Myself, I wouldn’t brag about a “long list” of f*ckups that got me chewed out by senior officers. But I guess things are different in the Air Force; over there where you evaluate the effectiveness of weapons without reference to anything that happens on the battlefield.
“Myself, I wouldnt brag about a long list of f*ckups that got me chewed out by senior officers. But I guess things are different in the Air Force;...” [dsc, post 72]
I don’t often laugh aloud at towering ignorance, but your post did the trick. Can’t afford the megabytes to spell out the particulars of what you don’t know.
I wasn’t mistaken; neither were the subordinates in my branch. Flag-rankers were having difficulties reconciling the whims of their own egoes with reality. Like a great many ambitious, impatient people, they took it out on us.
And I guess you didn’t get the word about armed services unification, which was mandated by Congress in 1947. My own office was so small and specialized, we had to work with every other armed service to get the mission done. Sooner or later we had to tell senior leaders from each and every service what was going on. Some smartened up and grew up.
It occurs to me we’ve barely begun to scratch the surface. Know this: wars are bad paces to collect data on weapon effectiveness. Absurdly so. It’s one of the major reasons operational testing is mandated.