Does the voter ever get to see the generated paper ballot to determine if it accurately reflects his choices?
If the choices are encoded in a non-readable form, there is no way to determine if this encoded string (bar code) is correct. But a manual recount would not read this encoding.
The only way I see the fraud occurring in light of possible recounts is if the generated paper artifact reflects the altered ballot.
Maybe someone else on this board knows how the ballots are printed and whether the plain text result is printed along with the encoding. I agree that a manual count of the ballots should provide evidence if that is done but I thought most all ballots were recounted with a machine. So I don’t really know how this is managed.
I need to do more research to see where the fraud opportunities are for this instance.
I found this website from SC that indicates how the ballot from the BMD is printed:
https://www.scvotes.gov/new-voting-system-faqs
From the website:
I heard the ballot uses a barcode. What’s in the barcode?
In addition to the summary of votes printed in text on your ballot, the ballot marking device also prints several barcodes. None of the barcodes include any information about the voter. One barcode includes a number that identifies the ballot style (i.e., which offices are on the ballot). The other barcodes include numbers that identify the selection made by the voter in each contest. When the voter inserts the ballot into the scanner, the votes are tabulated by reading the barcodes. The barcode provides the same information to the scanner as do the oval positions on a hand-marked paper ballot.
More on barcodes and ES&S ExpressVote ballots.
So how do we know the information in the barcodes matches the selections printed in text?
Election officials test ballot marking devices and scanners prior to every election to ensure they are tabulating correctly. Election officials also audit paper ballots to ensure that the scanner’s count of the barcodes matches up with the count of the written word.