We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 444 U.S. 990 (1979), limited to the following questions:
"(1) Is the doctrine of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , applicable to the bifurcated procedure employed by Texas in capital cases? (2) If so, did the exclusion from jury service in the present case of prospective jurors pursuant to Texas Penal Code 12.31 (b) violate the doctrine of Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra?" 2
Also, the decision was written like this:
We repeat that the State may bar from jury service those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths. But in the present case Texas has applied 12.31 (b) to exclude jurors whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or might not [448 U.S. 38, 51] be affected. It does not appear in the record before us that these individuals were so irrevocably opposed to capital punishment as to frustrate the State's legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally valid death penalty scheme. Accordingly, the Constitution disentitles the State to execute a sentence of death imposed by a jury from which such prospective jurors have been excluded.
The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is consequently reversed to the extent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty.
IOW, very narrow, not broad.
We repeat that the State may bar from jury service those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths.
The state may bar jurors who would nullify laws.
To continue with your quote:
But, in the present case, Texas has applied §12.31(b) to exclude jurors whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or might not [448 U.S. 51] be affected.
"Special seriousness" isn't jury nullification and your quote offers zero support for your position.