Posted on 07/31/2022 7:51:25 AM PDT by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Small arms, ATGMs, MANPADS, loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles, trailers and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it is not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Total Losses:
Russia - 5010, of which: destroyed: 3193, damaged: 103, abandoned: 323, captured: 1391
Ukraine - 1386, of which: destroyed: 731, damaged: 30, abandoned: 36, captured: 589
Total RuZZian losses have crossed 5000!!! Demilitarization and denazification of RuZZia continues.
“Ukrainian Forces used 155m M777 Howitzer fire to destroy two 2S3 “Acacia” 152mm SPG and another vehicle in #Kharkiv Oblast.”
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1553708163895103491
Trying to repair the bridge. Waste of time…
“Russian engineer equipment on the Antonovsky bridge in Kherson.”
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1553700858889732096
Two cars pass before police car hit. Remote activated. Collaborators no more.
“Video of the explosion of a car with police collaborators in Kherson on July 27”
https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1553742862239539202
Some Humor.
“The correct version of the Russia promo.”
https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/wcjmwx/the_correct_version_of_the_russia_promo/
Ukraine: military situation update with maps, July 30, 2022
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
———————————————————————————————————————
Extras:
Ukraine Situation Report: HIMARS Knocks Out Strategic Rail Bridge Near Kherson
Ukraine continues its bridge-busting campaign with its HIMARS-launched guided-rockets, and this time a rail bridge near Kherson took a direct hit.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-himars-knocks-out-strategic-rail-bridge-near-kherson
Includes intercepted dialogue talking about how the Azov troops were murdered, while putting out the fabrication they were killed in a Ukraine Grad (HIMARS) attack. Note: satellite images show open graves at the prison before the “strike” and covered afterward.
WiU Commenter #1 (May be located in Germany):
As absurd as it might sound I am having problems at this point to find Russians. They have largely gone off grid and I believe this is a strong indication of something. Sectors with active ground combat - really only south Donbas and Donetsk - display exclusively separatists, PMC or foreign (Chechen) units operating. With Russian support - artillery air support and so on.
But I am failing to ID a single regular Russian unit along the entire front from Kharkiv to Donetsk. I therefore doubt there are any - or at least any significant number - regular forces capable of performing offensive operations anywhere along that line. I also believe - emphasis on theory - we are witnessing yet another major redisposition of forces.
Several regular units have been ID’d in Russia lately, at crossroads and railway stations. These could of course simply have been pulled rear, as was promised, for R&R (”pause”). But the logic of pulling them all the way back to Russia eludes me. I think, therefore, that they are in transit. Transit to where? I really have very low grade observations to answer that one, except it is obviously not anywhere east or north of Donetsk (they were already there, and are leaving).
I note that on the now frequent clips and photos about the bridge-situation in Kherson Oblast, I can’t help noticing that the (few) units one can see moving or waiting to move across the rivers, are combat units. Not supply. And they are moving North. This is anecdotal, but in the lack of other indications it seems to me the Russians are moving forces into, not out of, Kherson Oblast. The sole logic of moving units there with offensive capabilities is - performing offensive operations.
The intuitive sector would rather be Zaporizjzja. This sector is very dark on OSINT, manned mainly by territorials and irregulars on the Ukrainian side that do not share info on social media, and regulars on the Russian side who seem to have no active dialogue. The always-generous-with-information separatists are nowhere near. I hear no sound from the occupied population there either.
All in all, the Russians could be transiting their entire army to that sector and I’d never know. Well, as always everybody will know everything soon enough, and all will become evident. But right now, something is afoot and it is an indication.
About the pontoons - it is very much a strongpoint of Russian competence (and a pride and joy that they have). They can assemble or disassemble a PMM-2M in 40 minutes and deploy a PTS 2 in even less.
They are second to nobody in this field - it has been a major emphasis since Soviet times and the need to overcome water obstacles on their way to the English Channel. They have (compared to NATO) enormous amounts of these systems as well. The Russians will be able to bridge any water obstacle in the Kherson - the focal issue being the severe reduction of volume and speed of transit this entails, compared to intact bridges. Setting a cap on capacity of delivery of consumables and therefore offensive capacity.
Also, vulnerability - Ukraine has already destroyed a great many pontoons this war. A soft spot in the Russian armour is engineer personal. Before the war, in 2020, they had problems with personnel. Many of the job openings require education and wages do not match these requirements, comparing to what was then available on the private job market to people with those levels of education. So, while fully staffed, the engineer brigades were under-qualified.
Many specialists and officers missing, filling out with people with insufficient qualifications. Keeping in mind that Russia has a very significantly lower proportion of specialists and officers than NATO to begin with.
———————————————————————————————————————
••Nuclear Deal:
In a US$20 Billion loan, Russia will build nuclear power plant for Turkey, and Turkey will repay from the revenue the plant generates. This means the Turkey will be connected to Russia’s nuclear fuel rods.
••Uranium Production & The Wagner Group:
US uranium production was shut down in the early 80s. Production fell from 10s of millions of pounds to 21,000 lbs, making the US dependent on Russian uranium concentrate (Edit: Hillary selling 20% of US stocks to Russia dod not help.)
African countries of Mali and Niger are large produces of uranium ore which they sell to France. Wagner Group operates in both countries. In those countries, the Group helps Russia corner the uranium market by gaining a larger share and so set world prices. The do this by gaining leverage over the country’s internal politics and economy; similar to what they did in Libya by stopping oil production for to help Russia early in this year.
By controlling production in Mali and Niger, the Russians gain leverage over France and can ask for concessions.
As you can see the Wagner Group is more than an army for hire. The Group is an integral part of the way Russia operates its foreign policy and how Russia corners or tries to control the Commodity Markets.
••Gazprom
Stopped NG supply to Latvia.
••Swedish Power Supply:
Power will be less and to expect black and brown outs during the winter.
••Russian Shortages:
Shortage of fiber optic material. The forms used to make the optic fiber needs a special form imported from Japan. Russian internet and communications will be hard hit.
••Polish Deal for Krabs:
The deal was for 60 SPG Krabs. Got 8 more recently. Number is 36-40 in Ukraine now. These help to offset the broken PzH-2000s. US still maintains clear numerical advantage over Russian LR artillery and in precision.
••Ukraine Evacuation:
The government asked people to leave the city of Donets because there may be no water, no NG, no food, no electricity in the city during the winter. Like the destroyed infrastructure in other destroyed cities, the Russians will not be able to repair it before winter.
••Russian Partial Mobilization:
Every on of the 85 regions in Russia is required to provide at least a battalion to the Front. The big concern is, since Russia is made up of many ethnicities, the new battalions will be wholly ethnic in make up. This might create local separatism or local nationalism.
Also, from the Novosibirsk region, managers of factories got a request from Central Government to form battalions from the workers to send to Front. This mobilization is unlikely to gather enough people (for various reasons) and is an indication that the system cannot integrate people from those regions on its own.
••HIMARS:
Destroyed ammo dump in Nova Kakhovka; no new hits at bridges. Point is to explain the impact on Russian supply lines that the destruction of the bridges creates. Small access road across the dam is repaired and functioning. This access only provides a small fraction of the supplies the previously functioning bridges could supply.
———————————————————————————————————————
Summary:
Russian troops captured village Semygirya Continued HIMARS attacks against Russian ammo depots
Destroyed Russian ammo depots in Nova Kakhovka.
Key areas:
- Izyum bridgehead: no changes
- North Donbass area: village Semygirya captured by Russian troops
- Donetsk West: no changes
- Kherson bridgehead: no changes.
1. Kharkiv: No changes.
2. Izyum bridgehead. No changes.
••Some unsuccessful Orc attacks - just distractions.
3. North Donbass: village Semygirya captured by Russian troops.
••Southern section attacks mostly unsuccessful. Slowly but surely towns being gobbled up by Wagner Group mercenaries. Most important distinction between Wagner and UA is Wagner lacks bureaucracies, have free hand, and attack in fewer numbers.
4. West of Donetsk: Avdiyivka and Maryinka. No changes.
••Major front for Russian offensive. No major gains, but slowly taking some ground - a street here and there.
5. Vugledar: No changes.
6. Velyka Novosilka - Gulyapole stretch of frontline. No changes.
7. Kherson bridgehead: No changes.
••Orc 20th D, 7th AD, 7th MC are the units endanger of being cut off.
Orcs attack disrupted at Davydiv Brid by UA artillery. Initiative may have switched here to UA.
Livin’ alone
I think of all the friends I've known
When I dial the telephone
Nobody's home
All by myself, don't wanna be
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna live
All by myself anymore
Hard to be sure
Sometimes I feel so insecure
And love so distant and obscure
Remains the cure
All by myself, don't wanna be
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna live
All by myself anymore
When I was young
I never needed anyone
And makin’ love was just for fun
Those days are gone
All by myself, don't wanna be
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna live
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna be
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna live
All by myself anymore
All by myself, don't wanna be...
“Nova Husarivska”: Oh no, what we going to do...
Dirty RuZZian.
Crew: 4-6, range: 11 miles, rate of fire-sustained: 1rpm max. 1402 active units with another 1600 in storage (in dubious condition)
Well done. 👍
Please Sirz. I don’t wantz to be last one picked for the 3rd grade kickzballs team.
Canz I be a Dirtyz RUSZianZ to? Please.
Run like hell from the cauldron before it closes would be my guess...or surrender. 🤔
More cow bell-er tank kills please.
This Thread Approved by The Ministry Of Truth
Canz I be a Dirtyz RUSZianZ to? Please.
—
NO!!!
You are a genocide boosting, war crime loving, Filthy Reptile, RuZZian loving, FSB troll
https://twitter.com/DeuNachrichten
Every day it is getting more and more obvious that the brunt of the fighting today is going along the Solidar, Bahkmut, Adveyevka, Donetsk, Maryinka line. Near Bahkmut Russian troops have been stubbornly advancing throughout the day. According to the General Staff of Ukraine, its last evening report, Russian troops were able to take positions in Semigorye, took, according to their data a part of the settlement.
Usually when the Ukrainian side says about losing part of a settlement it often turns out that they have lost the whole. So far I have no data that the entire Semigorye have been taken. Nevertheless according to the same Summary of the General Staff there are attacks in the area of Zaitsevo and Kodema we see that they attempt to access Bahkmut from the south in order to then start the battle inside the city already.
Ukrainian sources say that Zaluzhny reported to Zelensky the other day that the battles for Bahkmut inside the city itself, according to his calculations may begin next week. This is already becoming inevitable, given that the main reserves are now going into the Southern direction. Some of the artillery systems have been removed from here. There is nothing the Ukrainian armed forces can do here to counter the might of the Russian offenses.
Reserves are running out and the tactics that I spoke about a couple days ago, how Russian troops are attacking today near ADveyevka and Donetsk directions (by the way they took several strong points in the area of Peski and Kras nogorokva took some positions in the area north of Adveyevka - all this puts an extra pressure on the Ukrainian army and it brings results.
Because the losses that the enemy is suffering on this entire contact line (and our units are not really in a hurry to go forward, they are just grinding reserves here and taking new positions only when the enemy stops offering any resistance at all) that is the ratio of losses is now to the level of 1.15; 1.20 and it is clear that the Ukrainians cannot bear such losses for a long time. If the Russian command is able to maintain such an intensity of fire on this entire line for at least a week or two, it is obvious that at first the front will float and the enemy will roll back to the northwest quite quickly, surrendering Bahkmut and Solidar and in August we already see the battle for Savyansk and Kramatorsk already.
https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1553745899871952897
Seen a few takes recently arguing that Russian weapons don’t work well. Having spent time inside a number of Russian manufactured systems I thought I’d address why I think there is often a gap between Russian weapons on paper versus their performance in the field. 1/25
There are two primary problems with Russian weapons: integration and cognitive load. To begin with integration, a few years ago some Mi-24s allocated to ISAF were undergoing maintenance. It was found that some of the bolts holding the tail rotor in place had cracks in them. 2/25
This set off a panic among some US officers who went about trying to ground all aircraft of that type fearing that poor quality control in the supply chain represented a flight safety risk across the force. For NATO aircraft this would be a massive problem. 3/25
What the Mi-24 crews had to explain to their US colleagues was that this was normal. It was why the helicopter has 8 bolts in its tail rotor of which 4 would often crack. All 8 bolts are replaced after a specified number of flying hours irrespective of their condition. 4/25
So, on the one hand quality control in Soviet manufacturing was poor. On the other hand the design team just accepted this and built in redundency to produce a very reliable and effective attack helicopter. Russian weapons involve lots of these kinds of workarounds. 5/25
This becomes a problem when you want to integrate new things onto the platform. When the Mi-24 was built it was intended for gun runs using rockets and machine guns. As MANPADS proliferated however the Russians recognised stand-off ATGMs were needed. 6/25
The Russians have built several very effective ATGMs some of which can be mounted from the Mi-35. They have impressive range and penetration. They are accurate weapons. However, the Mi-35 is built with the assumption that lots of its components will break while in use. 7/25
This firstly means that there is a lot of vibration in the platform and secondly means that this vibration is not consistent between platforms or between flights, as various sub-components fail. The result is that the mounted optics on this aircraft are very hard to use. 8/25
The last time I was in an Mi-35 we gave up searching for targets with the sensors in the nose and just used a big pair of field glasses out of the cockpit. The result was that while we had plenty of range with our ATGMs we couldn’t actually accurately engage at that range. 9/25
You’ll have noted in Ukraine the Russians keep teaming Ka-52s and Mi-35s together because the former was built around its sensor suite and so it works much more effectively. The design team made trade-off decisions that ensured the sensors worked. 10/25
So this is the first reason for a delta between capability and performance. Individually Russian weapons and platforms tend to do what they are designed for and do it reliably. When you start integrating things together however there are often problems deep in the design. 11/25
Now for cognitive load. The Soviet military was a conscript military and the Russian military today has a similar structure. When you buy a Russian weapon system you usually get a nice cardboard flow chart showing you the buttons to press in what sequence to get a result. 12/25
If you get in a Buk for example there are a lot of buttons and each one tends to do one thing. Furthermore, each operator does one task. It is actually quite easy to teach someone to use it to a basic standard because using the controls doesn’t understanding the system. 13/25
However, to use the system to a high standard is really difficult because YOU are the integrator. The computer isn’t doing much for you. If something is out of the ordinary you need to find the workaround and get the crew to do all the right things in the right order. 14/25
NATO systems tend to have far fewer controls and what the controls do is contextual. The system supports the user so they can focus on judgement. The result is a system with a much higher initial training burden but a much higher effectiveness for a newly trained crew. 15/25
If you have expert crews then Russian weapons systems are highly effective and can be more effective in some cases than NATO counterparts. If you watch old Finnish or Ukrainian Buk operators who have been at it a while it is impressive. 16/25
But if you have short term contract soldiers - and especially if you lost a lot of your more skilled personnel early - then the Russians are left with crews whose basic proficiency isn’t sufficient. You end up with less and less skilled people using the equipment. 17/25
That is how you end up with Russian air defence systems getting hit by UAVs. It isn’t that a Buk can’t see or engage it. The Ukrainians Buks which are less capable platforms are detecting and engaging UAVs just fine. 18/25
So what is going on with Long Range Precision Strike. There have been some impressive misses. What is interesting is how often the misses are in the right distribution to have struck the target but are all displaced from it. 19/25
In a lot of misses with the newer Russian systems the problem is that the Russians are either getting the wrong coordinates of the target or the launcher has the wrong coordinates for itself. This is likely a problem with EW fratricide. 20/25
In exercises the Russians had switched to digitised fire control. In Ukraine they’ve lost a lot of the operators who knew how to do that. They’re coordinating on voice. And jamming navigation all over the place. Sequencing strikes and deconfliction is hard. 21/25
There are lots of other issues with the Russian targeting process. Often they are 48 hours late striking a target because of how inefficient their kill chains are. In Chernobyl it was noted that their soldiers were using maps from before the disaster... 22/25
Well, some of the things they’ve struck that appear completely random or blatant misses make more sense when you look at the older maps. So in some cases their kill chain is 40 years out of date. 23/25
There are also older systems that have relatively poor accuracy and some systems being used out of role (ACSMs for example) that are similarly less accurate. With the newer systems however it isn’t that the weapons don’t work or aren’t precise. 24/25
In conclusion, the problem with Russian weapons isn’t usually that they don’t work but rather that when they are linked up and operated by under trained crews they become decidely less than the sum of their parts. 25/25
Go eat your Borschit, Dirty RuZZian
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.