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[capitan_refugio, quoting Chief Justice Chase in Texas vs. White] "The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final."

Wait -- don't pike. Quote the rest of that passage, so we can see the context.

It is needless to discuss at length the question whether the right of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause regarded by herself as sufficient is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and [p*725] arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these, the Union was solemnly declared to "be perpetual." And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect Union." It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?
But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government, by the States. Under the Articles of Confederation, each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still all powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this term that the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence, and that, "without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States." Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States. [p*726]
When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution or through consent of the States.
Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest and subjugation.
Our conclusion therefore is that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion.
[Emphasis added]

Texas vs. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868), Chief Justice Chase, Opinion

Here we see Chase channeling Lincoln's "mystical Union" buncombe and rejecting the implications of his being wrong with a telling "therefore".

Chase is wilfully dismissive of the legality and binding nature of the secession ordinance, which was an act of the People not "under" the Constitution, but above it. He also invokes the prerevolutionary "union" phantasm, and weasels the word "perpetual" into the discussion, from the utterly irrelevant Articles of Confederation which never governed Texas at any time and which is significant only in that that is how far Chase has to go, to retrieve the word "perpetual" for his prejudged, political screed, without bothering to inform his readers that the word "perpetual" does not have the meaning in law that he gives it here.

Chase here sits in judgment on issues in which he was himself a participant, in Lincoln's cabinet. There could never have been any doubt that he would parrot Lincoln with every line of every opinion he might be called on to write on the conduct and legality of the war (and from which he would decline to recuse himself as a party in interest), and Texas vs. White is therefore a good case to bring up whenever the seminar turns to the subject of politically-motivated judicial misconduct.