That's a very perceptive question, but in order to answer properly I think it is necessary to clarify the meaning of "nature" as used in your distinction between "nature" and "intelligence".
ARRRRGGGHHH! Boggled down in definitions. I'm pinging general_re because such definitions may affect his test. Without debating for a semester, and without trying to supersede the whole purpose of the thread, can we agree, provisionally, on the following:
Nature: By this, I mean something that happens, or that is formed, "naturally," in accordance with the laws of physics, chemistry, etc., and without intelligent intervention (ignoring the issue of whether Providence is deliberately causing everything to happen) -- for example, the Mississippi River, as it existed before humans lived in North America, is natural.Intelligence (or Design): By this, I mean things or events that are the result of intelligent intervention in the otherwise natural processes of the universe -- for example, the Hoover Dam, the Panama Canal, etc., are not natural.
One could say that what the bees do is "designed" in the same sense that what the thermostat does is "designed". When I build a thermostat, I build it to perform a specific sort of function, so that function is performed by design - my design, not the thermostat's. Similarly, one could claim that what the bees do is "designed" because their designer built them to do what they do - make hives. So it's a design on the part of the designer of the bees, not the bees themselves.
But for the thermostat, we know that because we know there are designers of thermostats who make them on purpose to do what they do. On the other hand, for beehives, the existence of their designer is the thing we're supposed to be proving. We can't simply take it to be true that the designer exists and therefore the beehive is designed in some sense, like we can with thermostats - that's the thing we're supposed to be showing to be true, and assuming it's true is begging the question. And even if you do continue along these lines, what you eventually run into is the problem of having no way to say that something isn't designed.
I'd be curious to know how "useful" such definitions are and if anyone is aware of clarifications posing as conditions. As for conditions, they have been previously agreed to. (cf. post 1253 and post 14 and following). We are liable to render this game obsolete with amendations by way of clarification. It may be that the conditions for a game wherein the stakes are slightly higher than "Scrabble" may require more fine print from the start.
In addition, general_re has made it clear that the conditions should be limited in a way that prevents us from exceeding the parameters: Now, I suspect the fallback position is to say that the bees and the thermostat are themselves designed, but I'm not asking about the bees and the thermostat - I want to know about emergent structures and processes like beehives and heating cycles....
He has also made it clear that the conditions must impinge on the very theory of ID. This means that parameters of the game --and I ask, do they or do they not?-- include the conditions that are admitted by those theorists--especially in the hope of making conclusions such as: I am testing the claims of ID theory - that design is real
In that case, and if general_re's object shares our general consent, your definition of Nature will have to be set aside unless it squares with those of the theorists to be debunked. Otherwise we have a game within a game usurping the conclusion.
A way out help us through this conundrum is to admit with Aristotle that reason is a structure inside the universe and is conditional. But the argument of the ID theorists (I suspect) is using some form of captatio benevolantia, agreeing to the initial condition granted by their opponents, namely, that reason is more than that.
One thing always buried in the competition is an important logical distinction about conclusions. They may be true or valid or both. Evidently a design inference (as any inference) can be valid. It is true insofar as the conditions are real.
Those with enough political deviancy will have taken a cue that they must hop skip and jump between validity and truthfulness whenever useful.
It is possible that the ID folks are pragmatists after all (from my experience, political interests will easily make pragmatists out of most) and they are hoping like anyone else that their house will stand in the end. In short, they are hoping their conditions are true. It is easy enough to get validity in proof. The rest, as Aristotle already knew, is divination.