Replies

Thomas C. Theiner

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1544495879884886017

The sound of russian ammo blowing up in Donetsk.

What does this mean for russian logistics?

A thread:

Since 2014-15 russia built dozens of ammo dumps hidden in civilian buildings near railway stations in the parts of Ukraine it occupies.

russian logistics depots are always close to railways as russia’s military has a serious lack of logistic units, especially transport units. This is compounded by russia’s military being corrupt and technologically backwards, even eschewing things like forklifts or cranes.

So russian supplies and ammo are loaded by hand onto trains, transported towards the front, unloaded there by hand, loaded onto trucks by hand, and then driven to the frontline units, where it is unloaded again by hand. It’s time consuming. No other army is so backwards.

So how did russian ammo supply in Donbas work until Ukraine received M142 HIMARS with long-range GMLRS rockets and highly accurate PzH 2000, AHS Krab, and CAESAR self-propelled howitzers? Well: 1) in russia 2,000 to 4,000 of tons of ammo were loaded onto a train

2) the train entered Ukraine, stopped at various points 30-40 km from the front, ammo was unloaded and stored nearby 3) then frontline units sent their trucks to pick up the ammo they needed The same applied for fuel, spares, food, etc.

So dependent are the russians on railways that they have 28,500 railway troops tasked with repairing and building railways. Like i.e. this bridge they built over the Oskil river to supply their planned upcoming offensive from Izium towards Sloviansk.

When russia’s military can’t access railways then its entire logistics system collapses. The russian advance East of Kyiv failed when the russians couldn’t capture the railways passing through Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. With cities like Nizhyn, Chernihiv and Sumy stubbornly

defended by Ukrainian troops, russia had to truck its supplies to its troops East of Kyiv... and that failed spectacularly, as russian troops can’t move more than 90-100 km from their supply depots and at that range russia can only supply its units for defensive operations.

The distance from railways in russia to Brovary outside Kyiv is 350 km... 300 km of which were swarming with Ukrainian special forces and partisans looking to blow up russian supply columns (photo). Now in Donbas, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia russia can supply its troops by train.

This allows russia to bring forward the 10,000s of tons of artillery ammo it expends every week; and send the replacement tanks, howitzers, etc. needed to replace russia’s immense material losses, and the needed fuel. But now the russian ammo depots and supply points

are within range of artillery and rockets. AHS Krab, PzH 2000, and CAESAR can use base bleed projectiles with 40 km range (photo: a CAESAR firing a base bleed projectile). Furthermore these howitzers’ use modern fire control systems, which use GPS to establish their own

position and then use the target’s GPS coordinates to calculate the correct elevation and deflection of the barrel, then automatically move the barrel into position. All three systems also use radar to measure a fired projectile’s speed & adjust the barrel after each shot.

Never before had Ukraine artillery with such accuracy and such range. This allows Ukraine to hit russian supply depots up to 35 km behind the front with pinpoint accuracy. And thanks to 10,000s of Ukrainian patriots in the russian occupied territories Ukraine knows the

coordinates of EVERY russian ammo depot. And now Ukraine also received GMLRS. GMLRS retains full accuracy up to 85 km. This allows Ukraine to land a rocket precisely onto a building 85 km away and set the fuze to detonate the 50 pounds of PBX-109 inside the building.

And if it is a large target (i.e. a warehouse) then Ukraine can hit it even if it is further away then 85 km. These two new artillery capabilities have two effects: 1) russia is right now losing 1,000s of tons of ammo 2) russia can’t store ammo within 100 km of the front

Every destroyed depot reduces the ammo available to russia’s massive number of artillery systems at the front. And russia has to replace this lost ammo. First it can’t produce as much as it uses and loses, so russia is already shipping old Soviet ammo from Belarus to Donbas.

Secondly russia can’t bring this ammo within range of Ukrainian artillery and GMLRS... and has to stop the trains now 90-100 km away from the front or else the ammo dump and train will be destroyed by Ukrainian artillery. Ammo and supplies 100 km from the front means

that russia again has to rely on trucks to supply its frontline units. But russia already lost at least 1,200+ of its truck fleet and the remainder has been in use for months now - and russia’s famous lack of maintenance is surely taking a huge toll on the remaining trucks.

So how will russian logistics “work” now? 1) trains will stop 100 km from the front and ammo will be unloaded by hand 2) trucks will be loaded by hand and then drive to the front. Loading by hand takes hours and driving 100 km in a rear combat zone takes more hours

Worse for russia - russian trucks carry less tonnage then Western military trucks and unlike Western ammo russian ammo comes in bulky wooden boxes.

• russian ammo trucks transport mostly wood
• Western ammo trucks (photo) transport almost only bang

3) the russian trucks finally arrive at the front 4) the ammo is unloaded (by hand) 5) the trucks return to the railheads At this distance russian truckers will struggle to make more than one supply run per day... and if the russians don’t plan their supply runs perfectly

then some units will get too little ammo, others too much - which is worse: because what do you with the extra ammo? Drop it on the ground or have the trucks stay with the unit until the ammo is needed? If you drop it on the ground and the unit has to move... well then the

ammo is lost. If you keep the trucks with the unit, then no one is driving back to get more ammo. And while NATO armies use software and AI to plan their supply runs, russians use officers’ guts... this wouldn’t matter if russia had enough trucks, but having lost so many

trucks of the already few ones it began the war with russia is now even less capable to supply units 100 km from railways. russia is a 20th century military with 19th century logistics... and now it is fighting an army receiving 21st century weapons. It will take time, but

hile NLAW, Javelin and Stinger helped Ukraine win the Battle of Kyiv; now CAESAR, AHS Krab, PzH 2000 and especially GMLRS will help Ukraine win the Battle for Donbas and the Battle for Kherson. Because: Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.

Trent Telenko

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1544472420484091905

I haven’t talked truck logistics in a while. This thread 🧵will revisit truck logistics of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

1. What we thought we knew.
2. The logistical truth on the ground.
3. And how Ukraine’s new HIMARS/GMLRS weapons are kicking over the logistical table.

What we thought we knew came from the outstanding November 2021 piece by Alex Vershinn titled:

“FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI”

The passage I’ve clipped here was the heart of the November 2021 advanced Western understanding of Russian logistics.

The problem with the passage below is everything Alex Vershinn stated as a ‘beer math’ model of Russian truck logistics is horribly wrong.

Alex Vershinn, like every other Western logistician, was blindsided by the 80 year/four generation Western intelligence failure to notice the Russian Army doesn’t use mechanized logistics ‘enhancers’ to move its ammo & supplies.

The Russian Army has no pallets, no forklifts nor any ISO containers. This is what Russian Army artillery ammunition supply points look like.

I’ve done several threads on this issue. This thread is from 24 March 2022.

And this one is from March 27th 2022 discussing the logistical advantages of Western & Chinese pallet capable supply trucks versus the Russian’s complete lack.

Alex Vershinn’s assumption that six hours of work day will fill & empty three truckloads of supplies in a 24 hour work day needs to be divided by 3 or 4 due to the lack of pallets & all terrain forklifts Moving ammo packaged thus by hand takes longer

I’ve talked to Ukrainian soldiers in the
@walter_report
Twitter space & it is taking a whole day to do one round trip resupply run to a range of 90 km, not 90 miles.

While Alex Vershinn mentioned in passing that damage to infrastructure invalidated his ‘beer math,’ expanding

...a bit on what ‘infrastructure damage’ means is required. When people on Twitter think of destroying bridges in Ukraine, they think like this

This Maxar video of the infamous “64 km convoy” north of Kyiv in mud season shows lots of little places where creeks or water drainage culverts go under the roads. Any one of those blown up, see photo, require longer truck by-pass logistical routes.

Infrastructure destroyed by Russian artillery plus the utter lack of mechanized logistics yields much different truck logistics ‘beer math.’ 1. 90 km on Ukrainian artillery ravaged roads is minimally a 2 hour drive one way or 4 hours on the road round trip.

2. Since Russian trucks need to be loaded by hand, you are looking at least 3 hours to load & a further 3 hours to unload. 3. Add in needed break times for the drivers, etc. & 1 Russian tactical truck can do 1 supply run a day to between 60% & 75% the radius of action

3. con’t ...that ‘FEEDING THE BEAR’ beer math laid out, call it 30% of Vershinn’s logistic capability model.

This has huge implications given the Ukrainian artillery depot interdiction campaign.

See
@TheBaseLeg
Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread

And see the
@COUPSURE
Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread here:

According to the US Army Chief of Staff, the latest versions of US GMLRS that Ukrainian HIMARS fire reach out to at least 85 km to hit within the various OSINT circular error probabilities of 3-to-7 meters.

Effectively, GMLRS will push Russian tactical trucks outside their sustained one-day, round trip, supply range. This means Russia is going to have to rely far more on railways than it has to date. And the Russians have been relying more and more on railways.

The easiest way to get around reduced truck supply lift is to ‘bomb up’ your tanks, AFV’s and artillery at railway siding. See the T-72 getting resupplied next to a train

Or simply base, resupply & fire your longest ranged & most logistically intensive rocket artillery from railway siding.

Once Ukraine works through the most critical artillery depots on it’s list (map). It will use all its newly acquired deep strike assets to slam Russian ammo supply trains like in those retweets.

Russian ammo trains in range of GMLRS are a whole lot easier to find & strike than tactical trucks. Plus, when detonated, extensive train clearance & EOD removal will have to happen before the rail lines line can