At the time, should the Russian have come through the Fulda Gap, they were estimated to be 72 hours from the English Channel. ... our position would have been 15k behind their first rest stop ... Understand that this was after full tactical and strategic nuclear strikes through out the European Theater by both sides ...
Joe Blow GI had no idea what they would have been up against. The US soldiers were quite confident that they had superior forces to fend off (in short order) the Russians and their obsolete weapons ...
The Russians passed their comm traffic using one day pads, the US soldiers passed their traffic in the clear using explicit directions to their positions routinely, despite having secure coms.
Every time the Russians lit up their SA radars, we would look at the clock and count down 15 seconds - the time it would take for the first nuclear tipped missile to hit our position.
Later back at NSA, us poor slobs learned that we were a first strike nuclear target for the Russians strategically and a first strike target for the US tactically ...
The Russian freak out, as you call it, was nothing more than one of their ordinary power plays, which our current regime fell for ... again. They were never worried about our missile system somehow interfering with any launch of their missiles.
Today, while the Russians have many silo based missiles, they also have their latest and greatest missiles on mobile and sea based platforms ... those are worth losing sleep over, if one is so inclined.
Never underestimate your enemy, especially if he happens to be Russian. Never forget Uncle Joe's maxim: Quantity has a quality all its own ... just ask Mr. Schicklgruber.
I agree that if we are not willing to use our technological advantage, then sheer quantity will often dominate. We learned that the hard way against the Chinese in Korea. You were part of the frontline tripwire in the 1960s. The only reason the Russians didn’t use their overwhelming conventional forces to overrun our troops in West Germany is they feared our nuclear first-strike capabilities. Many Soviet officials have written memoirs in the post-Cold War era revealing their immobilizing fear of our nuclear superiority. We were mislead by the disarmament crowd into thinking that the Russians were an unstoppable colossus when the truth was that much of their nuclear force was of dubious reliability. Penkovsky feared Kruschev more than Eisenhower or Kennedy, and worried that K was going to bluster his way into a military disaster that would destroy Mother Russia.