Why Did the Russian Controller and the Polish Crew on the Ground at Smolensk Lie?

It's a Kwazy Life ^ | June 7th 2010 | Tom Lamb

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Just recently, in a news article found here in the Polish press, it is now stated that the Russian controller lied to the crew on PLF 101.

Inspectors falsified data on the visibility of the Smolensk airport and they then gave false information to the crew Polish Tupolev. As prosecutors and testified against the Russians, would thus discourage the Poles to land. The fact came to the content of these testimonies. They are shocking. Because they show that people who should give the parameters necessary for the safe planting machine at the airport runway, in its sole discretion ming them.

Russian investigators and Victor Paul Pliusnin Ryzenko prosecutors testified that, although the visibility at the airport Siewiernyj was then 800 meters, they deliberately gave the Polish pilots, another value - 400 meters, which, moreover, was recorded on the recording of black boxes.

The reasons stated by the Russians for giving out the lower visibility was they wanted to discourage the president from landing.

In previous threads titled: How to Kill a Polish President and Use Bad Weather as an Accomplice, I stated the following before the transcripts where released:

In a sensationalized video released on the internet by an amateur videographer, you can look toward the end where the shallow valley sets and see the visibility is poor but not 200 meters as was stated by Russian authorities. Also, through the smoke you can make out the height of the obscuration of the fog and see blue sky.

By looking at the video on the previous thread, you could see the visibility was better than the 200 meters which according to the transcripts, was the visibility given to the president's pilot by the Polish crew from the Yak-40.

This idea that a lower visibility was given to deter the pilots from landing is nonsense.

Here is why.

10:24:49,2: KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please. 044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick. D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent. KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around. 2P: Have you landed yet? 044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but... If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow, or somewhere [else].

The Polish crew, even though the weather was a "bitch", told the president's crew "Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try..."

The Polish crew said "But speaking frankly, you can definitely try."

This is not an act of trying to convince the pilot to not land, it is an invitation to try an approach, an approach that ended in a tragedy. Moreover, the APMs that the Polish crew spoke about are runway lights that are left and right and form a gate on the approach end of the runway.

They were never there and if they had been, the crew on the president's plane would have known this during their prefight.

So not only do you have the Polish crew and the Russians on the ground lying about the actual weather conditions while suggesting that there are runway lights when there aren't any, the question is now raised on what about the Russian Il-76 that was carrying the president's security team?

They supposedly made two attempts.

Now logic does not follow -- if the weather was bad and the Russian controllers were trying to discourage the president's plane from landing, why did they not offer the same advice to the Russian pilots on the Russian Il-76.

Two missed approaches by the Russian Il-76? And the visibility was at least 800 meters or better.

So again, why the two attempts and two missed approaches? In a thread titled: Somlensk: In the Norm at 100 Meters, I pointed to an article that state:

The radio tower at Smolensk airport may have been dysfunctional on the fateful morning of April 10, and contributed to the Polish presidential airplane disaster.

Signals from the radio tower were problematic to the Polish crew of a Yak-40, which landed in Smolensk about an hour before the presidential Tu-154. It was the last airplane to successfully land at the airport that day.

Just minutes prior to the crash, a Russian Il-76 diverted to Moscow after it was unable to stabilize its approach to landing. The Yak's Polish crew saw it veer to the left of the runway, a mistake that should not occur when a constant radio signal is present, according to sources close to Rzeczpospolita.

(emphasis added)

The crew on the Yak-40 stated that they could see from the ground, the Russian Il-76 veer left of the runway.

Now given the Polish crew on the ground could see the Russian Il-76, there is no doubt that the pilots could see the runway because as now admitted, the visibility wasn't 400 meters or 200 meters and the ceiling was definitely not 50 meters or 100 meters because the Yak-40 crew could see the aircraft from the ground.

So why didn't the plane carrying the president's security detail land?

Moreover, how is it that you have a certified airport with mins of 100/1000 and aircraft veering left of the runway?

As pointed out on previous threads, there was indication that a mobile radar unit was sent to accept the VIP landing of Tusk.

The following photos are of radar units at Smolensk.

The first photo is what looks to be the RSP 6 radar. The second photo shows it was moved a few weeks after the crash and is with another radar platform in among a group of trees.

As stated before, the one radar is believed to be a РСП-6М2, РСП-10МН1.

The photos of the radar platform below match the one that was taken at Smolensk.

The radar is certified to ceilings down to only 150 meters and you can find here how the RSP7, a close platform to the RSP 6m2, operates.

However, on April 5th, Smolensk was certified to accept VIP planes with ceilings down to 100 meters and a minimum visibility of 1000 meters.

And that raises the topic of a radar unit that has the following vehicle that was seen at the radio beacon with two military green antennas setting left of the runway radio beacon mast.

First photo shows the military vehicle at the beacon. The second photo shows the two antennas left of the beacon.

The chassis design of the military vehicle fits the chassis design of support vehicles for the Nebo/ L13/117/119 mobile radars.

The second vehicle in the photo below fits the chassis profile.

Interior of the vehicle of the 117 mobile radar that is housed in the same chassis profile.

It is not known at this time what mobile radar unit was at Smolensk.

But to get an idea on how an older radar console looks, the following pictures below show the 2D images of the console.

What is known is that Smolensk has an ATC radar that can guide an aircraft along its glideslope.

And the president's pilot was lied to by both the Polish crew and the Russian ATC when it came to actual weather conditions at the airport.

There will be more coming out as this investigation moves along.

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