You are affirming the consequent again. That, and you are also just plain wrong. The Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout that the court's jurisdiction in habeas corpus comes from the Judicial Act of 1789. Therefore the ONLY way to remove the court's jurisdiction is to repeal, alter, or otherwise suspend the Judicial Act of 1789.
Furthermore, since you are making a jurisdictional argument about a federal court, you necessarily bring Article III, Sections 1 and 2 into play. They read:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."and
"In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
The short end of these clauses is to say that the federal court system gets its jurisdiction from Congress and Congress alone. Only Congress can "ordain and establish" the courts and only congress can make "such exceptions" and "such regulations" as to the judiciary's jurisdiction. Yet we know from 1861 that Congress never altered the judiciary's jurisdiction. Thus it is necessarily so that no jurisdiction was ever stripped from them in that year, making the Murphy case perfectly within the D.C. Circuit Court's realm of cases.
Your reference to the case is fine. It is your credential-less interpretation of it that is suspect.
If having absolutely no credentialed background or expertise in constitutional law is enough to make Harry Jaffa a "constitutional scholar" in your eyes, my coursework in constitutional law is more than good enough of as a credential to rebut him.
Farber refutes that line of reasoning.
"But there is an important exception. A court that lacks the power to hear a case - lacks jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject matter of the case - cannot give itself jurisdiction by fiat. The court's judgment is open to attack on the basis of lack of jurisdiction....
"It probably goes too far to say that the president can always make his own independent determination of whether a court had jurisdiction.... But if the court's exercise of judicial power is a clear usurpation of authority over a case that it has no colorable claim to be hearing, or if the court's claim of jurisdiction invades some critical constitutional policy, then the president may not be obligated to obey. Regard for checks and balances should make us reluctant to go much beyond such extraordinary cases. But when a court acts without jurisdiction at the expense of critical constitutional values, presidential noncompliance coheres with our normal understanding of the biding effect of judicial decrees.
"Whether we take the traditional approach and speak of jurisdiction, or a pragmatic approach based on constitutional policy, the question is ultimately the same: how drastic an effect does habeas suspension have on the courts? Does it merely require them, on the merits, to reject the petition if they find that the suspension is valid? Or does it render them utterly powerless to go forward after being notified of the situation, so that the executive is excused from paying further attention to the proceedings?
"Arguably, a valid suspension of the writ does eliminate the court's very power to proceed. This was apparently Congress's view in the Habeas Corpus Act, which confirmed the suspension. The jurisdictional view is also supported [ironically] by Taney's comment in another case. When a state court received a habeas petition from a federal prisoner, Taney did not merely say that granting relief had been erroneous. Instead, he said, when state judges learn that the petitioner is held in federal custody, 'they can proceed no further.' Thus, when habeas runs into a paramount federal interest, something more than ordinary legal error is involved if the court does not desist.
"The jurisdictional view of suspension also fits the purpose of suspending the writ. Suspension takes place only when needed to preserve public safety during invasion or insurrection. Thus, by definition, we are dealing with dire emergencies. It would be a considerable burden on the officers who are seeking to cope with the emergency if they are required to attend to habeas litigation. habeas proceedings would require them to produce prisoners before a potentially disloyal tribunal and engage in litigation over the validity of their actions. It would also introduce the possibility of release with or without bail. All of this would be highly disruptive to efforts to cope with the emergency. Thus, a plausible argument can be made that during a suspension, the executive not only has a valid legal defense that the habeas court should accept, but he is entitled to ignore any order to appear or to produce or release the prisoner."