You ignore the much more likely scenario of 50 republics doing an imitation of the Italian states during the Renaissance or the European nations of the 17th and 18th centuries.
You left out the third choice. They can go their seperate ways.
The problem is that the entire point at issue was whether the people of the southern states constituted a separate "people" with the right to secede as stated by the D of I. Surely you will agree that not any random group of people constitute a "people" with the right to withdraw from the government. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would mean that any two people have the right to reject their governments authority and rebel against it, as they decided that the two of them constitute a "people." Therefore, the two of us probably agree that any random two persons are not a "people," but that the American colonists were.
Most southerners believed they were a "people." Unionists, most of whom lived in the North or border states, strongly disagreed, believing that the people of all the United States constituted a single "people." There really was no way to settle this particular disagreement without violence.
Why in your opinion is it likely that the States of a Confederacy instituted for free trade and mutual defense on the principles of Republican government constitute a threat akin to hereditary despotisms? Your putting the two in a sentence together is not an argument. Why do you consider Republics hostile to peace? It would seem, given the countless foreign nations we've marched troops to since the Civil War, that our consolidated democracy in Washington, D.C. is the biggest threat our States have to peace.
The problem is that the entire point at issue was whether the people of the southern states constituted a separate "people" with the right to secede as stated by the D of I. Surely you will agree that not any random group of people constitute a "people" with the right to withdraw from the government.
You're right, I don't. I accept Madison's definition of 'the people' with respect to the power granted to the Union and reserved to the States and 'the people'. In Federalist Paper 39, James Madison, the father of the Constitution, cleared up what "the people" meant, saying the proposed Constitution would be subject to ratification by the people, "not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong." In Federalist Paper 45, Madison guaranteed: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."
The State's power to secede is spelled out in the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution does not forbid the State's the power to secede. In fact, the Constitution was specifically amended via the Bill of Rights to ensure "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." (9th amendment) "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." (10th amendment)
Now tell me where the Constitution forbids the people the right expressed in the Declaration of Independence to form political bonds of their choosing.
Unionists, most of whom lived in the North or border states, strongly disagreed, believing that the people of all the United States constituted a single "people." There really was no way to settle this particular disagreement without violence.
Correction, there was no way for the 'Unionists' to exercise their tyranny on the South and establish a limitless, consolidated government without invasion and violence. When the 'Unionists' stacked the dead hundreds of thousands high they had to find something worth the price, their quest for power over their countrymen certainly wasn't justification, even if it had been their reason.
You really need to read Federalist #39. The Constitution was not intended to create a 'national' government, and Madison made them very clear:
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the federal form, which regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.
First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a national, but a federal act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal, and not a national constitution.