Yes, you're correct, the M16 has a turnbolt design - but with a deeply recessed chamber, inaccessible from the outside and I expect that you know that.
Any part of those 29 years in combat - real combat, like in the infantry? If you had that experience, then you'd know that SLA Marshall cooked his study results. The most effective men in combat are the ones that aim and kill deliberately. "Spray and pray" only wastes ammunition. You'd also know that what happened with the introduction of the M16 and for 6 months after in Vietnam was an atrocity. R&D in an operational environment - the operational environment of Vietnam - was insufficiently done in the race to get the M16 mass produced and fielded.
The story of my last day in Vietnam is here:Link Here
You can say anything you want, but I was there and witnessed what happened and saw some our young men dead as a result. Then I saw the upper echelons fall all over themselves to hide from blame and try to either blame us or just treat it as an accident.
I worked for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab for 13 years, so I have had years of work with the different parts of our research and engineering centers. I have worked with JSSAP and seen first-hand how little operational experience the developers of small arms and crew-served weapons have.
The M16 and its mismatched ammunition caused the needless deaths of hundreds of our young men. it remains one of the sorriest episodes in R&D/procurement history.
“Ah, you’re a snide one: 29 years in uniform and that’s the best you can do?”
It’s all right. Not even Chainmail, with his above-average fondness for swagger, can induce me to poormouth any other part of the military (with a tiny exception). I was privileged to work with every specialty there was, in all US armed services, and allied nations too.
It’s mildly encouraging to find one other poster to the forum who knows SLA Marshall’s name, and a bit more besides. And I am aware of the doubts that have been cast on his methods, and his data. Which means nothing to the US Army establishment: SLAM died a hero in their eyes, and no one in their hierarchy has seen fit to pose the first question about the worth or validity of the concepts he gave form to, and they still cling to.
“...Any part of those 29 years in combat - real combat, like in the infantry? ...”
The unanswerable conceit: that only footsoldiers can tell us what “real” combat is - as if that were self-validating rhetoric.
But it is very answerable.
No, I did not see any ground combat. As a rated navigator assigned to B-52 aircrews, and later B-1 aircrews, I had to attend to other priorities.
Chainmail’s condescending pseudo-query can be expanded to, did we receive any hostile fire? Not that I know of. Things were tense at times, as we aviated to places that other Americans know only as names on a chart - if that. Situations were far-flung, and higher authorities were not on hand to tell us what to do, to cope with breaking events few Americans have the first knowledge of - even now. Real trouble was only a button-push away.
Americans assume that if there isn’t a declared war, and there aren’t any ground troops committed, there isn’t any fighting going on. They assume in error.
After being medically grounded, much of the remainder of my active-duty time was consumed in testing various systems for USAF and all armed service departments.
Most efforts were expended in the area of electronic defense: those devices fielded to save the bacon of aviators, sailors, armored troops, and footsoldiers of every stripe, who had to go in harm’s way. You know - all that stuff Chainmail has dismissed as pointless featherbedding that benefits only the evil military-industrial complex. Because only footsoliders are privileged to prosecute and understand “real combat.”
And I rounded out the career in a Joint billet, working in studies and analysis for the senior Army officer in US Strategic Command. It was a revelatory experience that renewed and deepened my respect and admiration for everybody who volunteered to put on the uniform and serve.
Our duties entailed assessing the effectiveness of sundry weapon systems belonging to all US armed services, that were farthest removed from anything Chainmail got involved in: long-range bombers, nuclear artillery, ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines. You know: all those systems that we’d prefer not to employ, but which we’d like to be really, really, really sure of, if we ever had to. Systems that Chainmail and fellow foot troops won’t be able to do anything about, if destruction of that variety rains down on them. Not even if they ditched their M16s for Kalashnikovs. Or M14s. Or M1s. Or even M1903s.
Much of that final tour was strangely like poking one’s fingers into holes in the dike - holes that were always too far apart to let one stretch one’s arms from one hole, to the next, to say nothing about backtracking to re-stop this or that hole that started to leak again. If one clique of GOFOs had just declared victory for their pet system or concept, in no time at all the next clique was trashing the whole idea (system, concept, and all). Everyone was enthusiastic about their special projects, and quick to ignore data they did not like, from the highest ranks to the lowest. Collections of “experts” like Battle Labs could be helpful, or they could be disasters waiting to happen. And we did not have to wait long. Took a deal of jawboning. And convincing. Not to mention patience. Scarcely as bracing as ground combat. But unavoidable, unless the nation was content to let its ground combatants go back to throwing rocks.
All of it merely confirmed my suspicions, that wars are poor places to collect data on system effectiveness, and that system development conducted in an operational environment is a day late. And often several dollars short.