The UN’s Yellowcake Loophole
But this begs the question: how could yellowcake deals proceed with nations that were already under restrictions established in the UN’s Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and presumably under the watchful eye of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?
The answer is simple: in 1972 the IAEA itself enacted changes to its own regulations that allowed certain nuclear materials to be maintained and traded even by countries known to be covertly developing a nuclear capability or who supported terrorist groups.
It is important to understand that yellowcake cannot be directly introduced to the enrichment process. It must first be converted to uranium dioxide. In its final report, the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) noted that Iraq had over 4,500kg of natural uranium dioxide that was under IAEA safeguards. There was also over 6.5 tons of uranium dioxide that had not been declared to the IAEA and was therefore not monitored by the UN. Saddam had a huge amount of material that given the proper equipment could have been immediately enriched to make nuclear fuel for a reactor or a nuclear weapon.
Then there was the problem of the 500 tons of yellowcake, some of which had slipped under the IAEA radar. But a key notation appears on the ISG inventory next to all of the yellowcake finds at Al-Tuwaitha: not subject to safeguards according to INFCIRC/153 corrected.
So, according to the ISG, the baseline material that is used to manufacture uranium dioxide, which is required to be under IAEA safeguards, is itself not subject to those same safeguards! In other words, the UN has regulated a loophole to countries that might want to manufacture enriched nuclear fuel by allowing them to have the milled yellowcake to start the enrichment process. The regulation explains the rationale for this deceptive practice: To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange nuclear material…[and] To avoid undue interference in the State’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities….
The Information Circular is very specific that safeguards shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities – that means milled yellowcake. You read that right; not all of Iraq’s uranium was subject to safeguards – so that ostensibly it could aid in its economic development. Therefore, any tin pot dictator could acquire and trade in processed yellowcake, just as long as they declared it to the IAEA. Apparently, the UN felt that it could ferret out any hidden equipment or facilities that could be used to enrich converted uranium.
Thanks to the release and analysis of the huge collection of seized documents and recordings, we now know that the UN’s confidence in preventing banned equipment from being imported to Iraq was wildly misplaced.
This regulatory loophole also answers the question of why Saddam was allowed to retain this yellowcake at Al-Tuwaitha, even though his known nuclear reactors and enrichment labs were long ago destroyed and never repaired. It’s because he could; and possibly because the profit potential of trading in yellowcake is very lucrative.
The value of uranium has skyrocketed in the last three years. When Operation Iraqi Freedom was winding down in April of 2003, the spot price of milled yellowcake was $10.75 per pound; the current price has boomed to $41.00 per pound. Today, the former dictator’s stockpile of yellowcake is worth well over $41 million. The market price will probably increase since the global demand for oil is finally causing developed nations to take another look at nuclear power in order to reduce demand for petroleum