Watie, I know enough history to know that it was not Lincoln's primary motivation at the start of the war. There are many posts on this thread, contemporary threads, and prior threads which point that out, so let's not beat the dead horse of Union motiviation. I don't usually discuss Union motivation because it has been well-documented over the last 140+/- years. I don't believe in the "War of Union Agression" anyway - its a myth. I have referred to it as the "War for Southern Independence," which is a proper reflection of what the conflict was all about. "The War between the States," I believe, is not as accurate, because it was a "national conflict."
Many of the Southern apologists cite Lincoln's 1848 statement about the right to throw off a government. But Lincoln's proviso was the revolution needed a "just cause" What was teh South's "just cause?" I put the onus on the Southern leaders. What were their motivations? They precipitated the conflict.
SW - "{T}he Emancipation Proclamation was ONLY passed because the north feared that GB, France & Canada would enter the WBTS on the southern side."
As a Presidential Proclamation, it did not need to be passed, as it was an order by the President. Again, historians have long noted that Lincoln aimed his proclamation at areas of the country much of which he did not control, namely the rebel states. The proclamation was, in part, a bit of political bravado, but in another sense, Lincoln added more fuel to the Northern war fires by articulating the abolitionist aspect of his political coalition. The South was fighting its war of independence to further thecause of enslavement as an economic tool. The North began the war by fighting to prevent the "balkanization" of the United States and destroy the illegitimate secessionist ethos in the deep south.
The idea that France, Great Britain, or Canada were going to enter the war on behalf of the South is one of the greatest myths and frauds ever perpetrated on the public. Canada (then still a British possession until 1867) had a thriving commercial relationship with its southern neighbors (that is, the Northern states on the Canadian border). The Canadians wished to steer clear of the Ameerican conflict. Even though some Southern terrorists and their sympathetic fellow-travelers, the Copperheads, operated at time out of Canada, the Canadians arrested them when possible. Politically, Canada was going through a re-organization of its own. As for Great Britain and France, they never even recognized the CSA. The first step toward intervention would have been to trade ambassadors. It didn't happen. Allowing rebel warships to enter ports or take on stores is one thing, but to interven militarily is quite another. To discuss contingencies and "what ifs" as part of a government, as did the French and British, does not mean that recognition was a fait accompli.
In fact, as William C. Davis notes, "Unfortunately, the whole [recognition story] is nonsense, a fiction based upon carelessness with the facts, false logic, and a willingness to which all too many of us are prone simply to accept what we have heard without examining it further." The British, at the time of Antietam, were not considering CSA recognition, but rather, to offer to act as a mediator in settling differences. Davis continued, "In short, the notion of foreign recognition and Confederate victory being narrowly averted by McClellan's equivocal win at Antietam is pure myth. They were never even a remote possibility." "SW - [L]incoln & many other northern political leaders said they had NO interest in freeing slaves ANYWHERE until early 1863,when the WBTS was going badly for their side."
If you only focus on the Shenandoah Campaign and the battles in Northern Virginia, you might say the war "was going badly" for the North. Just as Jefferson Davis had to stick with the bumbling Joseph Johnston and Braxton Bragg in the west, for lack of other competent leadership, Lincoln was stuck with the timid McClelland and other weak generals of the Army of the Potomac. Let's face it, Lee, Stonewall Jacksone, and Longstreet were the best the confederates had, and even at a disadvantage numerically, they were able to outwit and outmaneuver the North.
On the other hand, in the "Department of the West," the South started retreating in 1861 and never stopped. The death of Albert Sidney Johnston during his loss at Shiloh was a blow the from which the south could never recover. Until the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863, there were no notable southern successes outside of Virginia. (I am not including raids and other guerilla actions, especially in the "Trans-Mississippi" area, because the played no decisive role in the overall conflict.)
By July 4, 1863, with the twin coffin nails at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, the military fate of the South was sealed. In fact, the "Anaconda Plan" war plan, laided out by old Winfield Scott in early 1861, had pretty much gone the way as planned. The Virginia Theater of Operations did not go well for the north until meade took over and Grant arrived. However, the overall "War" never went badly; in fact, it stayed on plan.
The Proclamation did make the south radioactive in terms of international support. Whatever chance the south had for recognition by the UK or France pretty well ended at that time.
Myth has obscured this, but it is definitely true.
Walt
traditional scholarship when i was in grad school in the '60s was PRO-southern and the damnyankees got mauled in the classrooms of the US as badly as the rebels mauled the federals in every theatre until mid-63.
our side could have held the southland AND the trans-mississippi for a VERY long time had Marse Robert fought a defensive/guerrilla war on OUR soil, rather than making attacks in PA & MD. sooner or later the north would have given up trying to re-conquer the CSA. (may i remind you what a relative few VC did to US troops in RVN?)
free dixie,sw