[Ken H]

"For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests."

As I said, the states take their dispute to the court where it is then settled without involving Congress.

Your case cite is consistent with Marshall's opinion in Gibbons. States do not have the power to regulate commerce among the several States. If a State exercises such power, then under article III the Court may strike it down. See Sandy's explanation:

Sandy: That when Congress has not acted upon an area under its authority, then the implication was that Congress didn't want that area acted upon at all. And to this argument, what did Marshall reply? "There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted."

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1414947/posts?page=256#256

None of which has to do with the meaning of "rather than". You still have provided no counter source to my citations.

[robertpaulsen]

"If a State exercises such power, then under article III the Court may strike it down."

It may. Sure, that's their job to make that determination. But if the Court doesn't -- as in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company? Then the state "commerce" law stands as constitutional.

"Rather than" is "rather than". What's to say? It implies a choice -- it doesn't exclude.

And I'm not going to waste both our time with some archaic quote as support which you won't accept anyways, just as I don't accept your "biblical interpretation of a Proverb".