Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)
THE SOMALIA CONFLICT AND ITS EFFECTS ON REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA BETWEEN 1990 AND 2004
A project Paper Submitted to IDIS in partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of Diploma in Strategic Studies By Major Imaana Laibuta
Supervisor Mr Robert Mudida Nairobi 2005
DECLARATION
This is my original work and has not been presented for a degree/diploma in any other university.
Major Imaana Laibuta: Signature___________________ Date______________
This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor for the project paper.
Mr Robert Mudida: Signature_____________________ Date_________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to express my gratitude to the Department of Defence Kenya and the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) university of Nairobi for enabling me to undertake this study. I would like to recognize the assistance given by the library staff Defence Staff College (DSC) and University of Nairobi in extending their library services for my use. I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Mudida, my supervisor, for his tireless efforts in providing me with direction and guidance in the course of my research. Special thanks go to the Defence Staff College Administration and the Commandant in particular for providing an enabling environment for the studies and research. Other appreciation goes to the entire college community and various staff for their administrative support that made this research possible. As it is not possible to mention by name all those who made this research possible, let them rest assured that their various contributions are very much appreciated.
DEDICATION I kindly dedicate this project paper to my wife Kathambi and daughter Rita for their tireless efforts in typing and retyping and my son Kimathi for designing the cover and the other graphical maps. Their assistance, support and encouragement went a long way in enabling me to complete the paper in time.
ABSTRACT This study is designed to analyse the Somalia situation and the impact of the conflict on the regional security in the Horn of Africa and the subsequent mediations instituted to resolve the conflict. The study will examine the main causes of the Somalia conflict, the impact of the conflict in the region and give recommendations on how the conflict can be resolved. The study will also analyse IGAD efforts in mediation and the role played by the regional governments and especially Kenya towards this goal. The internationalisation theory of conflicts and conflict systems is utilised in the analysis of the research material. The division of the Somalia state by international borders has greatly influenced the internal conflict and its internationalisation through contagion hence affecting the whole of the Horn of Africa. We find that the conflict in Somali is both intra-state and interstate in nature. The issues covered in this paper revolve around security concern and the analysis will be pegged around the cause and effects of the same. The question that begs an answer is why the mediation efforts have failed in Somalia for many years while no efforts have been spared to achieve that goal. First, we need to look at the complexity of the conflict. It has been internationalised and this creates more actors in the process. Second, it has broadened to involve the western governments who initially had interests during the cold war and after. Third, the clan warlords assumed initially that they had capacity to annihilate their enemies and control the state with time. The fourth element that we capture is banditry whose consequences continue to affect and impact the security in the region in general. The complexity of the conflict shows that the success of reaching a resolution lies in minimising the external influential forces that supported various groups and persons in Somalia. Djibouti, Eritrea and Arab states supported the Transitional National Government. Ethiopia provided political support to Somaliland and also assisted the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which is opposed to Transitional National Government. These forces should call for a regional reconciliation and dismiss their personal interests for the sake of prosperity, peace and security in Somalia. Therefore, for a lasting peace to prevail in Somalia as well as its Diaspora a legitimate government that is accountable to its citizenry and sensitive to their needs must emerge. This authority has to be built from the ground, not through the warlords. Therefore United Nations, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on development and the rest of the donor world in the international community have to exercise steadfastness in their support for Somalia.
ABBREVIATIONS
AU African Union DSC Defence Staff College NEP North Eastern Province of Kenya NFD Northern Frontier District IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development PE Peace Enforcement PKO Peacekeeping Operations PSO Peace Support Operations PSTC Peace Support Training Centre SNA Somali National Alliance UN United Nations USA United States of America UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia USC United Somali Congress UNSG United Nations Secretary General
DEFINITION OF TERMS Conflict: This refers to the underlying issues that result into tension, crisis and violence among parties, states or communities. Clanism: Is defined as a bidding bond between members of the bigger family through patrilineal kinship. This influences the being of the people in the society whether political or social allegiances, which are determined by descent in the male line and can change depending on one’s prevailing interest in the community. Consent: Is an agreement obtained from the parties to a conflict for setting up of a peacekeeping mission as per an agreed mandate. Peacekeeping: Operations aimed at preserving peace between two consenting belligerent parties as defined in chapter (CAP) 6 of the UN charter. Peace Enforcement: Forceful intervention to prevent gross human rights abuse or genocide as defined in CAP 7 of the UN charter. CAP 6 ½: Common military Jargon referring to half way between CAP 6 and 7 of UN meaning limited use of force by a peacekeeping force for self-defence or to solve an immediate breach of peace by the warring parties. Shifta: A Somalia slang meaning a roaming bandit or rebel
CHAPTER LAYOUT PAGE
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 1 1.0 Background 1 1.1 The statement of the problem 4 1.2 Objectives of the study 5 1.3 Justification of the study 5 1.4 Theoretical framework 6 1.5 Methodology 7 1.6 Limitations of the study 7 1.7 Literature review 7
CHAPTER TWO THE CAUSES OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT 27 2.0 Complexity of Somalia Conflict 27 2.1 Role of clanism in the conflict 29 2.2 First Postcolonial government 32 2.3 The Siad Barre rule 33 2.4 The Shifta campaign and its impact on Somalia 35 2.5 The Ogaden war and its impact on Somalia security 37 2.6 Disintegration of security in the final years of Siad Barre rule 39 2.7 Total disintegration of Siad Barre rule 40 2.8 The rise of warlords 41 2.9 Disintegration of Somali nation state 42
CHAPTER THREE
IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT AND MEDIATION EFFORTS 43 3.0 Effects on Kenyan security 43 3.1 Effects on Ethiopian Security 45 3.2 Effects on Djibouti Security 46 3.3 Proliferation of small arms and cattle rustling 47 3.4 Establishment of terrorist bases 47 3.5 IGAD and UN mediation efforts with reference to Kenya 48 3.6 Reconstruction of Somalia and re-integration 54
CHAPTER FOUR 56 4.1 Summary 56 4.2 Recommendations 58 4.3 Bibliography 62
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY Background
Somalia is a Republic in Eastern Africa, bordered on the North by the Gulf of Eden, on the East and South by Indian Ocean, Southwest by Kenya, West by Ethiopia and on the Northwest by Djibouti . See map below
The country has been in a state of civil war and anarchy since 1991, when the central government was overthrown. Before 1991, Somalia was governed under a constitution adopted in 1979 in which president Siad Barre held executive powers and the leadership of the only legal political party, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). His government, which was in power since 1969, was toppled in 1991 in a ferocious and destructive power struggle by clan-based rebels leading to state collapse and anarchy . Although warfare has existed in the Horn of Africa for centuries, the scale and deadliness of armed conflict has increased dramatically. Given the indirect casualties caused by the famine, disease, and displacement, major conventional wars fought with heavy weapons have occurred in Eritrea, 1962 to 1991, Ethiopia, 1985 to 1991, Ethiopia-Somalia, 1977 to 1978, and Sudan 1955 then 1972 and lastly 1983 to 2005. In addition, inter-clan guerrilla war has been fought in Somalia from 1991 to date . The Somalia conflict can be traced along the three categories of modern wars in Africa as stated in Young’s article, War in Africa since Independence. The first type is a common identity or value system despite having generally only one tribal grouping. Struggles to gain access to state power and resources have driven some warlords and other armed groups to attempt takeovers, while others have fought for regional autonomy or even independent mini-states. This struggle for power can be equated to the realist view of international system of dominance through balance of power . The struggle for power between clans and sub-clans has degenerated into violent conflicts. The second type of post-colonial war in Africa exemplified in Somalia arose from competition for regional influence and sharing of resources between clans. For example, in mid 1977, the Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia initiated open warfare aimed at ending Ethiopian control over the area. Meanwhile, non-African governments concerned with preserving political influence or access to valuable resources exacerbated internal and cross-border conflicts by supporting one side or the other. For example, Cuba and USSR supported Ethiopia during the Ogaden wars in which close to two million Somalis were left homeless . The third type of modern African conflict concerns disputed international borders, most of which were drawn by European colonial powers with little regard to pre-existing community occupied areas . The 1884 Berlin Treaty unmilitary divided Africa according to the European whims. This divided whole communities into small meaningless states without any qualities or cohesion of Nation States . The conflicts that took place between Ethiopia and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia was a direct result of this anomaly, while the doctrine of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) on non-interference in the internal affairs prevented the redrawing of borders. In the 1990s, insurgents like USC which overthrew Barre’s regime led to state collapse and gave to the rise to a new breed of leaders who came to power through warfare and were willing to use military might to retain power. The conflict continues to create refugee populations throughout the Horn of Africa region, and to contribute to loss of life through clan fighting, famine and disease. The destruction of the infrastructure and prolific on arms spending has drained the country’s resources . On the other hand international players have become reluctant to be directly involved in the Somalia conflict, and have called for the creation of more aggressive inter-African peacekeeping force.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Somalia has been ravaged by war since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. The massive human suffering in Somalia as a result of the conflict has had a profound long-term impact on the country’s peace, stability, security and development. The failure by warring factions from various clans to resolve this conflict has resulted into the continued loss of life as a result of intermittent fighting, famine, displacement of persons and the resultant flow of refugees. The conflict has promoted insecurity in the neighbouring countries: Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, due to proliferation of small arms, massive influx of refugees, many of whom are ex-soldiers with criminal intents. This has increased banditry tremendously especially in North Eastern Kenya, reducing economic activities and the free movement of the people. Meanwhile, regional states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt as well as International and regional organizations such as the UN and IGAD have intervened with the aim of creating peace in the war torn country . The research therefore seeks to examine and analyse the effects of the Somalia conflict on the state itself and its impact on the security in the Horn of Africa region between 1990 and 2004.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objective of the study is to analyse the effects of the conflict on the regional security in the Horn of Africa.
The sub-objectives are: i. To analyse the underlying causes of the conflict in Somalia, examining the role of UN, regional organizations, governments and the international community in resolving the Somalia conflict. ii. To recommend security strategies and measures that can be applied to end the conflict and build a new nation with a solid foundation.
LITERATURE REVIEW In literature review, we shall break this into components, which have influenced and fuelled the conflict in the region. For example, this will explore: the paradigm shift in the conflict, historical factors contributing to internationalising of the conflict, historical formation of Somalia, the collapse of state under Siad Barre, the disillusionment with the fall of Siad Barre leading to lack of a central monopoly of power, the effects of clanism in national politics and the impact of security in the region . The review is based on the internationalisation theory of conflicts and conflict systems . The division of the Somalis by the colonialists through international borders greatly influenced the internal conflict and its internationalisation through contagion hence affecting the whole of the Horn of Africa. This has led the Somalia conflict to be both intra and interstate in nature due to primordial clanism and sub-clanism . It is hypothesised that there is interconnectedness between Somalia conflict and the impact of security in the neighbouring countries. That extreme abuse of clanism structures by the Barre regime; and the interests of the warlords and banditry have fuelled the conflict. The objective is to examine the role of clanism and Barre’s regime as the main contributing factors to the Somalia conflict and then examine the mediation efforts to resolve the crisis.
Paradigms shifts in the conflict The conflict in Somalia made a major shift from intra-state to inter-state during the era of Siad Barre. This paradigm shift affected the welfare of the whole region in regard to security matters. Siad Barre in his determination to dominate, the dream of the Greater Somalia and the struggle to cling to power turned clanism into a machine of war . The term conflict refers to the incompatibility of goals between two or more parties due to different perceptions or ideals, resulting into tension, crisis and sometimes violence among the parties, states or communities. The underlying issues when not resolved in time can erupt to cause chaos and anarchy in a state. Okoth et al. captures these factors, that the perception of the threat and a limited time to make response underlies the conflict . In this regard intra-state conflicts are within the state itself and those engaged in the conflict are within. On the other hand inter-state conflicts are international in nature, among the contending nations or inter-state communities. These forms of the conflicts are influenced by cultural, social and economic factors within a state . This situation also is influenced by class differences that emanate in acquisition and unequal distribution of wealth and income. As Mwagiru argues, a conflict can be simple or complex in nature. This variance will determine whether the conflict is internal, international or internalised in the contest of its existence . The conflict in Somalia for example is structural, internalised, internationalised, inter-state and intra-state in nature. These factors led to the collapse of Somalia as a nation state. In the case of Somalia, we would not blame the colonial structures per se in the collapse of the nation-state. We agree with Turok when he argues that there is no discernible pattern to contribute to coups in Africa. This argument is based on the criterion that there is no social momentum of dissatisfaction, which has gathered enough steam for effective opposition . In this context the shifting paradigms of conflict has to be taken into account. These factors concern lack of transparency in the affairs of the state, continued destruction of human rights, leading to struggle for rights within the state coupled with collapsing infrastructure due to bad governance and corruption . A fundamental shift of paradigm, which occurred in the Horn of Africa during the reign of Siad Barre and influenced the growing conflict, was the internationalisation of the intra-state conflict to the neighbouring states. It will be remembered that these were days of the cold war and machinations of the world super powers were at play, especially in the third world countries. This was a period of protectionism of western and eastern power interests. The smaller nations in the process became pawns in the political games, especially with the entry of the Russians in the Horn of Africa . Siad Barre fronted territorial claims to try and smoulder discontent among the Somali clans to avert trouble within the state. He succeeded in internationalising the conflict in the Horn of Africa by invading Ethiopia and sponsoring the shifta campaign in Kenya. In examining the factors that led Somalia to attack Ethiopia and supporting rebellion in surrounding nations, one would agree with Okoth when he uses the term ‘unlimited imperialism’. This is where one state seeks to destroy the independence of another state due to a combination of ideological, security and commercial considerations . The same thoughts are captured by Bill Lee, that initial initiatives to settle things in the region failed because Siad Barre harboured the desire to settle Somalia’s ‘national problem’ by reclaiming the lost territories of the ‘Greater Somalia’ . The fundamental question arising from this desire to conquer the neighbouring nations is; how could a weak nation hold such a vision? What could be the motive of such a dangerous adventure? To understand this background is vital in appreciating the development of the conflict in the region and internationalisation of the same. When Somalia achieved independence in 1960, it was a weak nation economically and militarily; borne out of a union of the former Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somalia, with a population of 2.7m people. However, it had the advantage of homogeneity, same religious orientation, but lacked resources and sense of national patriotism due to the clan system and historical rooting of the people who were nomads. However, the desire for the greater Somalia vision became the driving force for the proud Somalis: “independent constitution committed the Republic to ‘retrieve’ the three ‘lost lands’ – the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, and Djibouti” . This goal and vision would be sustained in the coming governments, the military junta and as the primary strategic goal of the nation-state. Another factor that cannot be disregarded in the evolving conflict in Somalia is the failure of the military junta under Siad Barre to control the level of corruption and creation of ethnic balance, which later fuelled the inter-clan conflict and his downfall simultaneously. However, as Okoth contends he did not have the capacity to sustain social and ethnic cohesion, which became the undoing of the regime . However, for quite sometime, skilfully Siad Barre would control these clans with a clarion call of bigger and better Somalia. He built a strong military base by playing games with the super powers in this period of the cold war. But as Legum states together with playing games with these superpowers he silently used the clan card to unite the nation for the greater Somalia vision .
Historical factors contributing to internationalising of the conflict The review of the development of the conflict in the Horn of Africa would not be complete without exploring the formation of the clans, which underlie the same. Clanism is defined as a bidding bond between members of the bigger family through patrilineal kinship. This influences the being of the people in the society whether political or social allegiances, which are determined by descent in the male line and can change depending on one’s prevailing interest in the community. The Somalia clan and sub-clan structures are as shown below.
Historical formation of Somalia The factors which the politicians would exploit later lies in the heart of the formation as a nation. According to Arab historical sources, the Somali ancestors migrated south from the shores of Red sea to Cushitic speaking Oromo regions around the 10th Century, and the Oromo later displaced the Bantus further south . Another source based on northern oral history says that the Somali are a hybrid that originated from the marriage of two Arab patriarchs and local Dir women. Their descendants migrated from Gulf of Aden and moved to northern Kenya in the 10th Century. Some scholars argue that Somali ancestors came from an area between southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. However, the coastal settlements of non-Somalis existed before the 10th century. The coastal culture included Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, Greeks and Romans who came to trade and tap Frankincense and myrrh along the Gulf of Aden . Many Somalis converted to Islam between 11th and 13th Century. Along the Coast, intermarriages resulted into Islamic Arab-Somali elite who dominated trade and politics in Mogadishu and Merka. By the end of the 13th Century, the Hawiye clan assumed political leadership in the coastal region between Hala and Merka, and the Ajuran established a sultanate in the Shebelle basin. Between late 15th Century and early 17th Century, a series of migrations brought clans to their present regions. The Rahanweyn migrated to Juba and Shebelle river basins displacing the Ajuran. Trade between the interior and coast increased between the 16th and 18th Century and Somali clans struggled to control the caravan routes to Benadir coast. Eventually they dislodged the Arab merchants from the coastal towns, but in the 19th Century Omani sultanate took control over these towns . Britain was the first European power in the region and possessed Aden in 1839. In 1875, Egypt occupied some towns on the Somalia coast. When the Egyptian troops left in 1882, Britain occupied the territory and in 1887 a British protectorate called British Somaliland was proclaimed. Italy developed interest in Somalia in the 19th Century and established a foothold along the Indian Ocean coast after signing a treaty with native Somali sultans and conventions with UK, Ethiopia and Zanzibar. After WW2, Italy renounced the possession of Somalia through an Italian peace treaty adopted in 1947. The responsibility was given to US, UK, France and USSR but they failed to agree on its disposition and in 1948 referred the issue to the General Assembly of the UN. The General Assembly approved a plan granting independence to Italian Somaliland after 10 years as a UN trust territory under Italian administration. Italy accepted the terms of UN trusteeship agreement in 1950 and the British military government was replaced by a provisional Italian administration. The territory was named Somalia . The Somalia nation evolved from clans which had diverse history and who had fought over scarce resources for centuries. As Markakis contends, the conflict has revolved around scarce resources caused by the nature of the land inhabited and the sort of economic activities which is basically pastoralisim . The informants interviewed were of the view that clanism has a role to play in the ongoing conflict in the country. “The root of the conflict can be traced to the colonial period when access to power and resources were mainly regulated by Somalia’s many widely dispersed clan leaders who were under the control of the centralized colonial state leading to clan rivalry”. The resultant effect of this has been a simmering conflict and open wars in the region. The movement of the pastoralists and the scarcity of resources, especially water for the livestock, have continued fuelling the conflict for centuries . The stage was set for a new type of conflict when the independent government took power. The nation was granted independence in July 1960 when the British protectorate and the Italian trust land were joined and the rest of the Somali people were abandoned in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. The civilian administration that assumed power after independence became hopelessly corrupt and incompetent. On October 21, 1969, the military led by Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew the government in a bloodless coup. Siad Barre then adopted the socialist ideology and the designation ‘Jalle’ or ‘Comrade’ .
The building and the collapse of the state under Siad Barre Many wonder how Barre survived in power for so many years. However, the review of the literature reveals some pertinent issues that made this survival possible: i. The overthrowing of the elected but corrupt government and the promise for change, economic development and rebuilding the infrastructure. He came up with the “scientific socialism” ideology as the solution to prevailing problems. This, although vaguely understood by the populace, was widely embraced as the way to salvation. ii. He played games with western governments at the height of the cold war, which sustained the military machine for many years to come. iii. He rekindled the spirit of the great Somalia and in the process united those within and without. However, the same factor that brought unity was to bring him down. When the dream became an illusion, the same people turned against him. He was blamed for the failure in the battle field with neighbouring Ethiopia. iv. The resources, which should have built his scientific socialism, were diverted to building the war machine. When this failed the clans started looking after their own interests in the disintegrating nation-state. The issue of security spiralling from intra and inter-state wars become more pronounced in the process. As Ayittey recaps these events; as Barre’s regime became more and more corrupt, he resorted to more force in running the country. He went to the extent of dropping bombs on the people when they demonstrated in 1988. This also saw the incarceration of politicians, students and religious leaders opposed to him . The same thoughts are propounded by Nelson, which led to the collapse of the nation-state. The oppressive reign on people backfired when Somali National Movement (SNM) tried to overthrow the regime. The collapse of the army led to more clan cohesion, which accelerated the overthrow of Siad Barre .
The Disillusionment with the fall of Siad Barre According to Langenbacher, in the Somalia 1999 Human Development Report, the fall of Siad Barre regime in January 1991 did not bring the expected coalition government but instead, it yielded a two-year period of violent banditry, disputed claims of authority, factional warfare, and famine that eventually prompted a massive international intervention. What began as an episode of looting by retreating forces and incoming liberation militias quickly degenerated into systematic destruction of government buildings and public utilities. Disputed claims of leadership between Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the two figures in the Hawiye United Somali Congress (USC) prevented the re-establishment of any authority within Mogadishu and anarchy characterized the Mogadishu politics as well as Central and Southern Somalia. The factional fighting which was as a result of armed conflicts between the Darood and Hawiye clan-militias, further affected both the economic infrastructure and agricultural heartland of Southern Somalia and the result was a massive famine that claimed an estimated three hundred thousand lives. The untenable situation received intensive media coverage, and eventually the United States led an International humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December 1992 . The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) later called United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) when nominal command was transferred from US to UN, arrived after the peak of the famine but managed to put a quick end to the humanitarian catastrophe and temporarily contain factional fighting.
The Effects of Clanism in the National Politics Aguiar states that despite the fact that Somalia is the most homogenous country in Africa, where most of its citizens share same language, identity, religion, and culture, it has never achieved lasting stability since the early 1990s due to the civil war that has been one of the most devastating in modern African history . Aguiar further states that some scholars attribute this political instability to the Somali clan system; in which retaliation for offences committed by members of rival clans can easily escalate into warfare. Others argue that Somalia’s recent turmoil is a result of powerful elite and their warlords, manipulating clan loyalties in the hope of increasing their own wealth. The root cause of the problem is attributed to Somalia’s homogeneity, which is in fact a myth that obscures long-standing tensions between nomadic groups and the descendants of, Bantu-speaking slaves. Others trace the roots of the conflict to the colonial period, when access to power and pastoral resources was regulated by many widely dispersed clan leaders. Abdinur shows that the conflict is complex and war is being fought at various levels. There is war for basic food and essential commodities, commercial looting, clan pride and survival and fight for government power . (See clan and resource distribution map below)
The Impact on Security in the Region One primary impact in the region as observed by many is lawlessness after the collapse of the nation-state. This as Nelson shows, is that factional leaders want to control the key towns, ports and agricultural land. The ongoing crisis in Somalia was accelerated by external support of rival clan warlords . We can recap the effects of the breakdown of security along these lines: i. Lack of internal security with the collapse of the nation-state. The warlords have taken control of and divided the country according to their strength and numbers in their clan. ii. External actors aggravating the conflict with each warlord trying to get sympathetic countries to have a piece of the action regardless of the consequences to the people. iii. Building of active terrorists cells in the country and causing devastation in neighbouring states especially Kenya which hosts vast western interests. iv. Raping and killing of women. v. Small arms proliferation and banditry have come to characterise the region in general. As Mburu argues, banditry or Shifta movements cannot be ignored when considering security in the region. The impact has compounded security in the region and has found self-expression in the process. He argues that the nature of the conflict has given a lease of life to banditry and given it a commercial face. The external influence has given rise to the idealism of honouring banditry than treating it as a crime, depending on which camp is supporting the other . The impact of banditry in the region is far and wide, affecting people and regional governments alike. One, people have to change their lifestyle for survival’s sake as put by Mburu, because of the nature of the economic activity undertaken in the area. People have to learn to live with the changing face of banditry. This has impacted on whole communities because bandits are former army personnel and warlords militia who are well versed in art of targeted violence .
Effect on Djibouti Somali Clans Djibouti is the north-eastern neighbour to Somalia and it’s inhabited by Afar and Issa Somalis, hence Djibouti is of particular interest and importance to all Somalis. It was affected by the tide of Somali nationalism, which swept across the Horn of Africa during and after Second World War. Djibouti is faced with ethnic rivalry between its two main clans, the Afars and Issas. The rivalry is as a result of each group being part of larger clans that are deeply rooted inside its neighbours, Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite the harmony achieved in Djibouti’s first government and its efforts to deal with the daunting economic problems, it became a victim of the crisis raging around it within a few months of independence. The severance of Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line by Somali guerrillas totally disrupted trade through the port of Djibouti and Ethiopia hence destroying an employment source for majority of the Djiboutians . The Ogaden war displaced an estimated 10,000 Somali refugees into Djibouti and the ethnic tension between the Afars living in Ethiopia and the Ogaden were reflected in deeper divisions of Djibouti’s Afar and Issas. The impact of the Somalia conflict on Djibouti is clearly reflected in its population’s fluctuations. Refugees and illegal migrants coming from Somalia have seen the total population vary between 500,000 and 600,000. According to United Nations estimates, the country sheltered about 70,000 to 100,000 refugees and illegal migrants in 1998 . Djibouti played a crucial role in Operation Restore Hope for Somalia in 1992. These events have continued to impact negatively on Djibouti’s security and economy.
Proliferation of Weapons in the Region and Insecurity As the warlords continue to pursue their personal objectives, the state of affairs in Somalia has attracted the influx of weapons. Some neighbouring states with geopolitical interests in the reconstruction of Somalia continue to arm various political factions. These arms not only circulate in Somalia but also find their way to other neighbouring countries. Hargesia and Burao in Somalia have become flourishing arms markets from where arms find their way to Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia as well as regions beyond the Horn of Africa . The abundance of weapons has changed the face of criminal activities in the region as cattle rustlers, bandits and rebel groups acquire weapons from Somalia. Cattle rustling and banditry has changed from low intensity to high intensity conflict making large areas of the Horn ungovernable. However, the small arms themselves do not cause conflict or criminate activities but their availability in a volatile environment causes the violence .
The Mediation Efforts The question that begs answer is why the mediation efforts have failed in Somalia for many years. First, we need to look at the complexity of the conflict as we have explicated here. The Somalia conflict has been internationalised and this creates more actors in the process. Second, it has broadened to involve the western governments who initially had interests only during the cold war. Third the clan warlords assumed initially that they had capacity to annihilate each and control the state. The fourth element that we capture is that banditry continues to affect and impact negatively on the security of the region in general. Why then did the initial peace process fail? It was military in nature with the thought of subduing one group over the other. They neglected the most applicable process in mediation. The research done in Africa shows that the most successful process of reaching peace between warring parties is through mediation mechanisms . The International peacekeeping in Somalia was a period of high expectations and disappointments. Most Somalis expected the UNOSOM to disarm the militias, end famine and promote national reconciliation and rebuild the state. The UNITAF managed to end the humanitarian crisis quickly, and freeze factional fighting, but avoided possible risks of casualties in a disarmament mission against militias and instead embarked on a policy of arms cantonment rather than disarmament. On the level of national reconciliation and rebuilding of the Somalia state, UN operation in Somalia was given the mandate to achieve these goals by the UN Security Council. In the next three years the International community convened several peace conferences at both national and regional levels in a desperate attempt to bring lasting peace, but to no avail. Regional actors such as Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and international donors stressed they would work with warlords who established functional governance at the regional level. Meanwhile, the post-intervention period on human development initiatives has been deterred by a combination of insecurity and donor fatigue.
The Failure of Peace Initiatives in Perspective The resultant effect of the failure of the mediation efforts is the destruction of life, collapse of the infrastructure, economy, the nation state and even the society itself. In addition, the conflict has disrupted education and health care and inflicted serious physical and psychological wounds on the survivors of the war. As Deng notes: The situation has also resulted into gross violation of human rights including rape, torture and illegal imprisonment and has further led to breakdown in community ties, cultural integrity, and social cohesiveness. The conflict has also taken toll on security in the Horn of Africa, where massive resources have been spent by militaries to maintain peace . The failure of the mediation as the informants note is that: “The peacekeeping forces have not helped much in solving the conflict due to lack of understanding the aspirations of the Somali people and being slow in making decisions”. With the strategic withdrawal of the superpower, US, the Somalia conflict has been perceived in a more limited regional context. The level of responsibility can be seen as a pyramid, with the African states at the bottom and sub regional organizations such as IGAD at the next level and the west perched in a safe out of harms way distance . The review of the literature has captured the pertinent issues, which are going to be developed to pinpoint the necessary security measures in the Horn of Africa.
HYPOTHESIS The proposed theory hypothesises that the internalisation of the Somalia conflict has effect on the regional security in the horn of Africa between 1990 and 2004. There is interconnectedness between the Somalia conflict and the impact of security in the neighbouring countries. That extreme abuse of clanism structures by the Barre regime, Siadism, the interests of the warlords that overthrew him, proliferation of small arms and banditry have fuelled the conflict in the process. The objective therefore is to examine the role of clannism and Barre’s regime as the main contributing factors to the collapse of Somalia, leading to the rise of warlords and the consequent conflict, and then examine the mediation efforts to resolve the crisis.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY The justification of this study is to gain insight on the Somalia conflict between 1990 and 2004 and the reconstruction of the war torn state on the matters of security. The study will strive to answer questions on the existing literature on the causes of the conflict and look into the impact of the conflict on security in the Horn of Africa. It shall examine how this has adversely affected the greater Horn of Africa particularly Kenya in terms of security and the effect of the proliferation of the small arms. The study will also examine the preventative measures and peacekeeping strategies that can be applied in managing and containing the conflict. The essence of the study is to find means and ways that security measures can be applied to prevent the continuation of the Somalia conflict. The conflicting parties are forced to purchase and procure expensive arms with the available meagre resources to fight each other, which aggravates the security in the process. The conflict has also cost the Horn of Africa countries dearly in terms of security due to proliferation of small arms, and economically due to the influx of refugees and lost trade. Kenya in particular has borne the brunt of these effects and the settlement of the conflict is of utmost importance. This study therefore may be a useful reference on these effects and the security strategies that can be applied to end the conflict and avoid future recurrences. It will also strive to give recommendations on the best methods to apply on security measures in re-entering the fledgling peace initiative to the Somalia constituent, especially the warlords and clan leaders.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The research is based on the internationalisation theory of conflicts and conflict systems. The division of the Somali state by international borders has greatly influenced the internal conflict and its internationalisation, through contagion hence affecting the whole of the Horn of Africa. The idea of internationalisation poses important questions on proper management of the conflict and gives ideas on how the conflict can be managed effectively . The Somalia conflict can be identified thematically, whereby it is interconnected with conflicts in the neighbouring countries to form the Horn of Africa conflict system, whose existence was triggered by extreme abuse of clan structures by the Barre regime. Since 1990 the conflict has been internationalised drawing in the whole Horn of Africa and other international players and external actors, which has internationalised the conflict further. Since the exit of the UN from Somalia, IGAD has been trying to resolve the conflict culminating in the current transitional government.
METHODOLOGY
The main sources of information for this study will be Library and Internet Research. The study will mainly be based on secondary sources of data obtained from books and articles by different authors that contain information relevant to the topic of study. A limited field research such as interviews and the student’s own experience while working along the Kenya-Somalia border on and off since 1985, will be used to supplement the secondary sources of information.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CAUSES OF SOMALIA CONFLICT
The social context of human development and the cause of conflict in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to the role played by the Said Barre’s regime. The security of the region was hampered by internationalisation of the conflict and brought in diverse players without resolving the pertinent concerns in the neighbouring countries or Somalia itself.
The Complexity of Somalia Conflict We need to address the complexity of the Somalia conflict to have things in perspective. First, the conflict is complex in nature and has been going on for hundreds of years when we explore the role of ethnicity in its initial formation. This as Goodwin argues, is the essence of the problem and the solution abounds in the rubric of clanism, which welds and moulds the people in their respective sub-clans and clans. However, the challenge as pointed out is how the clans, which have been slaughtering each other, can achieve lasting peace . As one informant put it: “The clan system has played a major part in social, economic and political interactions. It has acted both as a cause of social cohesion and paradoxically as a cause of political conflict in Somalia. This has degenerated into a governmental crisis, which has eventually led to generally militarised social conflict throughout the country. The past governments have used the clan democracy and clan politics as a military tactic both to prevent unnecessary civil war and to ferment it. This exploitation has mostly generated conflict between various clan leaders and has resulted to the present conflict. Clan system is a major cause of the conflict because the governments have always based promotions in the army and recruitment of civilian state functionaries on clan criteria. For example during Siad Barre’s regime, public officers from the Marehan and Darod clans were recruited to important posts in the government and in the Army. This resulted into opposition from other clans that were left out, leading to the continued conflict.” Secondly the collapse of the nation-state left no single group strong enough and capable of taking a central role to deal with the conflict. The debacle experienced by the American intervention and UN forces emanates from this problem of lack credible internal actors to deal with . The third level of thinking and inter-related with the above is the personalisation of the conflict. The clan structure protects and dictates the conflict of the moment. Hence an attack on a rival clan’s interests by an outsider can make sworn enemy clans agree momentarily to fight the external influence. This is what happened in the case of Aideed . When Americans offered a prize for his capture, it revived colonial memory. This compounded the problem rather than resolving it. Lewis captures the same thoughts by averring that outsiders cannot understand this interlocking value of the clan system which underlies the lack of resolving the conflict in the process . We examine in a nutshell the formation of the clans and sub-clans and its implications in nurturing the conflict.
The Role of Clanism in the Conflict The history of Somalia as a people can be traced back to 10th century. It is shown that each clan found its way independently in the region (see the map showing the settlement of the clans below).
According to Arab historical sources, the Somali ancestors migrated south from the shores of Red sea to the Cushite speaking Oromo regions around the 10th Century, and the Oromos then displaced the Bantus further south. In examining the mode of settlement it is shown that each clan came and settled on its own. We further discern that there were internal wars going on among the incoming group and the existing communities, which led to bloody wars and annihilation of the weak groups in the process. The fight for scarce resources in the harsh climate influenced the thinking, security and the mode of relationships among the people. The term used by Fukui, ‘situational perspectives’ are factors which accelerate conflict in a given situation. These can include competition for resources, and how the state allocates the same . Irredentism found its expression in the expansionist views immediately after independence due to the imperialist setting of the boundaries, which bears repercussions even today. The spiral effect of the colonial boundary demarcation underlies the Somalia crisis. Her people were divided into citizens of different nationalities without consideration for their roots . The vision of Greater Somalia, which was exploited by Siad Barre in his quest to hold on power finds root in the expansionist philosophy pioneered by occupying forces. The colonialist exploited ethnicity and the principle of divide and rule, hence the African leaders followed the same pattern . The above factors can explain why the Somali clans have historically eschewed central authority. This is why historians have built on the concept of clanism as the main malaise affecting the whole nation. The clan gives protection and security, creates meaning and purpose of being. Clans wield power over the people’s lives and have a sphere of influence running through them. The dominant role of the male determines the well-being of the family lineage and its social and political affiliations, which is replicated at clan level. We find that by the end of the 13th Century, the Hawiye clan assumed political leadership in the coastal region between Hala and Merka, and the Ajuran established a sultanate in the Shebelle basin. Between late 15th Century and early 17th Century, a series of migrations brought clans to their present regions . The Rahanweyn migrated to Juba and Shebelle river basins displacing the Ajuran. Trade between the interior and the coast increased between the 16th and 18th Century and the clans struggled to control the caravan routes to Benadir coast. Eventually they dislodged the Arab merchants from the coastal towns, but in the 19th Century Omani sultanate took control over these towns. Fluidity in the Somali clan identity is one feature that is poorly understood by outsiders. First, each Somali can trace his genealogy over thirty generations giving membership in many sub-clans on their family tree. The level in ones lineage depends on the situation at hand as evidenced in the past decade of stateless conflict . For example, the conflict between Darood and Hawiye clans has led to a decline of their sub-clan identity to low levels. Secondly, clan links can be shifted and rediscovered depending on the situation. For example, clans migrating out of their home areas often take on the identity of the dominant clan (Shegad status), and if necessary and possible they rediscover their old lineage. Therefore, while clan system in Somalia is depicted as a fixed family tree, it is a tree on which a good deal of grafting takes place.
First Postcolonial Government It is explicit that from the ongoing analysis that the colonial government left weak systems and structures in place. This together with ideological varying and competing western interests, could not sustain the first independent government. Somalia was founded in 1960 by the unification of two pre-colonial territories namely; British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south. The two merged to create the current Somali Republic that was later renamed Somalia Democratic Republic . However, the immediate post independent era was marked by internal socio-political instability centred on two main issues, the merger of the two former distinct colonial territories and the support of irredentist conflict in the north-eastern Kenya and south-eastern Ethiopia. At the same time, the leadership was struggling to overcome the colonial legacy of being administered by two distinct political, judicial and linguistic systems. Clan loyalty hampered a more effective administration, dividing it into bailiwicks controlled by different clan networks, where personality and personal connections mattered more than competence in hiring government employees. In July 1960, Mr Aden Abdulla Osman was elected the first president and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke became the first Prime Minister, and in the next general elections of 1964, Abdirazak Haji Hussein became the second Prime Minister and despite many internal rivalries, president Aden Abdulla retained him in office until the 1967 elections that changed the political line . Hardly two years after the general election the personal bodyguard assassinated the prime minister on October 15th 1969 . This led to the toppling the civilian government on 21st October 1969, which was replaced with Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with Major General Mohamed Siad Barre as its president. The fundamental goals were; to end tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule, honouring existing treaties and full support for the national liberation movements seeking Somalia unification. The name of the Somali Republic was henceforth changed to Somalia Democratic Republic.
The Siad Barre Rule The overthrow of legally elected government by Siad Barre and his socialist leanings in search for weapons and support to achieve the Greater Somalia vision underpinned his regime’s goals. This goal destroyed the good intentions and became the undoing of the regime in spending the scarce resources, mobilisation and exploiting clan emotions. Mohamed Siad Barre as a youth had no formal education background but as an adult, the British Military Administration (BMA) sent him to Jeans school in Kabete, Kenya, where he learnt English. His first government was composed of experienced men of integrity and intellectuals whose careful appointment paved the way for restoration of public confidence in the daily handling of national issues. He vowed to eliminate rampant corruption, restore security, and called for the public support for reconstruction of self-reliance projects. He was indeed quoted on 9th March 1971 in the Times of London saying that lack of justice, maladministration and social progress was the cause of overthrowing the previous government . Initially, Barre had a lot of public support. This brought about the consolidation of his power base for increasingly totalitarian rule. He ordered the arrest of former government members and confined them in a detention centre in Afgoi for the next three and half years. Those interned included the first Head of State Aden Abdulla Osman and former Prime Minister Abdurazaq Haji Hussein, the very men who brought Barre into power, by appointing him the Army Chief of Staff. To solve clan identification problem, Barre initiated a solution where all reference to clan identity were prefaced with “ex-,” whereby the manipulation of the Somali language consigned clans to history. Next, Barre introduced the “Scientific Socialism system”, which he eloquently preached out of sheer expediency, but without knowledge or personal commitment. He purposely ignored the important principles of popular support as soon as he consolidated his power base. Barre’s Scientific Socialism rested on two pillars: mass organization and rapidly expanding security apparatus network with unlimited powers of searching, arresting, torture and detention without trial. To this end, he formed several terror organizations, such as the Guulwadayaal Militia, also called ‘Victory pioneers’ in 1972. Although it was a wing of the army, it worked under the supervision of the Political Bureau of the presidency. The militia was formed under the pretext of aiding in self-help programs, encouraging "revolutionary progress," promoting and defending the Somalia culture and fighting misuse of public property . It was however a terror gang with such duties as even checking and barring contacts between Somalis and foreigners. Yet another organisation was the Hangash (Red Berets), which was the most notorious and unlike the others, not made publicly known . It was created by Siad Barre in the aftermath of the 1978 attempted coup, to clandestinely deal with dissenting voices both in the military and the civil service. It maintained surveillance over the military, civil servants and even the National Security Service (NSS), the official government intelligence service. Another organization was the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), created by the military regime under Soviet guidance in 1976 with Barre as the general secretary. It was a five-member politburo, consisting of Barre, Brigadier General Mahammad Ali Samantar as vice-president, Major General Husseen Kulmiye as 2nd vice-president, General Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah and General Ahmad Mahamuud Faarahas as members. This rendered the Supreme Revolutionary Council largely ineffective. The SRSP was a Marxist party, but included Islamic teachings in its ideology. This eventually brought about the disintegration of the Army that was formerly the central figure of his power structure . However Barre still felt very resourceful and believed his popularity was everlasting and retained this self assurance up to and after his downfall. We have positioned that the conflict in Somalia is structural in nature. It is hypothesised that the extreme abuse of clan structures by the Barre’s regime, the interests of the warlords and banditry fuelled the conflict. This brings into context the structural conflicts: what generates this situation? Where do we locate the conflict? Who are the key players? What is the motivating factor in the process? In this regard there is need for looking beyond the violence and locate what underlies this conflict in the process. “In many ways, the idea of structural conflict marks an epistemological divide in which one camp embraces the primacy of structural conflict and the other looks elsewhere for explanations of conflict” . In this regard we need to explore the militarisation of the conflict.
The Militarization of Somalia Conflict by Barre’s Regime Ayittey carries the review of 52 African states and the militarisation process, which has affected the character of these nation states. He compares them to repressive apartheid system in South Africa as “quasi-apartheid regimes”. He develops three categories of military dictatorships: brutally repressive, very repressive and repressive. We find that from his analysis, Somalia in a very brutally repressive category . The militarization process in Africa finds its roots in the colonial era, as Okoth et al., demonstrates. The militaries’ obsession for defence of national independence and sovereignty became an excuse to join national politics. The military machinery, which was used by the colonialists to oppress Africans, became the same tool of oppression used by the post-colonial African leadership against their own people . The obsession of the military, as Ayittey contends in his comparative analysis has been the curse of Africa. Statistics show that since 1957, there have been one hundred fifty heads of state, but only six have relinquished power peacefully and voluntarily. Over expenditure on the military became destroyed the economies, which is evidenced in the Barre’s regime. He destroyed the existing institutions and created a system managed by him. He gave key positions to his lackeys and men from his clan only. This and the inequitable distribution of scarce resources accelerated his downfall.
The Shifta Campaign and its impact on Somalia When Kenya gained independence from the British colonial rule in 1963, it was faced by a low intensity guerrilla war, “Shifta or bandit war” by the Somali community in the NFD. Britain had refused to acknowledge the wishes of the Somali majority in the area and handed the territory over to the newly independent Kenya in 1963 . This led to serious armed skirmishes that lasted between 1963 and 1967 resulting into many casualties on both sides. Kenya suffered serious set backs due to lack of local support and adequate intelligence network as well as a two pronged attack by Somalis from Ogaden, Ethiopia, and those from Somalia, who formed a strong irredentists force to fight for integration with Somalia proper. During this period, the Somalia government supported the irredentist movements in Kenya’s NFD and Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, both morally and materially. The movements also received further support from Arab sympathizers. Following these events, Kenya established military posts in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir in June 1963 and subsequently outposts at Buna, Gurar, Moyale and Malka-Mari. Their main responsibility was to safeguard the Kenyan border, maintain peace and security by thwarting efforts by the irredentist Somalis to incite the larger Kenyan Somali community to secede . The shifta campaign was carried out between 1963 and 1969, which was marked by coherent and deadly skirmishes that inflicted serious casualties and damage to the Kenyan troops. Incitement of Kenyan Somalis against Local Security Forces was rife at this time. The shifta’s engaged in guerrilla tactics, carrying out ambushes and mining routes. However joint efforts by Kenyan military and Para-military forces, with cooperation of Ethiopia, defeated the movement . Between 1969 and 2004, there have been a few skirmishes in the area, with banditry and not irredentistism being the driving force. This continued to inflict casualties and losses on Kenya Security Forces. The Somalia government used the meagre resources to support the shifta movement, leading a big decline in her economy. Meanwhile, the Kenya Somalis were enjoying greater privileges compared to cousins in Somalia. This also led to disillusionment and a lot of discontent among the Somalia citizens. A culminating point was reached when seceding to Somalia was openly opposed by the majority Kenyan Somalis as they were politically, economically and sociologically better off in Kenya. In fact the Somalia Somalis now viewed Kenya as a country of choice other than as an enemy. This impacted negatively on the cohesion of the clans and loyalty to any central government . The disintegration of social, political and economic situation in Somalia in 1991 yielded this positive demonstration.
The Ogaden War and its Impact on Security of Somalia When Siad Barre came into power, he brought a new direction in the regional conflict. He adopted a pragmatic approach in contrast to Shermarke’s defamatory support of irredentist movements in both Kenya and Ethiopia. After the Ethiopian coup that toppled Haile Selassie and brought Mengistus to power, Barre saw an opportunity to capture the Somali inhabited region of Ogaden. As a deception plan, he continued seeking negotiated settlement of the Ogaden, whilst planning military action. Meanwhile, Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was formed in Ogaden. This is the outfit that Barre used to launch an offensive in Ogaden by infiltrating his army into the WSLF militia. He commenced the war in mid 1977 and by August 1977, his Army had captured all the area inhabited by Somali speaking people in Ethiopia . However, aided by USSR and Cuba who responded massively with eleven thousand Cuban troops and one thousand five hundred Soviet advisers, Ethiopia reasserted control over the region in early 1978. They had launched a two-staged counterattack from the east and north, bypassing the dug in Somali Forces at Jijiga and attacking from the rear and the flanks . Barre conceded defeat and withdrew his forces. The Ogaden war was so disastrous for Somalia, with the number of homeless in 1981 estimated at close to two million. Insecurity also became rampart in the region. This weakened Barre’s authority and social standing tremendously and he had to shamelessly accept US military and humanitarian aid, in exchange for the naval facilities at Berbera that was previously a Soviet base.
Disintegration of Security in the Final Years of Barre’s Rule The Ogaden war and the consequent refugee influx forced Somalia to depend on humanitarian aid for its economic survival. The defeat saw armed organized domestic resistance emerge. Barre was also faced by another challenge from the powerful Isaaq clan in the north and Hawiye, who predominated the capital. He unleashed a reign of terror against the two clans, using the Red Berets. The defeat in the war also produced a national mood of depression with organized opposition groups voicing their decent openly. He dealt with them by intensified political repression using torture, arbitrary jailings, execution of dissidents and collective punishment of the clans . In mid July 1982 with Ethiopian air support, Somali dissidents raided and captured the Somalia border towns of Balumbale and Galdogob, Northwest of Mudug the regional capital of Galcaio. This led to the declaration of emergency in the war zone and Barre appealed for assistance from the west to repel the invasion. He got some economic and military support from US, however the arms received were used to repress domestic opponents instead of repelling Ethiopians. Even with the US support the nation became debt-ridden, bankrupt and totally deprived of foreign exchange reserves, which Barre’s family and cronies had stashed in numerous secret foreign accounts. In the 1980s, the public ceased depositing money into the banks resulting to eventual collapse of the banking institutions starting with Savings Bank of Somalia .
Total Disintegration of Siad Barre Rule During the final three years of Barre’s regime, intensive fighting erupted throughout the country as opposition groups such as SNM in the Northwest, SSDF in Northeast, USC in Central Somalia and SPM in the South took control of extensive areas. In 1990, guerrilla leaders declined negotiations with Barre’s regime, as they were certain of eventual success. However a series of informal talks between the rebels were concluded in August 1990 with the SNM, USC and SPM announcing their agreement to coordinate a strategy towards forming a government. In September, the three groups met in Ethiopia where they signed an agreement to form a military alliance . During the final assault on Barre’s forces between December 1990 and January 1991, the guerrillas of Abgaal faction of USC penetrated Mogadishu, which was largely occupied by the Hawiye and successfully fought with no assistance from the SNM, SPM or Habar Gidir faction of USC. On January 26th 1991, Barre was forced to flee to his clans’ home base in Gedo taking with him the last semblance of a central government . Eventually he flew through Kenya to Nigeria where he was given asylum and died of heart attack in 1995.
Disintegration of Somalia and Rise of the Warlords Disintegration of Somalia was accelerated by two main factors: First by the offensive launched by the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1988 in the northwest and secondly the collapse of USSR which ended super power support of even dictatorial regimes in pursuit of ideological differences. Dwindling super support enabled the various rebel groups to launch a full scale civil war by late 1980’s mainly in the northern regions. The war then spread rapidly to the central and south. The national army eventually began to disintegrate and some members defected and joined their respective clan militias . In early 1990 the rebels formed a united front against Siad Barre forces. Desperate, Barre called upon the Darood clan to massacre the opposition in Mogadishu. This resulted in more unity among the various militias that saw Aideed capture the capital, Mogadishu. On 26 Jan 1991 Siad Barre fled to his clans’ home base in Gedo region, in the country’s far south. However after capturing the capital, the rebels failed to maintain their unity due to power greed and the old clan rivalry. This led to an outbreak of fighting amongst them, leading to a near genocidal campaign. The chaotic situation forced western donors to freeze aid, leading to more suffering. Due to the fighting, the rebel movements split even into further smaller forces depending on sub-clan interests and identities. This greatly reduced their military capacity, making it impossible for any one of them to capture total power. This inability created a stalemate situation, characterised by intermittent inter-clan fighting, resulting into over 50,000 casualties. Then a massive famine also occurred from late 1991 through 1992 claiming an estimated 240,000 lives and worsening the situation even further . Over 400,000 refugees fled to Kenya and Ethiopia. The chaos led to complete failure of Somalia as a state as declared by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, in 1992. Looting, rape and murder occurred indiscriminately. Infrastructure was destroyed and government property, archives and records looted. The judiciary and civil services became non-existence and the representation of the state at the international level disappeared . All aspects of running the peoples affairs, from security to provision of essential services, were left at the hands of the warlords. They however cared less about such things. Their main driving force was personal enrichment through looting, imposition of illegal taxes, protection fees and gun running. This had the net effect of breaking the very fibre of the Somali society. CHAPTER THREE THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REGION
We have examined the complexity of the Somalia conflict, the role of Siad Barre and his Siadism in internationalisation of the crisis and his use of clans to hold on to power. The vision and search for a Greater Somalia impacted adversely on the security of the Horn of Africa with devastating effect. The collapse of Somalia had a spillover effect in the region; proliferation of small arms, banditry and incursions by fleeing soldiers. Barre’s obsession with the Greater Somalia vision and its irrelevance as far as governing Somalia was concerned, is captured in Young’s article: War in Africa since Independence, where he states that since most African countries gained independence in the 1960s, numerous conflicts have erupted into open warfare. Most of these wars have been internal, effecting no changes in international borders. Many have nonetheless had disastrous consequences, displacing communities, exacerbating poverty, and killing hundreds of thousands, a situation clearly seen in Somalia.
Effects on the Kenyan Security Kenya greatly suffered the misrule of Barre’s regime from the shifta war fought in the northern frontier to incursions by fleeing soldiers after the collapse of the nation. The internalisation of the conflict by Barre had immediate security impact on the Kenyan borders. This increased banditry, proliferation of small arms and continuous hit and run battles affecting the whole of the northern region. The end of the shifta war did not improve the security or living conditions in NFD as fast as expected due to the hostilities between the various Somalia clans found astride the common border. The flooding of the region with small arms led to their proliferation in all parts of Kenya. At a conference on the proliferation of small arms hosted by Kenya in March 2000, former president Moi, noted that the unchecked flow of the arms was destroying peace in the region . Somalia is a distinguished source of arms since early 1990s, and it is estimated that in one month about 5,000 automatic rifles are smuggled into Kenya. This has made Kenya a major transit point of weapons in the region. Refugees have also become a major source of insecurity as noted by a senior firearm-licensing official who was quoted as saying that fleeing fighters bring in all manner of arms . The increasing availability of weapons has led to the rising insecurity, especially in Nairobi, where guns are used for violent robberies. An analysis by the US State Department in 2001 quoted a Kenya’s top firearms licensing official; “seventy five per cent of the country is awash with illicit arms”. In the NEP the presence of firearms is strongly felt; especially along the Kenya-Somalia border where guns are carried openly. These are used in acts of banditry, cattle rustling, and armed highway attacks. It is estimated that cattle raids in latter half of 1990’s accounted for more than 1,200 deaths and theft of over 300,000 livestock. The scope, magnitude and lethality of the attacks by armed cattle rustlers has forced communities to arm themselves leading to spiral of violence in the process. Effects on the Ethiopian Security The magnitude of the Barre’s naked search for Greater Somalia became apparent with the weakening of the Ethiopian regime after the overthrow of Haile Selassie. Barre saw an opportunity to expand his vision. However, this proved to be an expensive mistake with the changing role and support from the western world. His forces were defeated in the battlefield and this became the beginning to the end of Barre’s regime. The statement by his government at the time echoed the disappointment of the failure to garner support from the foreign powers. Barre saw his defeat as being the work of the super-powers. He claimed that the Soviet Union and US were acting in cohort . This also led to cracks appearing in his regime and his undisputed role as the head of the army was put into question. The cost of the war, however, to the Ethiopian regime was heavy and the impact on the state machinery was to rebound later as the events unfolded. The dynamics of state modernization and disputes over national borders had a great effect on the Ogaden province of Ethiopia. The war involved international support from Cuba, Soviet Union and United States and the super power rivalry was transferred to Ethiopia and Somalia where political, military and financial aid was offered in exchange for military bases and other resources. In southern Ethiopia, political instability and the aftermath of the Ogaden war created an opportunity for armed communities along the Ethiopia-Somalia border to continue organized cattle raids. This clearly shows how refugees and rival clans carried firearms to execute their rivals, spread banditry into Ethiopia . There was an increase in attacks within Ethiopian territory in 1979 by armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian Government, who were supported by and operated from Somalia. These attacks were in form of hit-and-run incidents by guerrillas and bandits armed with small arms and grenades. The attacks and counter attacks resulted into the killing of many civilians and combatants. The recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea led both governments to give military support to rival groups in Somalia igniting a deadly conflict that spread instability to northern Kenya and delayed hopes for peace efforts.
Effects on the Djibouti Security The historical ties of Djibouti and Somalia are the source of immense insecurity in the country. The rivalry between the two interlocking clans has been a borne of contention and insecurity. The root cause is that two clans, Afar and Issa, whose origins are in Somalia, have majority of the people in Djibouti. It is further shown that the colonial legacy of divide and rule and arbitrary borders continue to fuel the conflict. This has a direct bearing in the ongoing security concerns. Djibouti is the north-eastern neighbour to Somalia and Afar and Issa Somalis inhabit it. Consequently it is perceived as being part of the Greater Somalia. It was affected by the tide of Somali nationalism, which swept across the Horn of Africa during and after Second World War. The country is faced with ethnic rivalry between its two main clans, which is as a result of each group being part of the larger clans that are deeply rooted inside its neighbours, Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite the harmony achieved in Djibouti’s first government and its efforts to deal with the daunting security problems, it became a victim of the crisis. The severance of Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line by Somali guerrillas totally disrupted trade through the port of Djibouti and along the railway to Ethiopia . The Ogaden war displaced an estimated 100,000 Somali refugees into Djibouti and the ethnic tension between the Afars and Issa of Ethiopia and was reflected in the Djibouti’s already divided Afar and Issa clans. The impact of the Somalia conflict on Djibouti is clearly reflected in its population’s fluctuations. Refugees and illegal migrants coming from Somalia have seen the total population vary between 500,000 and 600,000. According to United Nations estimates, the country sheltered about 70,000 to 100,000 refugees and illegal migrants in 1998 alone . The resultant effect of this is continued insecurity as a result of fight over scarce resources in the country. The Somalia conflict has significantly affected Djibouti’s economy and trade, which has yielded a sharp decline in commerce. The result has been a near total breakdown of security and economic activities, creating a spiral effect of violence in the country.
Proliferation of Small Arms and Cattle Rustling The proliferation of small arms in Somalia especially among ordinary citizens, poses a dangerous threat to public safety, human security, and development . The Somalia conflict is exacerbating cross-border crime and banditry, the influx of refugees and the proliferation of arms and drugs thus creating instability in the region. The arms do not only circulate in Somalia, but also find their way into neighbouring countries. Hargesia is a flourishing arms market, while Burao is an open arms market that serves the whole region and from where arms find their way to Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and other countries. Establishment of Terrorist Bases The collapse of Somalia proved a fertile ground for the terrorist’s organisations. The reign of terror became the order of the day, and while the warlord’s fought it over, banditry, murder and rape increased. The war torn country’s lack of central government has been a breeding ground for radical Islamic fundamentalist movements, linked to Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Somalia’s recent history reveals that the political vacuum has encouraged both domestic and foreign actors to establish links with terrorist groups . The suspected Al-Qaeda linked Al-Ittihad Al-Islami group, targeted foreign businessmen in 1995 and 1996, then in 1997, it switched to kidnapping aid workers and peacekeepers for ransom. In 2000 and 2001, competing warlords targeted aid workers in lethal attacks leaving at least 15 dead and over 40 injured. Osama bin Laden, in a CNN interview, claimed to have trained Somalis in the tactics of targeting helicopters with rocket propelled grenades, a tactic they effectively employed in downing several US Black Hawk Choppers in 1993 . CHAPTER FOUR
THE MEDIATION EFFORTS IN SOMALIA Challenges
The collapse of the nation-state, spiral of violence in the county and the breakdown of the rule of law made mediation efforts an unattainable goal. Many resources and efforts have been spent on Somalia for decades searching for peace in the war torn country without success. In addressing the mediation efforts we take into cognisance the past brutal military regimes, clanism and the past colonial history, which influences the present state of affairs. The challenge is the balancing act when the military force comes to intervene in a volatile situation like Somalia. The neutrality demanded in such a hostile environment is a key element to the success of the mission. This hinges on the population, the clan warlord’s and the mandate of the mission. European and American forces have not been effective in peace-keeping operations in Africa in general. The American debacle where 18 Marines were killed illustrates this position. Given the enormous problems that European and American U.N peacekeepers have had in Africa, and considering the increasing reluctance of western governments to take part in future peace-keeping activities in the continent, African governments have to take a leading role in dealing with African conflicts. This, as witnessed in the Somalia mediation efforts can bear fruits when African leaders take the mantle to search for home grown conflict resolutions.
The Conflict Analysis and Management Theory In Africa, each conflict has unique causes and will require unique solution. A case specific approach will have to be taken in addressing internal conflicts. Military interventions should be considered an instrument of last resort, to be applied only after it has been established that diplomatic instruments cannot be successful. This action should be taken only in a holistic framework of building peace and stability. In management of the conflict, we need further to explore the linkage of the internal and internationalised conflict as in the case of Somalia. It is shown that international and internal conflicts are linked. In this regard international conflicts have domestic sources, which can be traced to the lack of fulfilment of internal needs. In the process of searching for ways and means of fulfilling these needs, it results into internal conflict, which in turn results to internationalisation of the conflicts especially due to the nature of inter-state demographic situation of Africa. To appreciate the difficulties of achieving a breakthrough in the mediation efforts we need to look at the factors creating complexity in the structural conflict . The critical challenge we need to address in the failed Somalia intervention is the perception of the intervening forces. What is their role and mandate to execute the operation in the country regardless of the prevailing history of the state? We have to take into cognisance the oppressive military regime, which has oppressed the populations for years. This line of thinking shows a continuum of the oppression and aggression from external forces. It generates and fuels the conflict rather than achieving its former objective of restoring peace in the nation. This is what happened in the interventions by external peace-keeping missions. It is the basis of understanding the failure of the mission in Somalia.
The failure of coercive diplomacy in Somalia We need to look at some of the risks involved in coercive diplomacy. We find that as Goodwin points out, the risks are many and diverse to the forces engaged in this process. One is the risk of ultimatum. A soldier has limited chips to bargain with when the situation changes for worse . Two, another important factor which took place in Somalia and is relevant in this study is crisis management and coercion on the ground. It is in this regard that a soldier’s ‘crisis-management’ is specified in the ROEs, but the question arises as to what does the soldier do when the things change especially in political and or social manoeuvres in a given geographical area . This situation was experienced when soldiers who expected to be welcomed by the Somalia civilians were murdered instead. We find several factors contributing to this volatile situation and the challenge of finding lasting peace in the country. First is the brutal regime of Barre, which broke all the social and government systems in the country. The second is the pursuit of the Greater Somalia vision, which exhausted the resources and in the process created insecurity in the whole nation. The third fundamental factor is internationalisation of the conflict to achieve the vision; which in the process affected security in the Horn of Africa. The fourth factor borne as a result of the collapse of the nation-state is the rise of clan warlords and banditry on an unprecedented scale. The conglomeration of these factors creates complexity of finding lasting peace in Somalia. The same thoughts are echoed by one of the informants: “The US led intervention initiated by President Bush to feed Somalis was a success, but the operation began to fail when the peacekeepers expanded their mission to include rebuilding of state institutions without consulting the Somali people. The failure to disarm the warlords portrayed lack of seriousness by the UN and US in restoring law and order. This shows that the forces had no clear vision on how reconciliation should proceed. ……they failed to discard the fiction that a large military force can only be apolitical when it is supporting internally and internationally agreed upon political goals.”
IGAD and UN Mediation Efforts The first two mediation conferences were hosted by Djibouti with the support of Egypt and Italy in 1991. They managed to form a new Somalia government led by Ali Mahdi whom Italy and Egypt favoured over his rival, General Aideed. Aideed contested the outcome of the conference blaming Italy and Egypt for plotting to alienate him from the leadership. Eritrea and Ethiopia supported Aideed’s claims for power. This resulted into a four-month bloody confrontation between Aideed’s supporters and those of the interim government. Between 1993 and 1994 the United Nations organized four ill-fated peace conferences. Three of these were held in Ethiopia and one in Kenya. In March 1993, the UN assisted by the US and Ethiopia, organized other conferences in Addis Ababa. They brought together fifteen factions with the aim of establishing transitional institutions but bore no fruits. In 1994 the UN organized further talks in Nairobi, Kenya, but they also failed. Their outcome always aroused hostilities between General Aideed’s Somali National Alliance and Ali Mahdi’s Somali Salvation Alliance. The continued hard line stance taken by Gen Aideed, led to various clashes between his militias and the UN Peacekeeping Force which had been deployed to enable humanitarian assistance . Subsequently the US, which was the major component of the force, declared him a fugitive. This led to a bloody confrontation between him and US forces. The US was badly humiliated by the militias who killed and mutilated scores of Marines. The US and UN immediately withdrew from Somalia. This led to further chaos, more suffering and lose of lives. Later Gen Aideed was killed during inter-militia fighting and his son, Hussein Aideed, who had been living and working with the US Marines, replaced him . In October 1996, the former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi arranged the first face-to-face meeting between Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The leaders verbally agreed on a cessation of hostilities. However, soon after, heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu dashing hopes for peace in the Somalia capital. In January 1997, twenty-six Somalia factional leaders met in Sodere, Ethiopia, and formed the National Salvation Council (NSC). They agreed to convene a national reconciliation conference in Boosaaso in north eastern Somalia, to form a provisional government. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, president of the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland had no desire to see Somaliland reintegrated into Somalia. He rejected all invitations to the conference and so did Hussein Aideed . In the same year the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mandated Ethiopia to pursue further Somalia reconciliation process but all efforts failed. After a series of consultative meetings among various sub-clans in 1997, the Somalia’s self-governing State of Punt land consisting of five regions namely; Bari, Nugal, Mudug, Sol and Eastern Sanag came into being in mid 1998. By then many prominent and educated Somalis were either dead or had fled as warlords ruled everywhere. Stability only existed in the Somaliland Republic and smaller mini states like Puntland and Juba land. Although unrecognised internationally, they were the only signs of stability in a totally failed state. In 2000 Djibouti hosted a reconciliation conference in Arta, which resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG), the first in a decade. This enabled the formation of a national police force and army and half of the estimated 20,000 militiamen roaming the countryside were demobilized . However the external interference from Ethiopia, which viewed Djibouti as a meddler in the internal affairs of Somalia due to her own vested interests, helped to form an alternative government of Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC). In 2001 former Kenyan president Moi, invited the TNG and SRRG for talks in Nakuru Kenya. They agreed to share power but again external interferences made the deal flop. In 2002, IGAD Heads of States and Governments met in Khartoum, Sudan and mandated Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to coordinate and hold new peace conferences under the auspices of IGAD. They initiated a peace process in Eldoret, Kenya in October 2002, which was supported by the European Union, United Nations, Unite States and the Arab League . The factional leaders and the Transnational National Government signed a cease fire in October 2002 and a truce was reached in December same year although some fighting continued in Somalia. They concluded an agreement to form a 450 member federal government in 2003 based on clan quotas. In July 2003, a Declaration of Agreement led to a transitional parliament that comprised of 351 members apportioned by clan. The political leaders in consultation with the clan elders selected the members of parliament. The members of parliament were then to select a transitional president who would serve for five years. In August 2004, as part of the IGAD led process, the Somali Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) was established with Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the president and Ali Mohamed Gedi was elected the Prime Minister . They further swore in a reduced 275 member parliament who elected a speaker and a deputy speaker. However, the new government is yet to settle fully in Somalia.
Reconstruction and Reintegration of Somalia The challenges emanating from the reconstruction of Somalia are: i. A need for a well-planned disarmament programme. The disarmament must be comprehensive, impartial and transparent. ii. A critical need for rehabilitation, reintegration and transfer of skills to generations of gunmen and women who are involved in banditry and crime. iii. The new government on its part has to win the support of the Somali people as well as those in Diaspora, Somali civil society and business community. iv. A credible police security force will herald the beginning of new era in the country. v. That the efforts to reconstruct and reintegrate a country emerging from war into relative peace are necessary to prevent recidivism into violent conflict. vi. That Partnership with civil society and the private sector is crucial in reconstruction, it is the government that should provide the framework within which the other actors must operate and which will define the general development of the country. vii. That the government should develop a consistent strategy for demobilization and reintegration of combatants and militias and repatriation of refugees from other countries. viii. Somalia can make use of Kenya’s highly recognized military institutions to train its security forces. Subsequently Kenya could also send its own security forces to help in restoring and maintaining law and order in Somalia. This will help in creating a strong bond between the two countries as they share a border, a coastline and a common people. The informants interviewed were clear in their recommendation that the critical role is to be played by the people in building the broken systems and infrastructures. One of them was categorical that; “To resolve the conflict and find lasting peace, I would recommend that emphasis be put on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure to prepare the country to enter a constitutional phase. This should include putting in place institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection of human rights and safeguarding of the integrity of the country. All disputes must henceforth be settled through dialogue, negotiations and other peaceful legal means.”
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
The Somalia political instability has been attributed to internationalisation of the conflict by the Barre’s regime in its aim of achieving the Greater Somalia vision. The use of clanism as a clarion call backfired with the defeat of the army in Ogaden, leading to the collapse of the state. The raise of the tribal warlords keeps on fuelling the conflict and complicating the peace process in the region. The immediate post independent era was marked by internal socio-political instability centred on the merger of the colonial territories and the support of irredentist conflict activities in the north-eastern Kenya and south-eastern Ethiopia. When Barre consolidated his power base he adopted a calamitous policy, which favoured his clan, and this led to disintegration of the Army that was formerly the central figure of his power structure. The collapse of the state in 1991 left the country without a central government or viable infrastructures. However the disaster in Somalia was not created by fighting alone, but rather by the massive, persistent and deliberate violations of human rights committed by all factions. The collapse of the state has been followed by diverse mediation efforts. These range from regional bodies, UN, US and many others without success. The most recent and successful effort has been under the auspices of IGAD. The outcome of the 14th Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Kenya led to a possible rebirth of the Republic of Somalia. The conference elected 275 members of parliament and new president, Colonel Abudullahi Yusuf. The prospects are however gloomy for the new government as it is faced with anarchy, and fears of growing terrorist groups. This is why Kenya, a terrorist victim in 1998 and 2002 has been in the forefront to ensure that order, stability and security prevail in Somalia. Another challenge is repatriation of about three million refugees back into the country; who are spread in many parts of Kenya, Horn of Africa and the rest of the world. A reconciled Somalia will offer hope for security, stability and peace in the whole Horn of Africa.
RECOMMENDATIONS For the young and fragile Somalia government to succeed in rebuilding the state security and prosperity: It is important that security measures are reinforced and infrastructure be reconstructed to ensure the smooth running of the new government. Neighbouring countries such as Kenya can assist by sending skilled manpower and security forces and advisors to Somalia. The leaders need to work on a progressive plan aimed at restoring peace, security and stability by involving the clans and their leaders and not just the warlords, especially in disarmament to pacify the process. That the government must face the challenge of reconciling people at all levels of the society including inter and intra clan and sub-clans, factional and political groupings. The people have to be determined to support this new dawn and future. The conflict has resulted to disunity on the basis of clan, ethnic, political, and sectarian religious lines. Rehabilitation, reintegration and transfer of skills to generations of gunmen and women who missed school and vocational training opportunities in all disarmament programmes will therefore be critical. Emphasis has to be put on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructures to prepare the country to enter a constitutional phase. This will include building institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection of human rights and safeguarding the integrity of the country. All disputes must henceforth be settled through dialogue, negotiations and other peaceful legal means. In keeping with the United Nations arms embargo against Somalia, the neighbouring countries have to cooperate to make sure that their borders are not used for weapons movement. The international community needs to assist in establishing an impartial National Somali Army and Police Force. This is possible through reinstatement of former “clean” Army and Police Force personnel as well as recruiting and training young people. Kenya should move fast to solidify its relations with Somalia by assisting in reinforcing security across the border. The two countries security forces should cooperate to guard the region, especially the North Eastern Province where banditry, trade in arms and porous boundaries are entry points of the terrorists. Kenya should also consider setting up industries in Somalia since theirs are non existent. Meanwhile it should strengthen its trade relations with Somalia to enable it export manufactured and agricultural products. A stable Somalia will not only create the right environment for Kenya to develop, but will stabilize the whole Horn of Africa. To achieve this goal, Kenya must play a major role in rebuilding a peaceful neighbouring country, which is in control of its destiny and welfare. On its part, Somalia can establish lasting peace by abandoning its dream of a Greater Somalia. Lobbying for a change in the new Somali flag without the five-pointed star that symbolizes the dream is essential. The international donor community, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Somalis in Diaspora, need to come to the aid of Somalia by providing funds to rebuild the ruined infrastructures. The United Nations in collaboration with the African Union should hasten the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the country to ensure that peace and security prevail for smooth running of the new government. The government has the responsibility to manage the reconstruction process through national authorities, provincial and local channels as well as security forces. This will call for peaceful environment by establishing a transparent, representational and interactive political structure, to avoid the spectacle of people falling back to clanism and lawlessness. There are governments and other outside actors who supported various groups and persons in Somalia. These actors should call for a regional reconciliation and discard their personal interests for the sake of prosperity, peace and stability. Therefore, for a lasting peace to prevail in Somalia as well as its Diaspora, a legitimate government that is accountable to its citizenry and sensitive to their needs must emerge. Its authority has to be built from the grassroots. Therefore United Nations, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on development and the rest of the donor world and the international community must exercise steadfastness in their support for Somalia.
QUESTIONNAIRE
I am a Kenya Army Major, student at Defence Staff College-Karen and the University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), studying: “The Somalia Conflict and its Effects on the Regional Security in the Horn of Africa Between 1990 and 2004.” I would kindly appreciate if you would please complete this questionnaire to assist me in analysing the study area.
Basic information
Age…………………..
Male [ ]
Female [ ]
Marital status................................
Highest Education Level………………………………………………....
Present Occupation ……………………………………………………….
For the purpose of this questionnaire the following definitions will apply.
Conflict: This refers to the incompatibility of goals between two or more parties due to different perceptions or ideals, resulting into tension, crisis and sometimes violence among the parties.
Clanism: Bidding bond between members of the bigger family through patrilineal kinship. This influences the being of the people in the society whether political or social allegiances, which are determined by descent in the male line and can change depending on one’s prevailing interest in the community.
Consent: Is an agreement obtained from the parties to a conflict for setting up of a peacekeeping mission as per an agreed mandate.
Peacekeeping: Operations aimed at preserving peace between two consenting belligerent parties as defined in chapter (CAP) 6 of the UN charter.
Peace Enforcement: Forceful intervention to prevent gross human rights abuse or genocide as defined in CAP 7 of the UN charter.
KINDLY GIVE YOUR BRIEF OPINION ON THE FOLLOWING:
1. The source(s) of the Somalia conflict is as a result of struggle for scarce resources among its people.
2. The leaders are to blame for the prevailing crisis in the country; they seem not to learn from the past mistakes and resolve the conflict.
3. The past history of the occupying forces for many centuries has oppressed the Somalia people and this contributes to the present conflict.
4. The biggest cause of conflict has been the clan system, which influences affairs of the state adversely.
5. These clan leaders, who wield great influence and may be the cause of the conflict, are key to resolving it rather than the politicians.
6. The basis of resolving the conflict lies with the carrying out civic education in the country to create a paradigm shift in understanding and appreciating of human rights and complementability of their aspirations in building a unified nation state.
7. The politicians have to consult the public on the manner of resolving the ongoing conflict rather than holding conferences in foreign countries.
8. The peacekeeping forces have not helped much in the Somalia conflict due to their partisan position and lack of understanding of the culture and aspirations of the Somali people.
9. What recommendation(s) would you make on the way forward in resolving and finding lasting peace in the country now?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayittey, George B.N. (1991). Africa Betrayed. New York, Transnational Publishers, Inc. Fukui K. and Markakis J. (1994). Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London, Villiers Publications. Ghalib Jama Mohamed. (1995). The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. New York: Barber Press. Goodwin D. (2001). Negotiation in International Conflict Understanding Persuasion. Wales, Creative Print and Design. Hashi, A. N. (2003). Weapons and Clan Politics in Somalia, National University Lafole. Legum C. and Lee B. (1977). Conflict in the Horn of Africa. New York, Africana Publishing Company. Legum C. and Lee B. (1979). The Horn of Africa in Continuining Crisis, New York, African Publishing Company. Lewis I. M. (1988). A Modern History of Somalia, Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. London and New York: Longman, 1980; updated edition, Boulder, Co: Westview Press. Mwagiru M. (2000). Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, Nairobi, Watermark publications. Mwagiru M. (2001). Conflict Management in Africa. Lessons Learnt and Future Strategies. Nairobi Views Media. Nelson H. (1993). Somalia: A Country Study. Washington, DC, American University Press. Okoth G. P. (2000). Africa At The Beginning of The 21st Century. University of Nairobi press. Ruhela P. S. (1994). Mohammed Farah Aidid and His Vision of Somalia. New Delhi: Hindustan Offset Printers. Shanty F. and Picquet R. Encyclopedia of World Terrorism 1996-2002. Armonk, New York M.E. Sharpe INC. Turok B. (1987). Africa, What Can Be Done? London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd Thomson A. (2000). An Introduction to African Politics, London and New York, Routledge Publishers.
WEBSITES Biwott H. K. Post-Independence Low Intensity Conflict in Kenya, 1992 http:// www. globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/BHK.htm. Helen Chapin Metz. Somalia: A Country Study, 1992. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/ somalia/ background.htm. Hugh McCullum. Somalia: Faint Hope for a Failed State. http://www.africafiles.org/ article.asp. Jos Van Beurden. Searching for Peace in Africa, 2000. http://www.conflict-prevention. Net. Klein A. Politics, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. http://www.ifaanet.org/ifaapr/stateo~1.htm. Langenbacher D. UN Report on Somalia 1999 Human Development. http://meltingpot. fortunecity.com/ lebanon/254/undp.htm. Marwa P. Developing Capacity for Peace and Small Arms Control in the Horn of Africa. http://www.bicc.de/ events/unconf/workshop_texts/workshop_marwa.php. Mburu N. Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications. http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol8num2/mburu.pdf. Microsoft® Encarta® Reference Library 2005/Encyclopaedia Premium Suite. Mwalulu J. The Somali Conundrum. http://www.africatoday.com/cgi-bin/public.cgi. Robb C. The politics of Defending America. www.iop.harvard.edu/study-groups/02-defending-america.html. Small Arms Proliferation and Africa. www.iss.co.za/ PUBS/Newsletter/ OAU/ OAUiss3. html. The IGAD Somali National Reconciliation Conferences Report, 2002-2004. http://www.db.idpproject.org. The Somalia Conferences on Reconstruction Strategies, Hargeisa, 1998. http:// www. iprt.org/ FirstConfOnReconstruction.htm. US Department of State Report on Somalia Profile, 2005. http://www.stae.gov/ r/pa/ei/ bgn/2863.htm. Weapons Inflows and the Impact of Regional Conflict. http://www.hrw.org/ reports/ 2002/kenya0502-03.htm.
ping for future study
Good luck with that.
reference to question number nine...”What recommendations...etc...”
I would fuckin’ nuke the place-