firepower, two things Russia could well put to use in a drawn-out war of attrition in Ukraine. They are also, in many instances, accustomed to working in relatively horrible conditions with minimal rights or resources, which makes deploying them to a war zone likely attractive to Moscow.
Speaking of military aid to Ukraine, the next U.S. package could exceed $1 billion and include both GMLRS rockets for the M142 HIMARS and missiles for the NASAMS surface-to-air missile system, according to a report from Reuters. The package would reportedly further include 50 medical variants of the M113 armored personnel carrier.
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Deported Civilians: How civilians are illegally deported to Russia
https://www.info-res.org/post/deported-civilians-how-civilians-are-illegally-deported-to-russia
Excerpt:
Ukrainian refugees are presented with the illusion of choice from the moment of their capture until their involuntary settlement in Russian territory. They are trapped in a Kafka-esque system working against them. Kept under the watchful eyes of the invading forces from the moment of their capture until their forceful placement in Russian territory, there is no safe way to escape a process in which the wrong answer can cost them their lives.
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WiU Commenter On Mobile Warfare:
The only strategic answer to massed concentration is mobile warfare. The UAF has so far chosen not to engage in it. I do not think it is lack of insight, inhibiting them.
Nor lack of ability as such, we have seen this. South of Izyum. When the Russians had shaped the battlefield - establishing crossings and built up forces at Kamyanka - they developed the “flower” with three petals. One of them developing along the T2122 road to Barvinkove.
Forcing a wedge between the 81st and 95th, the Russians established a hole through which they raced. The UAF responded with 3rd Separate Tank Brigade (OTBR) - a reserve unit with a mix of T-72 variants, who’s appearance was very much a surprise to all involved.
On April 4th they met the advancing 47th Guards Tank Division head on in a meeting engagement, with multiple clashes lasting some 48 hours. After that they performed a delaying action along the road, frustrating Russian advance almost to a standstill in spite of the 47th being relieved by fresh assault units of the 4th Guards Tank Division on April 8th.
By April 10th the Russian momentum was spent, a few kilometers South of Brazhkivka. They stopped. And remain there today, although none of the mentioned units.
For these 6 days we saw mobile warfare (not only there but along the entire 40 km bridgehead front, along all three petals of the flower). The UAF objective was seemingly the same as it always seems to be - to straighten the line and reestablish a static situation. As momentum was lost, Russia was only too happy to oblige.
After surrendering her objectives with the North pincer of the wide option - it was in her own best interest to establish a static situation which she could thinly screen yet totally control by massed firepower. As is always the case.
While mobile, Russia was unable to concentrate mass artillery in the manner now standard along the static frontline. She had to rely on her most mobile and fast artillery assets, very roughly about 40% or so of her total indirect firepower, operating with limited battlefield intelligence, which the UAF could compete with.
Both sides used tactical air support, both fixed wing and rotor, to increase firepower and compensate the relative lack of artillery assets usable in the fluid situation.
We saw all characteristic traits of mobile warfare - low level of battlefield intelligence causing units to smash into each other with both parties surprised, deep penetrations stretching 5-8 km behind enemy lines were frequent with strikes against rear units, fluid situation lacking fixed positions and lines dominated by highly mobile groups - armoured and not. We saw running battles and tank-on-tank battles.
To the outside observer (me), it seems the UAF performed very credibly in this type of warfare. Casualties were catastrophic (the 3rd is still recovering at Kharkiv) of course, the situation utter chaos and mayhem. Their own SU’s dropping on their heads quite literally.
We saw entire battalions chewed up inside 24 hours during those days. But they dealt a lot more damage than they suffered and the Russians faced the same situation in spite of having the initiative. It was in fact the last Hurrah of the 47th and 4th as far as we yet know. Neither have appeared in force ever since.
It is still mysterious, why the experience did not encourage the UAF to switch to mobile warfare. Ukraine is a very very big country. Fighting to the death for 1 km really only makes sense if there is zero ability of offense. If you are able to strike back in a fluid situation, real estate as such matters little.
At the Izyum bridgehead, by Brazhkivka, there was no line, but a battlefield area some 5-6 km deep and 7-8 km wide and the loss of control of 5 km one day was not relevant the next, to either side.
With zero offense the sole possibility of destroying the enemy forces (the ultimate objective) appears to consist of static defence. But the reliance on static defence has time and again failed as a concept. Long before this war.
At Popasna, defenses were for all practical realities impenetrable (just like Pisky). But between the prepared positions, manned by regular, there was only a screen of territorials - as there is everywhere, because there are no other real options, given the sheer length of contact line.
This screen was swept aside and Popasna encircled, forcing a disorderly retreat by the regulars. This is what keeps happening and will keep happening.
Even if the UAF does not believe itself capable of mobile warfare (although evidently it is), static defence is still not an option in their best interest. While it once may have led to proportionally lower casualty rates than an attacking enemy, thus useful for attrition - it does not now.
The battles we see lack exploitation phase, meaning there is no point where the Russian forces go mobile (sacrificing more than half of their firepower and trading it for speed). There is only one phase - the one where a passive UAF is bombarded until extinct, then mopped up. This is not beneficial to attrition.
Remaining static as a strategy leaves the UAF with the single option of obtaining higher firepower than Russia. Having no tactical nuclear weapons and no possibilities of achieving air superiority, this means outgunning their artillery.
Thus, the UAF strategy is obviously to win the artillery war. It is very difficult to see the qualities of this strategy. Western aid is useful and good, but news coverage chronically forgets that the UAF is the most powerful army in Europe, larger than those of France and UK put together and the UAF had 1500 artillery pieces (and tubes) when this began.
Germany has 120 tubes. Meaning, the UAF fails to trade blows with the Russians using their 1500 pieces, additions that would tip the balance, will have to be in the size of at least 500-1000 pieces. It is everyone’s choice, to believe or not believe this is forthcoming.
At the operational level, the UAF obviously continues their warfare against Russian logistics, now with much improved tools to do so.
Returning to the battle of the Izyum bridgehead, the UAF did the same and ranges allowed them to be effective even without HIMARS. They destroyed at least four pontoon bridges and even blew a dam to flood the river - tearing down another two.
They made imaginative use of raiding across the river to hit logistics. It very probably hurt the Russians a lot - probably delayed them, reduced their effectiveness, and put a cap on their firepower. It contributed to the defeat of the North pincer. But at no point - not even when entirely severing all river crossings - did it eliminate Russian capability of offensive operation. Nor, back then at leas, did anyone expect that it might.
Backing off, allowing the Russians to dig in and erect their own static defense is, of course, also not an option. Russia has far superior firepower, and it would end badly. As we have seen time and again with UAF assaults such as Oleksandrivka (the Kherson one) and Vasilivka (the Zaporizhzhia one).
The UAF cannot defeat prepared Russian positions. So - cannot attack prepared positions, cannot defend their own prepared positions - seems to lead to the only viable option. Move. Hit the enemy on the move. Mobile warfare.
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••UA still on defensive - most situations stable. Cannot attack Russians or defeat artillery. HIMARS - some attacks on ammo depot oil south, but not prevent smalls Cale Russian attacks.
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Summary: No changes;
Attack by Russian 108th Rgt/7AD from Snigurivka bridgehead towards west in the direction of Mykolayiv, questions that whole idea of disrupting Russian logistics by destroying bridges over Dnipro.
HIMARS system successfully attacked Russian ammunition depot in Skadovsk (Kherson region).
Key areas:
- Izyum bridgehead: no changes
- North Donbass area: no changes
- Donetsk West: no changes
- Kherson bridgehead: no changes.
1. Kharkiv: No changes.
••North of Kharkiv, small scale rocket, mortar shelling attacks continue.
2. Izyum bridgehead. No changes.
••Small Russian attack went no where.
3. North Donbas:
Russia troops are moving along the main east-west road in Bakhmut.
••Northern section: Quiet.
••Southern section: Orcs attacking toward Soledar. Orcs moving along road toward Bakhmut.
••How long the UA can withstand the pressure - depends on human actions. In terms of command, UAVs, morale - things are definitely not there.
4. West of Donetsk:
Ukrainian troops temporarily stabilized frontline in Pisky.
••Orcs continue to hammer in same directions around Donetsk, pushing UA out of Pisky, mostly.
••But Orcs stalled, unclear why.
5. Vugledar: No changes.
••Attacks toward Vugledar - probing actions.
6. Velyka Novosilka - Gulyapole stretch of frontline. No changes.
••All quiet.
7. Kherson bridgehead: No changes.
••Only difference is attack by 108/7AD straight west toward Mykolaiv.
••Bridges pretty much inoperable except the one over the dam.
••UA still has bridgehead and opportunity to attack south
“100,000 North Koreans”
Did we already use up the 100,000 Syrians and 100,000 Libyans?
“ It is still mysterious, why the experience did not encourage the UAF to switch to mobile warfare”
My theory is that their assessment was that it risked Strategic defeat, if outnumbered Ukrainian Forces collapsed during high intensity maneuver warfare. A rout and political collapse might occur, if Russian forces came poring through some gap or another. They had to overcome that widespread expectation, or Western Governments would still be hedging their bets, for future relations with Russia afterward (cough, Germany, cough).
I think the Strategic decision was to rope a dope the Russian forces, bleeding them gradually, while buying time for sanctions and Western aid to improve the balance. They had to buy time.
I saw an analyst speculating on the Internet (for what it’s worth), trying to guess how many HIMARS rockets the Ukraine is getting. (The number is not released, likely classified, as it should be)
His view was that it is likely now ramping up to well over a thousand per month - maybe 10,000 by year’s end.
That could support a serious counter offensive.
Four full loads of twelve rockets per night, would be around 1,500 per month. Given good targeting Intel and the accuracy of these weapons (almost one shot, one kill), that would be powerful ability to shape the battlefield, attrit and disrupt Russian forces.
They could back up maneuver forces in a clinch, but that mission would likely fall to tube Artillery.