Posted on 02/02/2014 8:44:04 AM PST by marktwain
| Courtesy of Lauren Carroll/Journal myfox8.com |
FORSYTH COUNTY, N.C. – Forsyth County Sheriff Bill Schatzman defended his department’s request to trade two vintage Thompson submachine guns for 88 new Bushmaster rifles as county commissioners reignited their debate on Thursday.Apprarently, some people in the county think it might be a good idea to hang onto the Thompsons, which have some historical value. One commissioner considered a compromise:
Commissioner Mark Baker asked if the board decided to keep one gun for historical purposes and trade the other, could the county get 44 rifles. Schatzman didn’t know.Sheriff Schatzman mentioned that putting the guns on display involved serious costs of its own:
“What would you do with a diamond ring if it was worth $30 to $50,000? How would you display it? Would you put armed guards around it or just put it in an alarmed case?” Schatzman asked.Readers now know the answer to that question, at least in part. They are so important today because those who want to undercut the second amendment have managed to put laws in place that create artificial shortages and weird economic incentives. Like many of the gun laws in the United States, they do not make any sense.
He was confused by the Tommy gun concerns.
“They’ve been in a dark room collecting dust and rust for the last 50 years,” Schatzman said. “Why are they so important today? I ask that question in all honesty. I don’t know the answer.”
Unintended Consequences...
Several years back, on some gun web page, someone posted a photo of a shed that burned in SE Asia, There were dozens of burned Tommy guns laying around.
it was enough to make you sick just looking at those fine firearms destroyed.
I always liked a firearm that, by just looking at it, causes the fainthearts to pee their pants.
Without admitting having done so, I believe that the Heller decision did just that. Whether such will ever be recognized is another question.
Contrary to what many lower courts said, the Miller decision did not "uphold" the National Firearms Act of 1934.
The government, in its case, claimed two reasons why Miller should not have been dismissed by the lower court.
One reason was that Miller and Layton, his co-defendant, were not members of an organized Militia and therefor the Second Amendment doesn't apply to them.
The second reason proposed was that the weapon in question was not suitable for use by a Militia.
My recollection is that the Supreme Court didn't even respond to the first issue. They did discuss whether the weapon was suitable for militia use. This issue would have been irrelevant if Miller and Layton had no Second Amendment protection whatsoever. The implication is clear that the Supreme Court would have agreed with the lower court dismissal on Second Amendment grounds if the weapon in question, a short-barreled shotgun, was found to be useful to a Militia.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court dismissal and REMANDED the case to that court. The REMAND means that the Supreme Court expected the lower court to re-hear the case and consider whether the weapon was suitable. There was no instruction to consider whether Miller and Layton had any membership in a Militia.
Unfortunately, one of the defendants died and the other disappeared before the case could be re-heard. I'm sure the government was pleased that the case went no further.
Lower courts since that time have routinely LIED about the Miller decision and created the fiction that the Second Amendment is some kind of "collective right", which is utter nonsense.
A proper understanding of the Miller decision, then, reveals that the Miller Court only extended protection to arms which are useful to a Militia. The Heller decision extends the protection of the Second Amendment to firearms which are useful for self-defense in the home. Clearly this was a reversal of the decision in Miller.
As ideas such as "constitutional carry" and other parts of the right continue to be accepted, I expect that we might see a clarification of that in the future. There may come a day when Kalifornians can re-attach the plastic pistol grip to their Kalifornia neutered ARs, making it more similar to the arms borne by our military and thus much more useful to a Militia.
Regarding the NFA (1934), there’s always the question if a given federal gun-control bill would have passed the Senate if state lawmakers had not foolishly ratified the ill-conceived 17th Amendment.
It is also important to note that United States v. Miller was decided in 1939 when Constitution-ignoring socialist FDR was building an activist justice Supreme Court majority.
The Miller case was a complete set up by the trial judge, Heartsill Ragon.
There is a link in the article, but hear it is again.
http://gunwatch.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-peculiar-story-of-united-states-v.html
Should have mentioned: Heartsill Ragon was the Chuck Schumer of his day. He was appointed to the federal court by Franklin Roosevelt, and gave up his congressional seat to take it.
And supported by the NRA.........
“The NFA was the first of real federal “gun control”.
And supported by the NRA.........”
Yes...Kinda, sorta. They also opposed parts of it, which is why handguns did not get the same treatment as gun mufflers and short barrelled rifles.
Remember, back then, the NRA was very much an insider’s “in the loop” kind of outfit. The NRA has gone through tremendous changes in the last 80 years, some good, some not so good.
Anyone who would like to read more about this might be interested in the information I have at my website about it. It is the most comprehensive compilation of Miller related documents that I've seen, and is available as a regular HTML webpage and as an EPUB ebook. I produced the Epub myself, so you may have some formatting issues, but it should all be there.
I would re-phrase what you wrote as follows:
"That since there was no testimony that the sawed off shotgun was a useful militia weapon, that the case is remanded to be decided on the basis of facts not yet in evidence."
As I recall, the Supreme Court said, "we cannot say" with regard to the "usefulness issue", and, in fact, they did not say. They reversed a dismissal and remanded; they did not uphold a conviction.
I can't see how any lower court is entitled to treat the Miller case as if there had been evidence supporting Miller's guilt. The lower courts lied outrageously as far as I am concerned. I'm no expert on rules of precedent but it seems to me that such a ruling only establishes a precedent that a prosecution in a Second Amendment case requires evidence, not that the NFA was unconditionally Constitutional.
The phrasing of the Miller Court's decision also seems to turn the protections of the Bill of Rights on its head, addressing the lack of evidence of usefulness. The proper burden should have been on the prosecution to provide evidence of non-usefulness.
The issue is similar to what I have understood regarding claims of self-defense. It is sufficient for a defendant to claim self-defense and the legal burden then falls on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense was not justified. The burden is not on the defendant.
My earlier point is that Heller does "reverse" Miller, in that a prosecution today must show both that a defendant's use of arms falls outside the protection of the Second Amendment due to non-usefulness to a Militia, and also that such use falls outside the protection of the use of arms for self-defense. The Miller case was defective because it addressed the former and not the latter.
I actually agree with the original District Court judge that the right to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment is not conditioned on the type of arm or on its usefulness; only on whether it constitutes a member of the category called "arms".
“Unintended Consequences”
Interesting read.
100%...
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