Posted on 04/02/2022 9:29:31 AM PDT by SpeedyInTexas
A detailed list of the destroyed and captured vehicles and equipment of both sides can be seen below. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Running total
4/2 - 389
4/1 - 362
3/31 - 350
3/30 - 342
3/29 - 331
3/28 - 316
3/27 - 307
3/26 - 297
3/25 - 289
3/24 - 280
3/23 - 275
3/22 - 270
3/21 - 263
3/20 - 257
3/19 - 251
3/18 - 244
3/17 - 235
3/16 - 229
3/15 - 217
3/14 - 209
3/13 - 204
3/12 - 193
3/11 - 187
3/10 - 164
3/9 - 156
3/8 - 149
3/7 - 140
3/6 - 120
3/5 - 108
As noted on the website: "This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here.
From Michael Kofman:
Thoughts on the current state of the war. First half of the thread is a bit of a catchup for me, having not posted anything last weekend, and then the rest on where things might be heading & what to look for in the coming weeks. Thread. (map below from Nathan) 1/
From the outset the Russian campaign suffered from a diffusion of effort, driven by unachievable (in my view) political objectives. Instead of a center of gravity the Russian effort had numerous competing objectives & 4 military districts executing with poor coordination. 2/
Russian forces ran out of momentum and became combat ineffective on most fronts 3-4 weeks into the war. UKR forces have counter attacked, and made sustained gains for over a week now. 3/
The next decisive battle will be in the Donbas where Russian units are regrouping and attempting to push UKR forces out. That’s the front to watch in the coming weeks. How this battle turns will probably inform Moscow’s thinking on prospects in a sustained war. 4/
The Russian retreat from Kyiv (east & west) is likely to involve most if not all of the units. I’m now skeptical they will leave forces behind. Judging by organization/cohesion of the withdrawal I wouldn’t call it a rout, but it represents a significant military defeat. 5/
Ironically the retreat, and rearguard action to cover for it with UKR forces in contact, might be one of the better organized aspects of the Russian campaign in the north, relative to the terribly executed offensives. 6/
But rather than pinning Ukrainian troops in the north, UKR now has the opportunity to reinforce the JFO in the Donbas, and there will be a substantial amount of abandoned equipment captured in the Kyiv area that Russian forces have probably left behind. 7/
A few weeks into the war a battle for Kyiv was looking highly unlikely. Russian forces were stalemated in heavy fighting in towns on the outskirts, couldn’t encircle or blockade Kyiv, and they lacked secure supply lines. For weeks they had been dithering & suffering attrition. 8/
Nor is there to be an assault on Odesa in the future. The offensive southwest was overextended, mauled in fighting around Mykolaiv, and suffered a defeat at Voznesensk. Russian forces retreated to set a perimeter around Kherson and seem set to hold there. 9/
UKR forces also made sustained gains around Sumy, and it is hard to see any prospects along that axis for Russian forces. The road to Poltava is supposedly now open. Current situation a bit unclear, but momentum appears on UKR side. 10/
There are indications that Russia deployed separatist units in this area (Trostyanets) in order to shift forces to the Donbas. For over a week Russian forces have been redeploying for a push in the Donbas, depleting forces on several stalled fronts. 11/
Russian units around Kyiv are likely to be redeployed by rail to the Donbas or near Kharkiv. A number of fresh BTGs have been brought in from what was available in the Russian armed forces to reinforce the Donbas campaign. This sets the stage for the next phase of this war. 12/
In the Donbas, Russia has made incremental gains, seizing Izyum. Those offensives were plagued by poor force density & employment, which has characterized much of the campaign. However, withdrawn units are now arriving from other fronts to reinforce the Russian attack. 13/
That said, a large Russian envelopment of UKR forces in the JFO looks unlikely. Rather it will be a slow, costly, and ponderous assault in an effort to push UKR forces out. This is where Russia appears to be concentrating the bulk of its forces and firepower. 14/
Russian forces took weeks to make progress in Izyum, and are still stymied in trying to advance further south. No real advance from Zaporizhia in the past week, but if Mariupol falls it could free up Russian logistics and manpower along the southern axis of advance. 15/
The salient that has developed around Severodonetsk-Lysychansk is where UKR positions appear vulnerable in coming days. Izyum-Kamyanka is an area of heavy fighting where Russian forces are on the offensive, but struggling to make progress. From @HN_Schlottman below: 16/
Although I think it makes sense to frame the next chapter in this war as principally a battle for the Donbas, I would caution against assuming that this bounds Russian aims and Moscow will then declare victory, seeking an early end to the conflict. 17/
UKR has initiative on other fronts and may conduct further offensives in Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv regions. I suspect there likely to regain territory along these fronts. /18
As always, these are impressions based on very incomplete information. Will follow up with a complementary thread about Russian force availability, conscription, and attrition, which I wanted to post separately. /19
Lol. I was just starting to read that on Twitter. You made it much easier.
(AP) — The former chief prosecutor of United Nations war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has called for an international arrest warrant to be issued for Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“Putin is a war criminal” Carla Del Ponte told Le Temps
Wow! Russians are masters of retreat!
They are doing something right!?
Please quit posting content from this site in news. Post in bloggers only.
Seeing that photo of a destroyed T-72 tank helps me to grasp why the “fearsome” Russian army is struggling against tiny Ukraine.
The T-72 entered service in 1973 which means it is a 50 year-old piece of equipment and even with upgraded reactive armor it is still an antiquated 50 y/o piece of equipment. They might as well be using upgraded T-54/55 tanks.
And to think NATO was so terrified of thousands of Soviet tanks rolling into West Germany during the cold war.
Everyone gets to have a talent. It appears the Russian army has focused its energy on running away from a severe beating.
They’ve lost over 100 T-80 and T-90 tanks as well. Compare that to US M-1 losses in Iraq. In the first Gulf War we lost zero. During our entire time in Iraq, we loss less than 40. The Russians have been in Ukraine just over 1 month.
I’m not an expert on military tactics, doctrine or equipment, but if what is being reported out of Ukraine is true, it would appear that Russia was either too stupid or too arrogant to learn anything of value from watching the US military in battle from 1991 thru today.
Makes me wonder if China is learning anything or if they are equally arrogant.
“Please quit posting content from this site in news. Post in bloggers only.”
Sure. Didn’t think about that.
“Apparently, we have the third verified loss of the Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UCAV. This one was shot down by the Russian army in #Kherson Oblast. Date is unknown.”
3rd one confirmed lost. Reportedly, Ukraine has 20. Firm number seems hard to pin down though.
If the ukranians can keep that kill rate they can turn the tide of war pretty quickly agains the russians in a way that will shock the russians and the world.
it will be pretty similar to the way the USA made afghanistan a no fly zone for the russian during the afghan war of 80’s with stinger rockets.
only this time its with stuff like the switch blade, the turkish drones, and half dozen other stand off tank killers. the russians don’t have any defense against this stuff.
where are these numbers posted on the website?
When US switchblades enter the Ukraine in quantity—its going to completely change the tide of war.
the bad side is that it will encourage the ukrainians to think they can retake the crimea.
so they will be slower to come to the negotiating table.
consequently —instead of this war being over in May—its going to drag on through the year.
That said, the weapons set up is very similar to the afghan war where the US stingers pushed the russians out of afghanistan.
why? because Putin cannot afford to lose this war. If he loses this war—he’s going to be out of a job and risks his life.
Well, it was a lot more tanks, with limited intelligence on them, with a different army, and they weren’t 50 years old.
They did take Georgia, and the Crimea. So something is different here.
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