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ANA Westin Hotel, Washington, D.C.
20 October 1994
INTRODUCTION
Within the next few weeks, the Congress is expected to make decisions that will bear upon the viability of the United States' undersea warfare capabilities for the foreseeable future. This will be the likely effect of pending legislative initiatives that will determine what sorts of advanced nuclear-powered submarines are manufactured in this country -- and by whom.
To answer these questions thoughtfully, a larger set of issues must be considered: What is the importance of undersea assets to deterrence and U.S. security in the post-Cold War world? What are the implications of the Clinton Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) for the Nation's sea-based deterrent? What are the technological threats -- both present and future -- to U.S. undersea forces? What impact will arms control have on future U.S. force structure options? And what, in turn, are the consequences of the responses to these questions for the U.S. submarine-building industrial base and for the costs of its products?
Anticipating the need for careful consideration of these critical issues, the Center for Security Policy on 20 October 1994 convened a day-long "High-Level Roundtable Discussion on the Future of U.S. Strategic and Tactical Undersea Forces" involving over fifty senior past and present government officials and others with considerable expertise in this field. (This Roundtable was the second in a series of such symposiums conducted by the Center on major national security issues of the day. The first, held in June 1994, dealt with the future of the manned bomber force.)
Among the participants were: former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Caspar Weinberger; the former Director of Naval Nuclear Reactors, Admiral Kinnaird McKee; former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Al Burkhalter; former Under Secretary of Defense Don Hicks; and former chief strategic arms negotiator, Ambassador Linton Brooks. (A full list of participants is attached.)
This paper briefly summarizes the key points that emerged in the course of the Center's latest Roundtable Discussion. While much of the discussion dealt with the status of the sea-based ballistic missile force, most of the observations noted below bear on the future need for competent tactical underwater capabilities, as well.
No effort was made to define or formally approve consensus positions on these topics; nor were specific recommendations adopted by the group. Nevertheless, this summary sets forth a number of points that appeared to be generally agreed upon -- and which apply directly to pending decisions concerning the viability of U.S. submarine forces and America's capacity to maintain a credible sea-based deterrent in the future.
I. FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSEA ASSETS TO DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
The lead discussant for the first part of the day's program was Admiral Kinnaird McKee (USN, Ret.), former director of Naval Nuclear Reactors and a career submarine officer. His remarks, and the discussion that followed, focused in particular on the Clinton Administration's planned cutbacks in U.S. undersea assets in response to the recommendations contained in the Nuclear Posture Review. Highlights of the discussion included the following observations:
- The U.S. deterrent posture has relied heavily on the undersea leg of the nuclear triad (land-based missiles, manned bombers and ballistic missile submarines) because it is difficult -- if not impossible -- for potential adversaries to detect submarines that can swiftly and without fanfare be brought to bear on trouble-spots around the world. The NPR proposes to shrink America's fleet ballistic missile submarine fleet through a program of budgetary constraints and a slow strangulation of the industrial base.
- The submarine fleet's inherent characteristics of stealth, mobility and firepower impose a "terrible burden" of both certainty and uncertainty on potential adversaries: They are certain of the awesome destructive capability of our submarine force, but they are completely uncertain of exactly where that force is located. It provides the U.S. a great amount of tactical and strategic leverage in a variety of situations.
- The Clinton Administration proposes to retire four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) by 2004, ostensibly in compliance with START Treaty limits. Yet the START treaties require mutual and balanced reductions -- and Russia has yet to begin comparable reductions under START I. Neither has it ratified START II. Helping the Russians become a democracy by setting an example through unilateral restraint is not sound defense policy. In any event, the START treaties require the reduction of warheads -- not submarines.
- Retired nuclear submarines cannot safely be "put into mothballs" as can surface ships or diesel submarines. The cost to man and maintain a nuclear submarine in storage is virtually comparable to maintaining it on active duty. As a practical matter, therefore, if budgetary constraints are not relaxed, "retired" submarines will have to be dismantled ("turned into razor blades"). There will be no way to call them back into service if the need arises at a later date.
- The Administration is attempting to reduce the defense budget for its own reasons and blames it on treaties -- such as START II -- that are not in force yet and that may never be. The treaties are being used as a smoke screen to hide the Administration's real strategy -- cut the defense budget to conform to an illusory "deficit reduction plan," then define the threats in the rest of the world in such a way as to justify this smaller defense budget. Sound national security policy dictates that defense budgets react to the international threat environment. The Clinton Administration is attempting to conjure up a world with no threats to justify its decision to decrease defense spending.
- Higher defense levels cannot be reconstituted quickly. If relations with Russia turn sour and we have made the cuts suggested by the NPR, it will take at least five years for the United States to regain an adequate ballistic missile submarine force structure.
- Paying the Russians to reduce their arsenal -- as provided for in the Nunn-Lugar amendment -- has proven to be largely self-defeating: Moscow is using at least some of the funds to develop new military technology. The United States may soon be in the absurd position of are paying both for the weapons systems against which it must defend as well as bearing increased costs in order to redress the effects of U.S.-funded improvements to Russian military capabilities.
II. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE SEA-BASED DETERRENT
The discussion then turned to a more general examination of the Nuclear Posture Review and the assumptions about current and future Russian behavior contained therein. The lead discussant for this topic was Dr. Daniel Goure, Deputy Director, Political-Military Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Key points made in the course of this portion of the Roundtable included:
- The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects a benign view of a world in which there are "problem areas," but no strategic threats to the United States. In fact, the NPR's central premise is that the U.S. and Russia currently are partners and will remain partners for the foreseeable future. The notion of using military force for strategic purposes is totally absent from the Clinton Administration's view of the world.
- If this unrealistic view of the world is accepted, it follows that the Clinton Administration can then attempt to: stop the production of essential elements of the U.S. nuclear weapons program; curtail nuclear research and development funding; reduce the submarine industrial base to a sole-source situation; and cut the number of undersea platforms to a minimum.
- The NPR anticipates that START Treaty compliance will require the retirement of four SSBNs and begins the budgetary strangulation that will ensure that the boats will be cut up by 2004, even if Russia is not in compliance (assuming that both START Treaties have come fully into force). If, on the other hand, the Russians do not reduce their armaments to treaty levels, the U.S. will not be able to reconstitute its submarine fleet. There is no planning or provision in the NPR for a situation in which Russia's interests diverge from our own.
- The main problem with the NPR is that it leads irrevocably to a significant erosion of the U.S. nuclear deterrent at a time when it is not merely unclear, but unlikely, that Russia will remain a friendly, non-competitive power. The NPR provides no "hedge" against a renewed strategic threat -- whether from Russia or some other source. There needs to be a point at which the NPR's course can be reversed upon a showing that its premise of a rosy future is incorrect.
- Russia's current program of aggressive military development is not seen by the Administration as the strategic problem -- the potential threat to the nation's security -- that it is. Rather, it is regarded merely as an inconvenience, something that gets in the way of the supposed U.S.-Russian "partnership." The fact that the Russian defense industry is building new, better weapons is seen as a problem of "inadequate defense conversion" rather than as deliberate, not to say threatening, Russian military planning.
- Moreover, the NPR cripples deterrence by setting building and reduction priorities that ensure degradation of U.S. capabilities: The United States is continuing vigorous production in areas where it has the capability to surge production in the event of crisis (e.g., aircraft) and reducing -- if not destroying -- production capability in the one area where protracted lead-times require steady, long-term commitment (e.g., nuclear submarines).
- Before the U.S. embarks on the cutbacks envisioned in the NPR, the Clinton Administration needs to ask the following questions: What evidence do we have that Russia is currently engaged in or is planning to implement substantial reductions in its nuclear capabilities? Does the NPR really permit the U.S. to reverse its course of nuclear reductions and reconstitute its capabilities if Russia does not reduce? Is the United States realistically going to be in a position to reconstitute its nuclear forces if Russia fails to ratify START II?
III. THE FUTURE THREAT TO U.S. UNDERSEA FORCES
The lead discussants in the third segment of the Roundtable were Vice Admiral Al Burkhalter, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Anthony Battista, a former, long-time Professional Staff Member of the House Armed Services Committee. They led an animated discussion of current and future developments in Russia and around the world that may give rise to serious challenges to U.S. undersea forces. Among the highlights of this segment's discussion were the following points:
- There are two direct threats to the U.S. undersea force: (1) an undiminished -- and improving -- Russian submarine development program; and (2) the proliferation of state-of-the-art diesel submarines, most often sold by Russia to dangerous countries in regions of strategic interest to the U.S. (e.g., Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Latin America, etc.)
- The Russian "bear" might be sleeping, but it is certainly not dead. A fourth generation Russian submarine with capabilities that may outshine the best American subs is expected to be launched shortly. This indicates that, in spite of the chaotic state of the Russian economy, Russian military technological development has not ceased. Indeed, as the U.S. reduces its submarine building schedule to, at best, one sub every one-and-a-half years, Russia continues to build at a rate of two-to-three submarines per year. Evidently, their nuclear shipbuilding base retains a high priority both within the military sector and vis a vis the domestic economy.
- By contrast, the vulnerability of the U.S. submarine fleet is growing as its numbers diminish. Moreover, Russian anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities -- particularly in the field of synthetic aperture radar -- are increasing at the same time that U.S. ASW capabilities are being severely constrained by shrinking R&D and procurement budgets.
- While the U.S. submarine fleet remains overall better, quieter and faster than its Russian counterpart, the gap is closing rapidly. Russia will shortly have -- if it does not already have -- comparable capabilities in a large number of submarines and a significantly larger fleet.
- There seems to be a state of denial in the Administration concerning Russian submarine developments -- as the Russians continue to advance, we are cutting submarine research and development funds. The Administration wishes the Russian threat away because of budget concerns.
- Although diesel submarines can be used to fight so-called "brown water navies" such as those found in the Third World, and are substantially cheaper than nuclear subs, they are no substitute for nuclear submarines because they cannot rapidly travel long distances from port submerged and cannot remain on station for long periods of time, ready to exploit an opportunity indefinitely.
IV. ARMS CONTROL AND FUTURE U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS
This segment of the Roundtable featured a presentation by Sven Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control on the National Security Council, and remarks by Ambassador Linton Brooks, chief U.S. negotiator for the START II Treaty. Among the key points made in the course of this part of the discussion were the following:
- The NPR does not identify Russia as an arena of potential conflict to which U.S. forces must be able to respond. NPR advocates conclude that if Russia is no longer a threat, then the defense platforms, built during the Cold War to counter that threat must no longer be essential to our defense. The trouble with this analysis is that the assumptions about the diminished Russian threat are not being borne out by Russia's stated intentions or U.S. intelligence evidence. The Administration is neither listening to the intelligence community nor crediting Russian statements as reflecting their intentions.
- The bottom line is that the Russian threat is real and largely undiminished. It is being ignored by the Clinton Administration. The U.S. is eroding its security posture in a period when it faces more instability, not less.
- A prime example of failing to make provision for the future in the face of a continued threat is the Clinton Administration's policy concerning an essential element for the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons -- tritium. The Energy Department has closed the only tritium-source reactor for safety reasons without making provision to build a substitute. It will take ten years to build a new tritium reactor. The U.S. will run out of usable tritium in about that time. Thereafter, a significant portion of America's most modern nuclear weapons will become unreliable and/or unusable.
- As the United States continues to denuclearize, it is losing valuable nuclear expertise, expertise which will be necessary -- but, unfortunately, nonexistent -- should it have to meet a nuclear threat in the future.
- The Clinton Administration is basing defense budget decisions on the assumption that START II is going to be implemented in Russia. What has not been discussed candidly is the fact that the United States may not be able to turn back if START II is never fully implemented.
V. INDUSTRIAL BASE AND AFFORDABILITY ISSUES
The lead discussant for the final segment concerning the condition of and prospects for America's nuclear submarine production base and the options for building affordable nuclear subs was Bob Gillcash, Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT). Among the noteworthy points made in the course of this segment were the following:
- The Administration is allowing the budgeteers to define force structure. That is, rather than beginning by defining the threats and the mission requirements to meet those threats followed by budgeting to fulfill the missions, the Administration is designing the missions to suit the budget.
- In the absence of sound strategic planning, the Navy is losing the ability to produce submarines. Vendors and contractors are taking themselves out -- or are being forced out -- of competition for government contracts. The industrial base is being ignored in decision-making about the needs of the submarine fleet. Because of the budgetary restraints being imposed by the Clinton Administration, the Navy is no longer making long-term investment decisions essential to preserve an effective underwater fleet and the industrial infrastructure needed to support it.
- The industrial base is not simply a system to build submarines. To be viable, it must also be a system for repairing and maintaining them and for developing the next generation of undersea combatants.
- In the period 1982-1991, the United States produced 37 submarines; in the period 1992-2001, only four U.S. submarines are planned, and that could fall to three. This represents a 90% drop in production. As a result, skilled welders, nuclear engineers, naval architects and other specialists in submarine production are moving into the civilian sector. Many of them will be unavailable to build the next generation of nuclear submarines when they are needed. The fall-off in capability in the submarine sector is faster than in other military/industrial sectors because of the drastic reduction in construction.
- Moreover, low production rates mean higher per-unit costs. A prime example of this phenomenon is the UK submarine construction program, which is so slow -- one ship every two years -- that there is no competition for component supply: Each component has only one supplier, creating a monopoly allowing the supplier to charge the government the highest price possible.
- By 2010, even if the United States manages to produce between one and two nuclear submarines per year, the number of decommissioned ships will overtake the number of those in production. The U.S. will not be able to meet the final force structure numbers contained in the Administration's own Bottom-up Review.
CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, the Center's Roundtable Discussion on the future of the submarine force made a powerful case for an immediate course correction concerning U.S. sea-based deterrent and associated industrial capabilities. As the American submarine fleet includes the most survivable leg of the Nuclear Triad and many of the Nation's most flexible and potent war-fighting instruments, the size and condition of this force must not be allowed to deteriorate to the point where its credibility, utility and/or survivability are imperilled.
It follows from this discussion that the United States cannot afford to disregard the need for a robust and highly competitive industrial base to support its future undersea war fighting needs. In the face of available information about the present and emerging threat, there can be little doubt that further erosion of U.S. capability to design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear-powered submarines would be unacceptable.
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