Replies

The judge had no authority to rule one way or the other as to whether or not ID or Evolution was science or religion. ... I have a law degree. I am an appellate Lawyer.

How nice. I assume you've read the opinion. And you therefore know that the judge was bound by Edwards v. Aguillard, holding that creationism doesn't belong in science class. That's the law, and conservative judges follow the law.

The defendant school board knew that too, as did their lawyers and the propagandists at the Discovery Institute. So the defense they cooked up (which has been in the works for years) was that they weren't pushing creationism. Oh no, heaven forbid! They were pushing ID. And ID is science! Yes indeed, science. Nothing but. So Edwards v. Aguillard doesn't apply. Right? That's the defense. That's the issue the school board presented to the court.

So what's a judge to do? Take their word for it and dismiss the case? Is that what you're claiming judges should do? Well, perhaps things are different where you practice law. Judge Jones didn't take the defendants at their word. Instead, he took testimony on their defense -- which is pretty much what goes on in every court.

And the record is an avalanche of evidence that ID is creationism and nothing but creationism. So the shabby defense didn't work. And the judge -- good conservative jurist that he is -- did his job as he's supposed to do.

First of all the judge is bound not by stare decisis but by the constitution. The decision on Edwards v. Aguilar was narrow and applied only to requirments in the curriculum. there were no requirments to teach ID in the Dover case so Edwards v. Aguilar is not applicable.

Perhaps you should read Scalis's dissent in Edwards v. Aguilard and decide if you agree with the majority or the dissent in that case.

Scalia predicted that the Lemon Test would be abused and it has.

"In the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence (7) on the ground that it "sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S., at 662. One commentator has aptly characterized this as "a euphemism . . . for . . . the absence of any principled rationale." Choper, supra n. 7, at 681. I think it time that we sacrifice some "flexibility" for "clarity and predictability." Abandoning Lemon's purpose test -- a test which exacerbates the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the language or history of the Amendment, and, as today's decision shows, has wonderfully flexible consequences -- would be a good place to start."

You want to argue with that?