Posted on 12/07/2010 10:40:57 PM PST by RobinMasters
The recent release by WikiLeaks of classified Pentagon documents reveals that U.S. military intelligence discovered chemical weapons labs, encountered insurgents who were specialists in the creation of toxins, and uncovered weapons of mass destruction.
The latest WikiLeaks document dump reveals that as late as 2008, American troops continued to find WMD in the region.
There are numerous mentions of chemical and biological weapons in the WikiLeaks documents, however the U.S. media appear only interested in those portions of the leaked material that highlight actions that are viewed as embarrassing for the U.S. military such as the accusation that U.S. commanders were aware of abuse and "torture" of prisoners by Iraqi soldiers and police officers.
The U.S. Defense Department continues to demand that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange immediately return the stolen military documents in his possession, including recent documents that created another stir when published, according to Elaine Wilson of American Forces Press Service.
(Excerpt) Read more at examiner.com ...
Yawn. Oh ye the uninformed.
You can start here just as good a beginning:
Personally, I don’t have a problem with Rumsfeld’s actions nor do I have a problem with where we are now.
The Middle East needed to be cleaned up and we needed a reason to predicate our actions.
I posted the google links as a good start and like I told “ain’tgotnothoughts” I don’t have a problem with how the whole thing worked out or Rumsfeld’s actions.
Saddam agreed to what in 1983? To attack Kuwait in 7 years?
LOL.
Talk about the insanity of US funding the uncivilized barbarians and then having to spend our blood and treasury to keep these blood thirsty lunatics busy in their sand pits... Of course we cannot ignore all the outside ‘help’ these barbarians get influenced out of the mighty UN.
DRILL baby DRILL!!!!!
Another thing:
All you need to do after you read the google search I provided is cross reference our support of Iraq by perusing newspapers of the day to see what we were doing.
You don’t actually think we were supporting Contra’s and giving stuff to Iran, while at the same time arming the Mujahudeen but skipped Iraq?
Here is Don meeting with Sadaam in 1983 as special envoy to Iraq http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Shakinghands_high.OGG
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran depended on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq started the war with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only in a highly redacted version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the international community respond to chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the issue.
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president [Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the meeting [Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document 37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its "preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41]. On March 3, the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document 42].
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].
And again, I am satisfied with the way things turned out and grateful to those who were well known in the process and the thousands of unnamed heroes to humanity.
Still got work to do and we went about it slow boating but I am convinced once Bahgdad is inundated with McDonalds, Coca Cola and Starbucks that area of the world changes... For good.
We adopted a philosophy of break things first but not too much, atrite the expected insurgency while rebuilding and reshaping the country into hopefully a partner of the US and an autonomous peoples who will be light to those in Iran.
Where is old Saddam these days? Think maybe he misread his standing in this world? Saddam was 'flying' high on himself in the 80's, so much so he viewed himself as the modern day King Neb, and rebuilt that infamous city Babylon. But imagine just how badly he misread his stature and found himself hiding in a 'pit' of all places.
Funnies are suppose to be funny. Even your google crutch ought to help you know what old Saddam was doing in 1983.
Wow... It keeps getting better.
I despise with every fiber of my being what was done to and said about Rummy. Most especially when it came from the coward elected Congress lords/ladies who hid behind a set up commission to splurge on that 'peace' dividend after the soviets collapsed upon themselves. May God Bless and protect Rummy for serving US so admirable in spite of the lunatic liberal accusers.
I don’t need the google crutch. I am well aware of what was going in 1983 and I posted a very good write up to you that briefly explains what we were doing and the National Security Directives Reagan issued in support of changing that region.
No reason to get mad at others who are little further ahead than you on this.
Many people didn’t know a thing about our efforts in Crapganistan or the story of Charlie’s War.
If you had met Jack Wheeler of knew of his work you might have had some hints.
Liddy and North were players in all this but you will have to look long and hard to understand their work if you didn’t live through the 80’s.
Heck, Bill Clinton and a couple of other Governors from Texas and Arkansas played major roles in this.
Why is Noriega in an American Jail? He was going to expose some unsavory details of our work regarding using his country as a conduit to deliver certain materials and peoples where they were needed.
Still, look up Jartran sometime.
Like I said, the world is in a better place than it was then.
So where is the line in any of this that Rummy supplied Saddam those WMD's? That and that alone was my point of contention.
Well you pose a thought I will try to complete for you in the morning.
May I ask how old you are?
I was born at the end of the ‘forgotten war’.
Let me put it to you this way.
Rumsfeld was the Special Envoy to Iraq, does it not make sense he would have direct knowledge about our work in Iraq or was he an empty suit that would be a two time Sec. of Defense?
We did deliver dual use technology to Iraq.
We did deliver Anthrax and supporting tech to Iraq.
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq’s nuclear program, and its “preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities” [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to “continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons” [Document 58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan’s nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration’s massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)
I think anyone would reasonably conclude that while we delivered that what we delivered was flawed materials and science but we did deliver it in the hopes Iran would expend its treasures in pursuit of technologies to overcome Iraq, further weakening Iran’s economy and stability.
Were you politically aware in the 80’s or getting along with life? Not dissing you just curious.
Are you upset about our linking Rummy to some unsavory acts as you hold him high esteem?
We too hold him high esteem but don’t have any problem with the unsavory acts.
Sorry, have to go to bed. I take care of a friend who is 100yrs and 5 months old and she seems a little restless tonight. Also have 3 other companies to run and will only get to one of them tomorrow.
I will try to find better information that may be useful to you and more informative.
Whoa friend. Bush was feckless plick who squandered so much good will after Iraq 1 and began closing bases shortly there after.
Clinton just excellerated the process so he could pursue his candyass utopia dreams.
Still, even he supported our efforts in S. America as Gov of Arkansas.
You can even look up secret flights out of southern Arkansas during his governorship.
Gotta run.
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