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[jsuati #204] This was totally different than the degraded condition Southern slaves were kept in partially through laws which made teaching them to read a crime.

"In the Northern states, we are not slaves to individuals, not personal slaves, yet in many respects we are the slaves of the community."
-- Frederick Douglass, 1848

Aimed against an attempt to educate Black children in Connecticut, a law was enacted to shut down the school of Prudence Crandall.

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened, That no person shall set up or establish in this state any school, academy, or literary institution, for the instruction or education of coloured persons, who are not inhabitants of this state, nor instruct or teach in any school, academy, or other literary institution whatever in this state, or harbour or board, for the purpose of attending or being taught or instructed in any such school, academy, or literary institution, any coloured person who is not an inhabitant of any town in this state, without the consent in writing, first obtained of a majority of the civil authority, and also of the select-men of the town in which such school, academy, or literary institution is situated; and each and every person who shall knowingly do any act forbidden as aforesaid, or shall be aiding or assisting therein, shall, for the first offence, forfeit and pay to the treasurer of this state, a fine of one hundred dollars, and for the second offence, shall forfeit and pay a fine of two hundred dollars, and so double for every offence of which he or she shall be convicted. And all informing officers are required to make due presentment of all breaches of this act. Provided, That nothing in this act shall extend to any district school established in any school society under the laws of this state, or to any school established by any school society under the laws of this state, or to any incorporated academy or incorporated school for instruction in this state."

In the case of State of Connecticut v. Crandall, at Brooklyn, October term, 1833, before David Daggett, Ch. J., the court instructed the jury as follows:

"This is an information filed by the attorney for the state, for an alleged violation of a statute law, passed by the General Assembly, at their last session, relating to inhabitants; the preamble to the act, embracing the reasons for the law.
"It is alleged in this information, that since the 22d day of August last, to wit, on the 24th day of September, 1833, the defendant has, wilfully and knowingly, harboured and boarded coloured persons not inhabitants of the state, for the purposes mentioned in said act, without having obtained in writing, the consent of the civil authority and the selectment of Canterbury where the school had been set up. As to the facts in this case, there seems to be but little controversy. It has scarcely been denied, that coloured persons have been harboured and boarded, by the defendant, for the objects alleged, within the time set forth in this information. You, gentlemen of the jury, have heard the evidence, and as it is your exclusive business to pass upon these facts, you will say whether or not they are true.
"If these facts are not proved to your satisfaction, then you may dismiss the cause; for in that event, you have no further duty to perform. If, however, you find the facts true, then another duty equally important, devolves upon the jury. It is an undeniable proposition, that the jury are judges of both law and fact, in all cases of this nature. It is, however, equally true, that the court is to state its opinion to the jury, upon all questions of law, arising in the trial of a criminal cause, and to submit to their consideration, both law and fact, without any direction how to find their verdict.
"The counsel for the defendant, have rested her defence upon a provision of the constitution of the United States, claiming that the statute law of this state, upon which this information is founded, is inconsistent with that provision, and, therefore, void. This is the great question involved in this case: and it is about to be submitted to your consideration.
"It is admitted, that there are no provisions in the constitution of this state, which conflict with this act. It may be remarked here, that the constitution of the United States, is above all other law, -- it is emphatically the supreme law of the land, and the judges are so to declare it. From the highest court to the lowest, even that of a justice of the peace, all laws, whether made by Congress or state legislatures, are subject to examination, and when brought to the test of the constitution, may be declared utterly void. But in order to do this, the court should first find the law contrary, and plainly contrary, to the constitution. Although this may be done, and done too, by the humblest court, yet it never should be done but upon a full conviction that the law in question is unconstitutional.
"Many things said upon this trial, may be laid out of the case. The consideration of slavery, with all its evils and degrading consequences, may be dismissed with the consideration that it is a degrading evil. The benefits, blessings and advantages of instruction and education, may also cease to claim your attention, except you may well consider that education is a 'fundamental privilege,' for this is the basis of all free government.
"Having read this law, the question comes to us with peculiar force, does it clearly violate the constitution of the United States? The section claimed to have been violated, reads as follows, to wit: Art. 4. sec. 2. 'The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' It has been urged, that this section was made to direct, exclusively, the action of the general government, and therefore, can never be applied to state laws. This is not the opinion of the court. The plain and obvious meaning of this provision, is to secure to the citizens of all the states, the same privileges as are secured to our own, by our own state laws. Should a citizen of Connecticut purchase a farm in Massachusetts, and the legislature of Massachusetts tax the owner of that farm, four times as much as they would tax a citizen of Massachusetts, because the one resided in Connecticut and the other in Massachusetts; or should a law be passed, by either of those states, that no citizen of the other, should reside or trade in that other, this would, undoubtedly, be an unconstitutional law, and should be so declared.
"The second section was provided as a substitute for the 4th article of the Confederation. That article has also been read, and by comparing them, you can perceive the object intended by the substitute.
"The act in question provides, that coloured persons, who are not inhabitants of this State, shall not be harboured and boarded for the purposes therein mentioned, within this state, without the consent of the civil authority and select-men of the town. We are, then, brought to the great question, are they citizens within the provisions of this section of the constitution? The law extends to all persons of colour not inhabitants of this state, whether they live in the state of New-York, or in the West-Indies, or in any other foreign country.
"In deciding this question, I am happy that my opinion can be revised, by the supreme court of this state and of the United States, should you return a verdict against the defendant.
"The persons contemplated in this act are not citizens within the obvious meaning of that section of the constitution of the United States, which I have just read. Let me begin, by putting this plain question. Are Slaves citizens? At the adoption of the constitution of the United States, every state was a slave state. Massachusetts had begun the work of emancipation within her own borders. And Connecticut, as early as 1784, had also enacted laws making all those free at the age of 25, who might be born within the State, after that time. We all know, that slavery is recognized in that constitution; and it is the duty of this court to take that constitution as it is, for we have sworn to support it. Although the term 'slavery' cannot be found written out in the constitution, yet no one can mistake the object of the 3d section of the 4th article: 'No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered, upon claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.'
"The 2d section of the 1st article, reads as follows: -- 'Representatives and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.' The 'other persons' are slaves, and they became the basis of representation, by adding them to the white population in that proportion. Then slaves were not considered citizens by the framers of the constitution.
"A citizen means a freeman. By referring to Dr. Webster, one of the most learned men of this or any other country, we have the following definition of the term -- 'Citizen: 1. A native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of the city in which he resides. 2. A townsman, a man of trade, not a gentleman. 3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any city, town or country. 4. In the United States, it means a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of purchasing and holding real estate.'
"Are Indians citizens? It is admitted in the argument, that they are not; but it is said, they belong to distinct tribes. This cannot be true; because all Indians do not belong to a tribe. It may be now added, that by the declared law of New-York, Indians are not citizens; and the learned Chancellor Kent, says 'they never can be made citizens.' Indians were literally natives of our soil; they were born here; and yet they are not citizens.
"The Mohegans were once a mighty tribe, powerful and valiant; and who among us ever saw one of them performing military duty, or exercising, with the white men, the privilege of the elective franchise, or holding an office? And what is the reason? I answer, they are not citizens, according to the acceptation of the term in the United States.
"Are free blacks citizens? It has been ingeniously said, that vessels may be owned and navigated, by free blacks, and the American flag will protect them; but you will remember, that the statute which makes that provision, is an act of Congress, and not the constitution. Admit, if you please, that Mr. Cuffee, a respectable merchant, has owned vessels, and sailed them under the American flag; yet this does not prove him to be such citizen as the constitution contemplates. But that question stands undecided, by any legal tribunal within my knowledge. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to determine that question.
"It has been also urged, that as coloured persons may commit treason, they must be considered citizens. Every person born in the United States, as well as every person who may reside here, owes allegiance, of some sort, to the government, because the government affords him protection. Treason against this government, consists in levying war against the government of the United States, or aiding its enemy in time of war. Treason may be committed, by persons who are not entitled to the elective franchise. For if they reside under the protection of the government, it would be treason to levy war against that government, as much as if they were citizens.
"I think Chancellor Kent, whose authority it gives me pleasure to quote, determines this question, by fair implication. Had this authority considered free blacks citizens, he had an ample opportunity to say so. But what he has said excludes that idea: In most of the United States, there is a distinction in respect to political privileges, between free white persons and free coloured persons of African blood; and in no part of the country do the latter, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites, in the exercise of civil and political rights. The African race are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society. Marriages are forbidden between them and whites, in some of the states, and when not absolutely contrary to law, they are revolting, and regarded as an offence against public decorum. By the revised statutes of Illinois, published in 1829, marriages between whites and negroes, or mulattos, are declared void, and the persons so married are liable to be whipped, fined and imprisoned. By an old statute of Massachusetts, of 1705, such marriages were declared void, and are so still. A similar statute provision exists in Virginia and North-Carolina. Such connexions in France and Germany, constitute the degraded state of concubinage, which is known in the civil law. But they are not legal marriages, because the parties want that equality of state or condition, which is essential to the contract.' 2 Kent's Comm. 258.
"I go further back still. When the constitution of the United States was adopted, every state, (Massachusetts excepted,) tolerated slavery. And in some of the states, down to a late period, severe laws have been kept in force regarding slaves. With respect to New-York, at that time, her laws and penalties were severe indeed; and it was not until July, 4th, 1827, that this great state was ranked among the free states.
"To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule of construction, to say, that slaves, free blacks, or Indians, were citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this race of men; but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not citizens.
"I have thus shown you that this law is not contrary to the 2d section of the 4th art. of the constitution of the United States; for that embraces only citizens.

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On July 26, 1834, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors dismissed the case against Crandall on a technical issue. The lower court decision that African Americans were not protected as citizens, however, remained standing. Although Crandall had won a technical legal victory and was free to return to her school, the townspeople of Canterbury would not accept the Supreme Court's decision. On the night of September 9, 1834, an angry mob broke in and ransacked the school building. With clubs and iron bars, the mob terrorized the students and broke more than 90 windows. What the Black Law and local ostracism had not been able to accomplish, this mob achieved. Fearing for the girls' safety, Crandall closed the school the following morning.

LINK

From Rhode Island, after being educated at a Society of Friends school in Plainfield, Connecticut, Crandall established her own private school for girls at Canterbury. The school was a great success until she decided to admit a Black girl. Crandall, a committed Quaker refused to change her policy of educating Black and white children. The result, White parents began taking their children away from the school. In March 1833 with the support of William Lloyd Garrison and the Anti-Slavery Society, Crandall opened a school for Black girls in Canterbury.
Local people were furious at this and many tried to prevent the school from receiving essential materials. The school persisted and began to attract girls from Boston and Philadelphia. The local authorities then began using a vagrancy law that meant the girls could be given ten lashes for attending the school. In 1834 Connecticut passed a law making it illegal to provide a free education for Black students. Crandall refused to obey the law and was imprisoned, but won the case on appeal. When news of the court decision reached Canterbury, a white mob attacked the school forcing Crandall to close her school down.

From Mark S. Weiner, Black Trials, Citizenship from the Beginnings of Slavery to the End of Caste, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 115.

On August 12, 1834, crandall was married to a minister who had courted her since the trial had begun. After her school was destroyed, she moved to New York with her new husband, who bled her dry of her money and, it seemed of joy. After he died, she moved to Kansas, gaining a name for her advocacy of feminism and spiritualism.

In those days there was no hereditary slavery based upon race as in the American South.

Well, of course there was hereditary slavery. The race-based distinction is a subject for scholarship. People who like to say "it was all about slavery" also like to say "it was all about race", and then when we get into the details, things get a little more complicated.

For example, your statement gets into trouble if you apply your statement to Jamaica, which recognized some people as "statutorily white", others as "colored" -- and neither were necessarily slaves, either. There were free blacks in the South, including the Virginian I just spoke of, who forged the first lifetime bonds for his servants.

My considered answer is that the identification of slavery with race was in part an accident of history and geography -- Africa was the big slave emporium -- and in part a firebreak for whites, the poorer members of white society being anxious not to be confounded with (black) slaves.

Aesop, for example, was such. Greek slaves were often the teachers of Roman youth.

Yes, yes, and Polybius the historian was another, and Narcissus and Palladius, the Greek slaves who grew great in Claudius's service, fortunately becoming freedmen before they were paid the compliment of assassination by Agrippinilla, Nero's mommy dearest and Claudius's poisoner.

But so what? House slaves always had different duties and easier work than slaves in quarries and fields.

This was totally different than the degraded condition Southern slaves were kept in partially through laws which made teaching them to read a crime....No, of course not but it also did not prevent you from trying to exculpate the Slavers from their guilt.

You still don't get it. I'm not trying to exculpate anyone -- you, on the other hand, are trying to inculpate them on a bad beef just as hard as you can.

In the first place, 19th-century American slaveowners were under no obligation to free their slaves on the representations of English and American abolitionists. There was no consensus informed by anthropology on the equation of black with white humanity: that had to await science. There was Biblical precedent and sanction for bondage, and there was legal sanction in the United States Constitution. So get over your after-the-fact sanctimony and deal with the situation as it existed. The Abolitionists and Abraham Lincoln owed the Southern slave owners an explanation in measured arguments and conversational voices why they wanted to abolish slavery, respect for the slave owners' property rights, and a fair price in redemption of the slaves they wanted to liberate. They also owed it to slave owners, to accept "no" for an answer.

So to say is not to say that in our modern perspective slavery isn't malum in se. Like indentures and other unequal working relationships, it's an old form of labor exploitation and ought to be illegal everywhere. What we are talking about is the legal and moral environment of 140 years ago, however, and the landscape was very different, when child-labor laws in the North bound grasping employers to work their young wards only 10 hours a day, and when it was perfectly legal to lock the fire-escape exits to keep young women workers from sneaking out for pee breaks, as they did at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company.

Besides you wouldn't recognize ignorance if it bit you in the ass.

I recognize you.