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“Just as the US military industrial complex wanted.”. . . written by someone that knows little, if anything, about Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

ometimes I just gotta let loose with a primer on FMS. . .

The international arms trade via government-run foreign military sales (FMS) is not well understood. FMS is oft-times misrepresented in popular media and through agenda-driven reporting/monitoring organizations. Consequently, many people are unaware of the driving forces behind FMS and usually associate FMS with unrealistic but entertaining fantasy or simply object to such activities altogether. The subject is further confused by a myriad of Executive Branch FMS bureaucratic processes, laws, vague regulations, as well Congress.

President Eisenhower’s 1961 (often taken out of context) “military industrial complex” speech contributes to an enduring negative view of the defense industry. Yes, President Eisenhower’s speech is cited as a warning about the defense industry and its growing influence among the “councils of government.” However, in context, President Eisenhower acknowledged the need for a robust defense industry and called on informed citizenry and politicos to “recognize the imperative need for this development.” (The “development” referred to a healthy defense industry).

Consequently, far from condemning the defense industry, he was recognizing its vital role in advancing US political, economic and military goals.

US arms sold abroad are severely restricted in their use by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), section 505, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2754). Further controls are mandated in the terms and conditions of the sales contract (Letter of Offer and Assistance—LOA).

When compared to nations such as France, Russian, Ukraine, China, North Korea, etc., the US places onerous restrictions on the use and transfers of US arms. These restrictions are sometime the proximate cause for a potential customer country to threaten (or seek) alternative sources for products and services.

A country must be approved by congress to receive certain military products and services. The president can’t unilaterally sell arms.

If they are on the approved list for defense articles and services, before marketing and sales efforts by the defense industry may begin, export licenses must be granted to allow discussions with the potential customer country—Granted by Congress.

If the country is not on the approved list for requested defense articles and services, the customer country must officially request a briefing on the FMS product they wish to obtain. In turn, the US country team in the requesting country, along with the DoS and associated mil-dep that would potentially contract and run the FMS program, must agree the potential sale falls within FMS guidelines for receiving the product. If the FMS product carries some level of classification, as most military products manufactured for export do, an “exception to national disclosure policy” (ENDP) is required.

are three (3), largely unrecognized, specific component-level benefits of FMS. They are: access, influence and infrastructure. These three factors, when properly understood, provide concrete reasons why the US engages in FMS and underscores national security benefits of FMS.

As mentioned earlier, core motivations for US international arms sales are vaguely written and do not clearly define specific elements of the sale and how these elements support national security. My research will develop a document that will prove the three previously mentioned benefits of FMS (access, influence, and infrastructure) and underscore how the US defense industry contributes to these three components. For detail, I provide a short discussion of these three components:

1. “Access.” The sale of FMS kit and/or capability requires political access to a country’s leadership. Before a FMS sale may proceed, political considerations affecting the current and forecast geo-political environment tales place. If a country decides to establish ties and/or expand relations with the US, then FMS is an excellent way forward to accomplish this goal. Purchasing US military gear is a highly visible political-military step that is noticed world-wide. An FMS sale therefore needs to initially be explored at the highest-level of government—US and the customer country. During initial FMS discussions through delivery and follow-on support, political and military relationships are developed and trust established. Additionally, a “total package approach” (TPA) to FMS is agreed and this ensures long-term political, military and physical access to the country as the program is introduced, activated, maintained and upgraded.

2. “Influence.” FMS expands ties and strengthens ties between the US and the customer country (“Small nations when treated as equals become the firmest of allies” ). These closer ties and stronger relations allows the US to exercise greater influence though political, military and physical means.

3. “Infrastructure,” a vastly important aspect of the US international arms business. Today, the US engages in FMS as a way to keep the defense industry alive. At $543 billion, the fiscal year 2013 US National Defense Authorization Act (current military budget) is comprehensive and funds a wide range of military expenditures. However, the NDAA budget falls short by nearly $31 billion in requested military expenditure. This 9% budget shortfall is significant. Most NDAA expenditures are for maintenance, modifications, upgrades and personnel. Consequently, new product manufacturing and research and development are limited in scope. This threatens the defense industrial manufacturing base. With FMS, research and development continues and the defense industry remains viable and productive. There are many other aspects to the infrastructure argument:

o Sub-contracting with allies is common practice and brings countries together through commercial ties. However, while there are many benefits of joint defense industry business ventures between the US and allies, the US should not rely on allies to supply essential military kit, especially when the US national security interests may conflict with and allies interests. As an example; potentially, if EADS retained the US strategic tanker/airlift program, during times of significant international policy disagreements, the potential of European Union directing EADS to suspend critical component deliveries could give the European Union significant “influence” over US national security actions. Ignoring a threatened European Union embargo of a critically important strategic airlift asset like the new tanker would have potentially devastating effects if ignored by the US.
o A closed complex manufacturing facility such as the Boeing C-17 facility in Long Beach, for example, can’t easily be re-opened and produce kit quickly enough to arm/equip a nation under siege or engaged in a major conflict. A defense manufacturing facility simply can’t easily resume production within months, and may possibly takes years to become viable. That is physically, technically and fiscally impossible.
o Research and Development (R&D) ensures the US possesses a qualitative edge in technology—and this edge is financed in part through FMS programs. FMS ensures R&D continues and the aviation defense industry continues to produce modern, reliable and technologically relevant products. Losing the technology edge not only means the US government loses its ‘edge’ in a conflict, the commercial FMS product is outdated and makes the international arms sales business much more difficult. The FMS customer wants the best they can afford, and if the US can’t offer the most modern and advanced product, then the US has effectively removed itself from the market. As a result, the US defense industry loses customers and, in turn, this weakens—if not ends—the ability of the US government to influence FMS customers.