Posted on 08/01/2005 7:57:46 AM PDT by Leo Carpathian
Post-revolution staglution, a revolution stagnating
By Peter Lavelle, Russia Profile's Weekly Experts Panel Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 22, 2005
Contributors: Vladimir Frolov, Janusz Bugajski, Patrick Armstrong, Ira Straus, Ethan S. Burger & Marc Greenfield, Gordon Hahn, and Dale Herspring
Peter Lavelle: Western punditry can't accept that a so-called "colored revolution" in Russia is very unlikely. This is probably partly due to the fact there is a general built-in media bias against Russia and a very specific bias against Vladimir Putin's Kremlin, as well as the fact that local Russian spin-doctors and journalists weave the most incredible scenarios of gloom and doom.
Should there be more focus on the prospect that a "colored revolution" or Western-styled "rent-a-crowd" regime changes have run their course in the countries of the former Soviet Union? This is not to claim that many people there have abandoned the hope for a more democratic future, but because a number of regimes have taken precautions against outside funding, training, and agitation, as well as the possible disillusionment with the results Georgia, Ukraine, and - to some extent - Kyrgyzstan have achieved after their "colored revolutions."
More to the point: Are Georgia and Ukraine experiencing post-revolution "staglution" (a revolution stagnating)? Georgia, the first darling of spinning a people's revolution in the post-Soviet territory, has lost much of its luster. Mikheil Saakashvili is not longer considered the icon of democratic ideals and reform many once considered him to be.
By most accounts, there has only been a change in leadership in Georgia, without significantly dealing with corruption or improving the lot of the average citizen.
In Ukraine, the "Orange Revolution" appeared to have completely squeezed of its once inspiring appeal. Once political allies, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko appear to be in deadly political embrace, each waiting for the other to submit or to be defeated.
Recent events in Kyrgyzstan, a successful presidential election, are difficult to assess. However, suffice it to say again there has been only a major change at the top and not a revolution in any meaningful sense.
How much does the "staglution" in the aftermath of the "colored revolutions" influence Kremlin perceptions and, importantly, how the Russian public understands of change in the post-Soviet space?
[1] Vladimir Frolov, Fund for Effective Politics, Moscow:
It is still too early to tell whether a colored revolution is a likely scenario in Russia. As things stand now, it is not much of a threat. But attempts at it will be made and there are serious public expectations that could be tapped to make a go of it.
Several factors currently point away from such a revolution in Russia.
Putin's regime has not been discredited, and still enjoys considerable public trust. Putin beats all possible opponents by a factor of twenty, although ratings in his performance in office are falling. People do not want him to stay for the third term, but see no viable replacement among likely alternative candidates.
For the revolution to succeed, the regime has to be totally discredited and be perceived as corrupt and inept. Such was the case in Ukraine where Kuchma' regime (and Yanukovich as its successor) lost legitimacy long before the elections. The same goes for Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Then there is the issue of opposition leadership. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, in Russia there is no strong political force, leader, or a broad-based civic movement around which all opposition to the regime might coalesce. Something tells me such a force or a leader would not come from the liberal camp. It more likely it would have a strong nationalist character. All colored revolutions were nationalist in nature.
Neither is there a regional opposition stronghold in Russia, like Western Ukraine or Southern Kyrgyzstan, where the regime's opponents could gather strength, train their supporters and receive Western aid.
The Kremlin has clearly drawn the lesson from "colored revolutions" that Western "funding to promote democracy" for NGOs and political parties should be blocked and the activities of Western democracy missionaries closely monitored and checked. The Kremlin will simply not tolerate a NED, NDI, or IRI funded free-for-all in Russia.
But all this might quickly change. There are some deep undercurrents within the Russian society that do not bode well for the Kremlin. Opinion polls register increasing public dissatisfaction with the direction the country is going (44 percent, according to the latest FOM poll, say it's going in the wrong direction, while only about one-third think otherwise).
But the danger for the Kremlin is that this discontent is of a dramatically new kind that is much more difficult to address than the social protests over unpaid wages and pensions of the late 1990s and even the more recent protests over the replacement of social benefits with cash payments.
There you could solve the problem by simply throwing money at it. Not any more. Now, people are growing restless not over a lack of money and basic necessities, but over a lack of opportunities to succeed.
It turns out the economic and political system in Russia is not providing enough upward mobility to accommodate all or most socially active and ambitious people. The system is rejecting outsiders, not accommodating them to strengthen itself. All state property and lucrative government jobs have been divided between a relatively small number of people.
[Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov recently put a finger on the problem by saying that the time of quick money and fast careers is over and people need to get used to it. The problem is that they won't, and Surkov knows it.
This also happened in Ukraine, where all avenues of upward mobility had been blocked by a small group of government-appointed oligarchs and corrupt officials. The "Orange Revolution" was driven by, among other forces, millionaires who desperately wanted to become billionaires, but were not allowed to by the old regime (they are now enjoying this hard-won opportunity).
Although only 3 to 4 percent of Russians today are actively prepared to take part in massive street protests, about one-third think demonstration bring more good than harm, and 38 percent would not rule out joining the protesters, a potentially large pool of supporters.
In absolute figures, even 3 percent in Russia is more than 4 million people, a huge crowd. And 42 percent think there are forces in Russia that could lead a colored revolution like that in Ukraine.
The figures were about the same in Ukraine eight months before the election. In October 2004 - three weeks before the vote - about 25 percent - up to 10 million people - were prepared to take to the streets or march on Kiev if the election were stolen.
The latter is also bad news for the Kremlin - 55 percent of Russians believe the elections do not reflect the will of the people and most expect the upcoming Duma and presidential elections to be unfair (51 percent and 44 percent accordingly).
Does that mean the Russians will rise en masse if the elections are stolen? No one really knows. Were it to happen today, the answer would probably be "No". But by 2007 it could be an entirely different ballgame. The elections to the Moscow City Duma in December will give us a taste of things to come.
[2] Janusz Bugajski, director of the East Europe Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington:
We must come up with a more catchy word than "staglution" or even "revatigue" ("revolutionary fatigue") for post-revolutionary deflation. There are two distinct issues raised in the introduction and they should be considered separately. First, what is the condition of the states that have experienced "colored revolutions," and can we expect major reversals in the near future?
Second, will Russia undergo a popular revolt against centralized rule, or will it continue to stagnate politically amidst widespread public indifference?
Roses and Oranges aside, revolutions are defined by a change of system, and not simply a change of government. In the case of Georgia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states, this would mean dismantling the repressive and corrupt systems that were first imposed by Moscow and then nurtured by Moscow after Communism and Sovietism collapsed.
The peaceful and popular revolts that launched this process in Tbilisi and Kiev were not media "spins" or Western engineered coups, as the Kremlin Chekists want us to believe, but were generated by public frustration and elite competition intended to transform these countries into more open pro-Western systems.
But the problem with any political revolution is the expectations that it unleashes and the limited time the new leadership has to deliver on its promises. Unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor Georgia have the resources, experience, time, or Western support that the Central Europeans benefited from when they launched their own "refolutions" in the early 1990s.
Not surprisingly, shortcomings are being registered in the slow pace of economic reform, the persistence of corruption and patronage, the limited volume of foreign investment, and the intensive political infighting. Meanwhile, Putin's Chekists and their trusted partners in Ukraine and Georgia rub their hands in glee while seeking to pressure or undermine the incumbent governments.
The future of both revolutions cannot be predicted, but any major reversal or restoration of the old regime would constitute a setback not only for the state in question, but also for the spread of democracy worldwide.
Regarding the Russian scenario, and according to Peter's definition, I am evidently not a voting member of the "commentariat," as I seriously doubt that Russia will experience a popular upsurge or a political revolution. Russia is far more likely to undergo a struggle for power and wealth among Putin's sectoral magnates and security chiefs, in combination with a slow descent into federal fragmentation generated by economic disparities and regional ambitions.
Unfortunately, instead of demanding higher standards from their rulers, the Russian public has been conditioned to be apathetic and tolerant of virtually anything the Kremlin decides.
Paradoxically, a Russian "cabbage revolution" could provide much needed fuel to propel the country toward a more sustainable system. It could mobilize broad sectors of the public, make leaders more accountable to the electorate, expose the perverted nature of the Russian election process, highlight the ambitions of the Putinists, and involve citizens more directly in the development and rejuvenation of their state.
Instead, while Kremlin strategists boast that Russia is immune to "Western inspired revolutions" they may ultimately be digging their own political graves.
[3] Patrick Armstrong, defense analyst for the Canadian government:
A "velvet revolution" needs five things all at once: The first is an unpopular and ineffective government, as we saw in Georgia and Ukraine. Second, there has to be a clearly recognized opposition leader, like Saakashvili in Georgia or Yushchenko in Ukraine. Third, the population must be willing to create the massive moral pressure that we saw in Georgia and Ukraine (and Lebanon). Fourth is the organization - all those flags, yellow scarves, tents and soup kitchens just don't appear out of thin air - it is through these things that foreign involvement is most apparent. Finally the authorities must not shoot the protesters down - and neither Shevardnadze nor Kuchma, greatly to their credit, was prepared to kill people to reverse the outcome.
Few of these conditions exist in Russia - the government is reasonably popular and does look efficient (whatever the columnists of Moscow News or the Berezovsky press may say), there certainly is no one opposition leader (indeed there are too many opposition leaders) ,and I really don't see thousands of Russians camping out in the Aleksandr Gardens or Red Square waving scarves.
Nor do I see the government shooting them down. But, once the new guy settles into the palace, all the old problems are still there, looking through the windows at him.
Georgia is a very good example. Saakashvili arrested a lot of people for corruption and that gave a good first impression, but it won't necessarily stop the new bunch from stealing or get at the underlying problems, which, in Georgia, are considerable.
Stalin (who, as a Georgian, had a certain Georgian agenda) created its borders (it never existed in its present form before) incorporating a number of non-Kartevelian peoples who didn't - and don't - necessarily want to be in it. The Georgian SSR's prosperity thrived in the cracks of the Soviet economy: One could fly from Tbilisi to Moscow and back again and make a profit on selling a few suitcases of flowers.
As soon as the entrepreneur had to pay what an airplane ticket really cost, that business disappeared. So the Georgian economy collapsed, the minorities wanted out (just as they had in 1919 to 1921) and things went from bad to worse very quickly.
Although people now seem to have forgotten it, Shevardnadze also came to power after a miserable period, following a coup d'tat, and was welcomed in much the same was as Saakashvili has been. But he was eventually brought down by the long-standing problems, even though he left the place in much better state than his predecessors had.
"Staglution" is a good word to describe what happens when the new team has to chew away at the intractable difficulties that brought down its predecessor.
[4] Ira Straus, U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO:
The West always viewed the Rose and Orange revolutions through rose- colored glasses - as democratic miracles. It overestimated the revolutions; it underestimated the importance and difficulty of their aftermath. Russia more realistically estimated the aftermath, knowing how deep is the morass of the post-Communist inheritance, but underestimated the revolution itself by dismissing it as a Western manipulation.
Now, Russian elites are getting their hopes up that the revolutions will peter out and, in the next stage, Russia will regain its positions of influence. Some are hoping for a counter-revolutionary wave to replace the revolutionary wave. This seems just as overoptimistic on the Russian side as was the original fairy-tale on the Western side.
Revolutions did occur, including a transformation in mass consciousness. The people felt part of a regime change in which their majority will finally came to power. The fact that old elites were included was what made it a revolution, not merely a popular rebellion; as in all true revolutions, the elite split and half of it merged its identity with a new popularly based power source.
These revolutions will inevitably hit snags and disappoint many of their followers, but few if any of them will be undone. The fact that Russia put itself on the wrong side of the majority is something that will count against it for a long time; it showed the people and elites of these nations - even the minority with which it sided - that it intended to thwart their democratic will, and gave the impression of trying to re-impose imperial domination through a symbiotic alliance with the regimes against the people.
The counter-revolutionary wave is bound to disappoint no less than the revolutionary. In the tug and pull between Russia and the West for influence in the CIS, neither side can even win a final victory. The countries are inevitably split by this tug of war; the victories of either side are bound to remain unsatisfying and unconsolidated. Any counter-revolution will be more unstable than the revolutions.
The only way to change this would be for Russia and the West to start pulling on the same side, putting forward their values of reform and stability jointly, instead of picking opposite sides on values and emphasizing one against the other. That would be a truly revolutionary step. It would finally enable consolidation and cumulative progress.
For Russia itself, the West long ago dismissed the likelihood of a "color revolution;" yet the state-owned polling agency VTsIOM finds Russians viewing it as a possibility by a margin of 42 percent to 32 percent. It seems that far more Russians expect it than the Westerners who are supposedly buying off people to bring it about.
The natural descent of the other color revolutions into the post-revolutionary morass is, meanwhile, taking away their mystical, inspirational appeal. The enchanted moment is long over when the erotic linkages of the masses in the streets could be viewed, whether with hope or trepidation, as contagious.
Like all revolutions, they have fallen away from the high point of mass assembly in the street, when almost orgasmic feelings of unity run through the crowds. Nevertheless, the revolutions already have accomplishments that should not be underestimated. They will continue to exert an attractive pull in the CIS - and to scare its authoritarian regimes, which are reaching for counter-revolutionary antidotes.
Counter-revolution has a sorry history of failure in modern Europe. The attractive pull of the revolutions will continue, even if mostly in the limited, gradual way that is the nature of ordinary political life; and in the end it have great significance.
[5] Ethan S. Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University & Marc Greenfield, Institute of War & Peace Reporting:
If Western policy makers were less focused on short-term results and crisis management, they might have discerned the Kremlin's effort to consolidate its old sphere of influence. U.S. success in the Cold War and failure in Viet Nam suggest that a hunkering down for the long-term - as Churchill did in 1940 - is a better approach to foreign policy, and one that Moscow seems to have adopted.
No one can deny that the "colored" revolutions made for great television. Unfortunately, real political and economic change takes time. Coups d'etats take many forms, including seemingly democratic elections. Pro-Western democratic governments do not appear spontaneously; they must be nurtured, and in the best of cases such governments survive only if they enjoy widespread popular support.
As recent events in Iran illustrate all too clearly, the mere holding of presidential elections is no guarantee of a favorable outcome (particularly from Washington's perspective).
Having completed the first stages of a political and economic recentralization, the government of Russia is gradually employing its principal foreign-policy leverage over the "near abroad," its legacy from the Soviet Union: the former Soviet sphere's inescapable industrial integration, the satellites' almost total dependency upon Russian energy supplies, and the predominantly apathetic and fatalistic populations of the local populations. (Just as elsewhere, more people turn out for sporting events in these successor states than for political demonstrations.)
On the one hand, we are dealing with extremely short periods of time, less than 15 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is far too early to evaluate the long-term significance of the recent regime changes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. One needn't travel far to find examples.
Let's not forget that after the Tsarist regime fell in February 1917, Aleksandr Kerensky's "democratic regime" was supplanted by the authoritarian Bolsheviks and supporters a short nine months later.
On the other hand, things aren't looking too good for democracy advocates. Recently, the call of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's member states (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), followed by individual statements from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, seems to indicate a concerted effort by Russia and China to remove the U.S. military presence in the region.
While this could be nothing more than a ploy to extract higher "rents" (both tangible and intangible) from the United States, it certainly appears to support the hypothesis that Russia has adopted a more active, assertive regional policy.
We believe that supporters of the view that Russia will continue to disintegrate territorially are too confident, at least for the foreseeable future. Although a superficial examination of the situation, especially the events in Chechnya, Dagestan and the Baltic States, would seem to support this prevailing view, it disregards Russia's resolve and the enormous economic and political resources that it has only just begun to bring to bear on the issues.
With respect to the northern Caucuses, Russia can keep this situation brewing indefinitely by the continued use of force, especially if one is willing to bear the human, public relations and financial costs, as the Putin government seems willing to do. Estonia may be the one Baltic state to have become largely free of Russian hegemony (in part thanks to a heavy Finnish and German presence in the country).
It is very unclear what will happen with Latvia, with its ethnic Russian minority and Russian "business" presence, and Lithuania, with its struggling economy and growing economic dependence upon Russia. Recent coordinated Russian government efforts to gain control of the Mazeikiai oil complex (the Baltic States' oil refinery, the Butinge oil maritime terminal, the Birzai pipeline and certain retail gas stations) only serves to emphasize this dependency and highlight the Kremlin's understanding that control over energy is more deployable as a tool of policy than brute military force.
In the southern Caucuses, the situation is no more encouraging. Russia's UES already is a major owner of Armenian power plants, and it appears that the Armenian government has allowed the sale of the national power grid to UES.
Kazakhstan may be better able to ward off Russian forays. Thanks to its rich oil and gas deposits many foreign companies are involved there. That includes, we should add, Gazprom and numerous Russian private and state energy concerns. The country's close ties and susceptibility to Russian influence are natural.
After all, not only is Russia the giant trading partner to the north, the country's ruling elite is a particularly apt and efficient example of the plutocratic, ex-Soviet, Communist Party ruling elite that emerged from the ruins of the empire.
Central Asia's other independent states are even less encouraging. All appear to be marching to a completely different tune, one that leads back to highly centralized, authoritarian statehood. The problem with this, in the context of regional integration, is quite straightforward - if they were more pluralistic societies it would be harder for an outside government to supplant the leadership with friendly faces.
Unquestionably, the entire region represents a region of Russia's vital national interests, both from security and economic perspectives. In addition, as Chinese demand for and dependency upon Russian energy supplies grows, these countries will find themselves right at the center of one of the world's new strategic axes.
As far as any dissolution of Russia's regions is concerned, the Kremlin has put these fears to rest through its establishment of single party "discipline" and the elimination of independent governors.
Finally, many observers, including us, have been warning for a number of years that the Russian public at large never had anything more than a vague notion of what democracy involved and has longed for the restoration of a strong central authority virtually from the outset of the reforms.
More significantly, and less noted, is the nostalgia for empire, evinced in virtually every poll and personal account of regret over the loss of the Soviet Union's status in the world a superpower. Regardless of the Russian public's understanding of what is occurring, it will greet the restoration of a sphere of influence enthusiastically.
[6] Gordon Hahn, independent Russian studies scholar:
We need to distinguish between this second wave of revolutions and "great revolutions." The latter are truly world transmogrifying events. The world is turned upside down (at least for a while) with the revolutionary leadership that has come to power having grand designs for changing the society and even the world radically in virtually all of its spheres.
We can understand this by looking at the ambitions of the French (18th century.), Russian (early 19th century.), Chinese (mid-19th century.), Iranian Revolutions (late 20th century.), among others following on the heels of the Soviet regime's demise at the hands of Russia's revolution from above.
Lesser order revolutions that seek to radically transform only their own societies and are perhaps still worthy of the nomenclature 'great', include revolutions from above like the Japanese (late 19th century.), Turkish (early 20th century.), and Soviet (late 20th century) revolutions, as well as some revolutions from below such as the Philippines (1980s) and Eastern Europe 1989 (though some of the latter were as much imposed or negotiated transitions as revolutions).
The so-called 'colored revolutions' were really limited to completing and correcting the processes begun during the fall of the Soviet regime precipitated largely by the Russian revolution from above, without which there would obviously have been another outcome (revolution from below, transition, or authoritarian or totalitarian restoration).
The limited nature of revolution from above (the planned dismantling but ultimate retention of many state and social institutions and the old elite, along with the discarding of some of the old regime's key state and social institutions) created a tenuous equilibrium based on half-reformed, ineffective institutions ill-suited for the present era.
Either some authoritarian or democratic revolution from below or some form of transition had to come in the mid- to long-term, and to the extent the 'mini-revolutions' fail to establish some viable order based on the better use of coercion or the consolidation of democratic and market institutions, they may occur again.
In some ways, these colored revolutions, once they are fully researched, may be shown to have been considerably or mostly second-wave revolutions from above - changes of power that would not have occurred without a major role being played by opposition figures already holding office and using state resources to organize and finance their revolutions (along with some foreign assistance).
The activity of the revolutionaries as state leaders now in power, not in opposition, shows the limited commitment they may have had to democratization and rule of law, evidenced by weak efforts at fighting corruption, anti-democratic measures such as Saakashvili's abandonment of elections for the mayor of Tbilisi, and possible property grabs in the form of renationalization in Ukraine.
[7] Dale Herspring, professor of political science at Kansas State University [Manhattan, Kansas]:
The problem the West faces in thinking that "colored" revolutions will break out in all 15 former Soviet republics is that we assume that everyone in the world wants a polity just like our own and that all that has to happen is a revolution - and behold, the country in question is now democratic.
However, the situation is more complex. For example, it is hard for the Western media to understand that when the Russians - for example - use the term "demokratizatsia" it does not mean what we refer to as democracy.
One may translate it that way, but it does not follow that the Russians (or many others) understand that to refer to a participatory political culture. In effect, in Russia, it means much more of a subject culture.
Russians want the right to have an impact, to vote on their leaders, but many in the West cannot get it through their heads that they do not necessarily want the oppositional type government that we enjoy. Leaders should lead, but not be totalitarian. Authoritarian is OK to a point, but a strong leader is expected.
Will this kind of a subject culture remain forever? Of course not. Political culture changes all the time and it will change in the case of Russia too. Furthermore, one of the problems with the colored revolutions is that, if they are going to be democratic as the West understands the term, then attitudes supporting a participatory political culture must exist.
They clearly do not exist in either Ukraine or Georgia. This does not mean that the country may not be more or less democratic.
What impact do events in Georgia or Ukraine have on the Russian populace? My suspicion is probably very little. It is important to elites, but I think Ivan Ivanovich is concerned about other, more important matters - like putting something on the table for dinner tonight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Peter Lavelle, plavelle@untimely-thoughts.com, July 22, 2005 Untimely Thoughts, http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/?art=1833 Vol 3, no 123 (346) Experts on "staglution" & Western NGOs
More and more folks in Russia hate Putin, whether they will manifest this with colors who knows...
From the headline I thought it was about Arlen moving to a part of the world more in keeping with his leftist views.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.