[little jeremiah]

And I do think this era is coming to an end, one way or another. Or both...

[Elderberry]

From Orly’s site Today:

Press release: 3 years after the case against Obama was originally filed, the 9th Circuit dismisses it saying it is moot, too late

Posted on | November 2, 2015 | 17 Comments

Press release: 3 years after the case against Obama was originally filed, the 9th Circuit dismisses it saying it is moot, too late

Law offices of Orly Taitz

We have seen the courts simply covering up Obama’s use of bogus IDs. All of the cases filed against Obama prior to the general election were dismissed because they were not ripe yet. The case filed after the election was dismissed because it is moot. This is a total outrage and a cover up of the usurpation of the US presidency.

Further, the court erroneously stated that the plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief, the court is wrong. Plaintiffs indeed seek the injunctive relief and it was denied.

Further, the court is sending a message to the secretaries of state and lower court judges: discriminate between the candidates, commit treason, cover up crimes and forgery and theft of IDs and we will further cover it up by saying: too late.

Bottom line, this is yet another proof that we do not have a system of Justice and any and all crimes committed by the establishment’s chosen puppets will be covered up by judges. This is tyranny!

Case: 13-16359, 11/02/2015, ID: 9740465, DktEntry: 52-1, Page 1 of 4

FILED

NOV 02 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES GRINOLS; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.
ELECTORAL COLLEGE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 13-16359

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02997-MCEDAD
MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 20, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order dismissing their claim that
President Obama is not eligible to be the President of the United States and their

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Case: 13-16359, 11/02/2015, ID: 9740465, DktEntry: 52-1, Page 2 of 4

claim for violation of California Penal Code § 2150. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1. We affirm the district court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ claim regarding
President Obama’s eligibility is moot.1 “Mootness, a question of law, is reviewed
de novo.” Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk & Yowlumne Tejon Indians v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 232 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 2000). Factual determinations
underlying the district court’s decision are reviewed for clear error. Wolfson v.
Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010).
“The exercise of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends on
the existence of a case or controversy.” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401
(1975). “There is thus no case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot, ‘when the
issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (quoting
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013)). A controversy does not
escape mootness simply because it existed at the time Plaintiffs originally filed
their claim. The controversy must continue to exist at all stages of review.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997).

1While the district court based its decision on several alternative holdings,
we reach only the issue of mootness.

Case: 13-16359, 11/02/2015, ID: 9740465, DktEntry: 52-1, Page 3 of 4

An exception to the general principle of mootness exists for cases “capable
of repetition, yet evading review.” See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). This exception is limited to
“‘extraordinary cases’” in which “(1) the duration of the challenged action is too
short to allow full litigation before it ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to it again.” Greenpeace Action v.
Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Alaska Fish & Wildlife
Fed’n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Plaintiffs’ case is moot. The issues presented are no longer live. Plaintiffs
initially sought to enjoin a series of events occurring prior to President Obama’s
inauguration on January 20, 2012. That request was denied by the district court
and Plaintiffs have not further pursued an injunction. Plaintiffs now seek
declaratory relief, but the declaratory judgment they seek would amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion and would have no effect on the legal relationships
of the parties. Thus, we are prohibited from issuing such relief. See Chafin, 133 S.
Ct. at 1023.

The claim fails to meet the requirements of the exception for cases capable
of repetition, yet evading review. President Obama is currently serving his second
term as President of the United States, and is therefore constitutionally precluded

Case: 13-16359, 11/02/2015, ID: 9740465, DktEntry: 52-1, Page 4 of 4

from serving as President again. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. Plaintiffs
argue that President Obama could run for another political office. However, the
natural-born-citizen clause of the Constitution applies only to eligibility for the
office of President of the United States. U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 5. Therefore, it
would be inapplicable to any other office President Obama may seek. Moreover,
such a scenario is too remote and speculative to meet the requirements of the
capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d
136, 142 (9th Cir. 1977).

2. We also affirm the district court’s decision to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claim for violation of California
Penal Code § 2150. Because the district court dismissed all claims over which it
had original jurisdiction, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 & n.7
(1988).
AFFIRMED.2

2Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Motion for Judicial Notice/Supplement Record on
Appeal is denied.