Name calling doesn't get you anywhere. But, it's a theory of mine, and other economists, that Greenspan kept the monetary policy too loose during a period of significant productivity growth. This in turn leads to lax lending practices because money is "cheap." The FED should have kept money tight, but we are paranoid in this country that deflation leads to depression, although deflation can occur with growth as shown in Friedman and Schwartz "A Monetary History of the United States." The productivity boom ended around 2000, which had it's small effect then, and now some other markets are clearing, like housing. To say that the FED doesn't have an effect on prices is true when looking in the long run with monetary neutrality, but it definitely has short term effects. Bush's meddling hasn't helped much either, and there has been some more meddling which hasn't even began to take effect yet. But overall, many of the commodity markets are increasing because people are fleeing to them with investment, suspecting a recession ahead, although there are a host of other issues there.
Ceteris paribus is important, not abusing your patience, because we are trying to examine the effects of a specific policy. Making a comment about the current price fluctuations, which is due to other issues, has no place in the debate unless you can link the two logically.
Sure, I'll admit I'm not good at English or spelling. But again, name calling won't get you anywhere.
It does follow unless you have another solution. By you very statement "One can easily despise the current tax structure AND find your scheme worse still." Means you'd rather have our current income tax system than the fair tax.
Price instability is a vital concept in this whole discussion, because 1) it's going to continue, unfortunately -- the gov't isn't about to stand back and let mkts clear; if anything they'll meddle more, and 2) any policy or tax regime must therefore perforce take into account said instability and MUST not exacerbate it.
ANY new tax regime introduces uncertainty into the mkt, and contributes directly thereby to (in this case) the continuation of price instability. The exception to this WOULD be (it hasn't been through all of history, but perhaps this time we'll get lucky) a new tax regime that, presumably by its stringent definitiveness, would reduce uncertainty. The 'fair' tax doesn't begin to meet this standard; hell's bells, you lot can't even offer a clear and complete and consensus description of how this mystical 'prebate' would operate.
I am profiting hugely from the current wave of FOMC easing, but notwithstanding that, I'll tell you right now that it's STILL wrongheaded. Greenbean was far too slack in monetary policy, due mainly, I might add, to the horrendous press he got during the 1991 recession. Bernancke should at least know better, but apparently he doesn't. Yuck.
The subprime/CDO/SIV mess is/was much more political; banks had been hammered for at least two decades by ACORN and other assorted Marxist assholes for 'redlining', i.e. not lending to credit-unworthy people. So the banks et al. adapted -- badly and greedily, I grant you -- and what happens? Now we have record-high (ex 1930s) default rates, untold amounts of capital have been vapourised, and ACORN and the bastards are now whining about ''predatory lending'', as if someone had held a gun to the head of the credit-unworthy in order to get them to sign on the dotted line. Bah!
My adaptation of Cicero's opening line of his first oration against Catalina was apropos because you assumed -- with no justification whatever -- that I was unfamiliar with the phrase ceteris paribus. Such assumption does try one's patience. Cuius vis homini errare est, I suppose.
The dangerous part of ceteris paribus in economics is that they never are.