Here is what I wrote back then:
From the Hamdi v Rumsfeld decision, comes this short review of Mitchell. I saw the case referenced several times, but I have not taken time to look it up yet, so I will limit my comments
(When you took exception to the use of the term "decison," I corrected it to "documentation.")
"The Fourth Circuit’s ruling also is entirely inconsistent with this Court’s long experience with the review of Executive branch seizures. In Mitchell v. Harmony, this Court reviewed and rejected the military’s seizure of a citizen’s property in Mexico during the Mexican-American war. 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 128-29. The plaintiff, a naturalized American businessman, filed an action against a U.S. colonel to recover the value of his property seized by the military. The government responded that the businessman had a “design” to trade with the enemy, and that the decision of the military commander to seize the property “must be entitled to some respect.” Id. at 118, 120.
"Rejecting these arguments, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court found the government’s defense to be based on “rumors which reached the commanding officer.” Id. at 133. “Mere suspicions of an illegal intention,” the Court stated, “will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence.” Id. If an Article III court, consistent with separation of powers principles, can inquire into the seizure of a citizen’s property by the military within a country at war with the United States as in Harmony, these same principles surely pose no barrier to an inquiry into the seizure of the citizen himself."
It seems that Mitchell is not applicable to the situation of the South in the ACW. By their insurrection, the southern rebels forsook their claim to United States citizenship. I do not see how they could assert legal protections, if those protections were even applicable, from the document and country they renounced.
From a 'reply brief" we find this statement: "In a footnote, Respondents distinguish this Court’s opinions in Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), and prize cases by explaining that they 'do not support the type of factual development that petitioners have in mind with respect to the challenged enemy-combatant determination in this case.'" Her is the web article:
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/03-6696PetReply.pdf
I may have been mistaken about connecting the two (or maybe not), but your focus on trivial terminology diverts attention from the issue at hand. You won't argue the substance, because you'll lose; so you argue the form its presented.
It is a loser's diversion, and you are the master at it.
From the Hamdi v Rumsfeld decision, comes this short review of Mitchell. I saw the case referenced several times, but I have not taken time to look it up yet, so I will limit my comments."The Fourth Circuit’s ruling also is entirely inconsistent with this Court’s long experience with the review of Executive branch seizures. In Mitchell v. Harmony, this Court reviewed and rejected the military’s seizure of a citizen’s property in Mexico during the Mexican-American war. 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 128-29. The plaintiff, a naturalized American businessman, filed an action against a U.S. colonel to recover the value of his property seized by the military. The government responded that the businessman had a “design” to trade with the enemy, and that the decision of the military commander to seize the property “must be entitled to some respect.” Id. at 118, 120.
"Rejecting these arguments, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court found the government’s defense to be based on “rumors which reached the commanding officer.” Id. at 133. “Mere suspicions of an illegal intention,” the Court stated, “will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence.” Id. If an Article III court, consistent with separation of powers principles, can inquire into the seizure of a citizen’s property by the military within a country at war with the United States as in Harmony, these same principles surely pose no barrier to an inquiry into the seizure of the citizen himself."
It seems that Mitchell is not applicable to the situation of the South in the ACW. By their insurrection, the southern rebels forsook their claim to United States citizenship. I do not see how they could assert legal protections, if those protections were even applicable, from the document and country they renounced.
1,279 posted on 09/16/2004 11:39:32 PM CDT by capitan_refugio
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WAS IT FROM THE HAMDI v. RUMSFELD DECISION??? NO!!!
NEXT LIE COMING UP
----------------------------------------------
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/backroom/1195393/posts?q=1&&page=1370#1370
HERE is what you wrote WAY BACK WHEN on 9/18/2004
I have not read Mitchell, but the description in the Hamdi footnote is that the plantiff was a US citizen. As such, it is not applicable to the southerners in the ACW. After perusing your post, I hope you are wearing your Depends, as you have probably blown a sphincter.
WAS IT A HAMDI FOOTNOTE??? NO!!!!
NEXT LIE COMING UP
-----------------------------------------------
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-backroom/1279209/posts?page=1086#1086
(5) It was indeed a footnote in the web article quoted from the Hamdi documentation.
1,086 posted on 11/24/2004 11:20:41 AM CST by capitan_refugio
WAS IT FROM A WEB ARTICLE??? NO!!!
WAS IT A FOOTNOTE??? NO!!!
NEXT LIE COMING UP
--------------------------------------------------
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-backroom/1279209/posts?page=1195#1195
[capitan_kerryfugio full of crap again]
From a 'reply brief" we find this statement: "In a footnote, Respondents distinguish this Court’s opinions in Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), and prize cases by explaining that they 'do not support the type of factual development that petitioners have in mind with respect to the challenged enemy-combatant determination in this case.'" Her is the web article:http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/03-6696PetReply.pdf
1,195 posted on 11/25/2004 3:49:22 AM CST by capitan_refugio
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DOES THE LINK GO TO AN ARTICLE??? NO!!!
DOES IT REFER TO THE FOOTNOTE PREVIOUSLY QUOTED BY CAPITAN_KERRYFUGIO??? NO!!!
DO IT CONTAIN A LINK TO THE FOOTNOTE IN QUESTION??? NO!!!
Apparently you are either:
That is not a " web article" but a copy of the "Reply Brief for Petitioners, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi as next friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi." (Eser Hamdi is Yaser Hamdi's father.) Indeed it says that RESPONDENTS distinguish this Court's opinions in "Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), and prize cases," citing "Resp. Br. 49-50 n.24." RESPONDENTS did that. The RESPONDENTS were Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.
AS I SAID, what you quoted was submitted by a public defender on behalf of Yaser Hamdi. What you are now attempting to lie your way out with is a reference by Petitioner (Hamdi) to a footnote by Respondent (Donald Rumsfeld) submitted by Solicitor General Ted Olson.
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums100103pet.pdf
The quote spans the width of the page ending page 24 and beginning page 25.
SOURCE: Petition for Writ of Certiorari on behalf of Yaser Esam Hamdi and Eser Fouad Hamdi as next friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi, submitted by Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Eastern District of Virginia, Counsel of Record; and Geremy C. Kamens, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Eastern District of Virginia.
THIS IS WHAT YOU QUOTED
3. The Fourth Circuit's ruling also is entirely inconsistent with this Court's long experience with the review of Executive branch seizures. In Mitchell v. Harmony, this Court reviewed and rejected the military's seizure of a citizen's property in Mexico during the Mexican-American war. 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 128-29. The plaintiff, a naturalized American businessman, filed an action against a U.S. colonel to recover the value of his property seized by the military. The government responded that the businessman had a "design" to trade with the enemy, and that the decision of the military commander to seize the property "must be entitled to some respect." Id. 118,120.
24 Rejecting these arguments, Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court found the government's defense to be based on "rumors which reached the commanding officer." Id. at 133. "Mere suspicions of an illegal intention," the Court stated, "will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence." Id. If an Article III court, consistent with separation of powers principles, can inquire into the seizure of a citizen's property by the military within a country at war with the United States as in Harmony, these same principles surely pose no barrier to an inquiry into the seizure of the citizen himself.
THIS IS FOOTNOTE 24 FROM THE BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS, RUMSFELD ET. AL.
SOURCE: Brief for the Respondents in Opposition filed by Solicitor General Ted Olson; Deputy Solicitor General Paul D. Clement; Assistant to the Solicitor General Gregory G. Garre; and Attorney John A. Drennan on behalf of Respondent Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et. al.
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-6696/03-6696.mer.resp.htmlSupreme Court Briefs
No. 03-6996In the Supreme Court of the United States
YASER ESAM HAMDI AND ESAM FOUAD HAMDI,
AS NEXT FRIEND OF YASER ESAM HAMDI, PETITIONERS
v.
DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUITBRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
THEODORE B. OLSON Solicitor General
Counsel of RecordPAUL D. CLEMENT
Deputy Solicitor GeneralGREGORY G. GARRE
Assistant to the SolicitorGeneral JOHN A. DRENNAN
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents have established the legality of the military's detention of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a presumed American citizen who was captured in Afghanistan during the combat operations in late 2001, and was determined by the military to bean enemy combatant who should be detained in connection with the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan.
In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 03-6696 YASER ESAM HAMDI AND ESAM FOUAD HAMDI,
AS NEXT FRIEND OF YASER ESAM HAMDI, PETITIONERS
v.
DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
This next-friend habeas action challenges the authority of the Commander in Chief and the armedforces under his command to detain an individual, Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was captured by coalition forces in Afghanistan in late 2001 when he surrendered with a Taliban unit while armed with an AK-47 assault rifle. The U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan determined that Hamdi is an enemy combatant who should be detained in connection with the ongoing hostilities. The military later obtained records indicating that Hamdi, a Saudi national, was born in the United States. Hamdi is now detained at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The court of appeals correctly held that respondents have demonstrated the legality of Hamdi's wartime detention, and that this habeas action should be dismissed.
* * *
More fundamentally, the evidentiary inquiry ordered by the district court is incompatible with the conduct of war-and the constitutional commitment of the war power to the political branches. When the Commander in Chief has dispatched the armed forces to repel a foreign attack on this country, the military's duty is to subdue the enemy and not to prepare to defend its judgments in a federal courtroom. As Judge Wilkinson observed, subjecting the military's battlefield determination that Hamdi is an enemy combatant to further fact-finding "would ignore the fundamentals of Article I and II-namely that they entrust to our armed forces the capacity to make the necessary and traditional judgments attendant to armed warfare, and that among these judgments is the capture and detention of prisoners of war." J.A. 461 (concurring in the denial of rehearing) (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670)). [24]
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE B. OLSONSolicitor General
PAUL D. CLEMENTDeputy Solicitor General
GREGORY G. GARRE
Assistant to the SolicitorGeneral
JOHN A. DRENNAN
Attorney
MARCH 2004* * *
24 Petitioners point (Br. 27) to Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). However, those cases do not support the type of factual development that petitioners have in mind with respect to the challenged enemy-combatant determination in this case. See Br. in Opp. 30-32. Moreover, those cases predate the far more relevant observations that this Court made in Eisentrager, discussed above. Petitioners' analogy (Br. 27) to the law of prize is also inapt. Discovery in prize proceedings was typically limited in scope to evidence taken from the captured vessel, see, e.g., The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1, 9- 10 (1866), and usually occurred after hostilities had ended.
As you were forced to admit after much discussion, you had never read the decision in Mitchell. Which, of course, explains why you were and are clueless of the context of the cherry-picked quote.
From Mitchell v. Harmony, including what you quoted. As is readily demonstrated, the quoted portion concerns nothing but the FIRST JUSTIFICATION of "trading with the enemy," which the Court said "has not been pressed in the argument." The Court considered FOUR MORE ALLEGED JUSTIFICATIONS and you have no earthly clue what the court said. Army Officer Mitchell was ordered to pay $109,372.52.
He justified the seizure on several grounds.1. That the plaintiff was engaged in trading with the enemy.
2. That he was compelled to remain with the American forces, and to move with them, to prevent the property from falling into the hands of the enemy.
3. That the property was taken for public use.
4. That if the defendant was liable for the original taking, he was released from damages for its subsequent loss, by the act of the plaintiff, who had resumed the possession and control of it before the loss happened.
5. That the defendant acted in obedience to the order of his commanding officer, and therefore is not liable.
The first objection was overruled by the court, and we think correctly. There is no dispute about the facts which relate to this part of the case, nor any contradiction in the testimony. The plaintiff entered the hostile country openly for the purpose of trading, in company with other traders, and under the protection of the American flag. The inhabitants with whom he traded had submitted to the American arms, and the country was in possession of the military authorities of the United States. The trade in which he was engaged was not only sanctioned by the commander of the American troops, but, as appears by the record, was permitted by the Executive Department of the government, whose policy it was to conciliate, by kindness and commercial intercourse, the Mexican provinces bordering on the United States, and by that means weaken the power of the hostile government of Mexico, with which we were at war. It was one of the means resorted to to bring the war to a successful conclusion.
It is certainly true, as a general rule, that no citizen can lawfully trade with a public enemy; and if found to be engaged in such illicit traffic his goods are liable to seizure and confiscation. But the rule has no application to a case of this kind; nor can an officer of the United States seize the property of an American citizen, for an act which the constituted authorities, acting within the scope of their lawful powers, have authorized to be done.
Indeed this ground of justification has not been pressed in the argument. The defence has been placed, rather on rumors which reached the commanding officer and suspicions which he appears to have entertained of a secret design in the plaintiff to leave the American forces and carry on an illicit trade with the enemy, injurious to the interests of the United States. And if such a design had been shown, and that he was preparing to leave the American troops for that purpose, the seizure and detention of his property, to prevent its execution, would have been fully justified. But there is no evidence in the record tending to show that these rumors and suspicions had any foundation. And certainly mere suspicions of an illegal intention will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence.
Also from Mitchell v. Harmony. (Harmony sued Army Officer Mitchell and won. The names were reversed for the appeal citation)
"Mitchell was an officer of the army, and was sued in an action of trespass by Harmony for seizing his property in the Mexican State of Chihuahua.""The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $90,806.44; for which and the costs, amounting to 5,048.94, the court gave judgment for Harmony."
"Upon the whole, therefore, it is the opinion of this court, that there is no error in the instructions given by the Circuit Court, and that the judgment must be affirmed with costs."
AND WHILE WE ARE AT IT, LET US NOT FORGET THAT ARMY OFFICER MITCHELL HAD TO PAY 6% INTEREST AS WELL.
David D. Mitchell, Plaintiff in Error, } v. } Manuel X. Harmony. }In obedience to the order of the court in this case, yesterday, the clerk of this court having filed the following report, namely:--
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 178. December Term, 1851
David D. Mitchell, Plaintiff in Error, } v. } Manuel X. Harmony. }
In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
In calculating the interest on the judgment of affirmance in the above-entitled cause, the clerk respectfully presents, at the instance of the respective counsel, the following different modes for the consideration of the court:--
1. Interest, at the rate of six per cent., on the judgment of the Circuit Court, from the 9th November, 1850, the day the judgment was signed, to this date.
2. Interest, from the 1st April, 1850, the first day of the term at which the judgment was rendered, to this date.
3. Interest, at the rate of 7 per cent., from 9th November, 1850, to 26th February, 1851, (the date of the writ of error,) and then at 6 per cent. on the aggregate, to this date.
4. Interest, at the rate of 7 per cent., from 1st April, 1850, to 26th February, 1851, and then at 6 per cent. on the aggregate, to this date.
The clerk feels bound to confine his calculations to the 18th rule of the court, irrespective of the act of Congress of 23d August, 1842. WM. THOMAS CARROLL, C. S. C. U. S.
14th May, 1852.
Calculation No. 1. $95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U.S., for New York, signed 9th November, 1850. 8,706.85 Interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, from 9th ___ November, 1850, to 14th May, 1852,-one year, $104,562.23 six months, and five days. Calculation No.2. $95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U.S., for New York, rendered 1st April, 1850. 12,204.57 Interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, from 1st April, ___ 1850, to 14th May, 1852,-two years, one $108,059.95 1/2 month, and fourteen days. Calculation No.3. $95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U.S., for New York, signed 9th November, 1850. 1,994.35 Interest, at 7 per cent. per annum, from 9th ___ November, 1850, to 26th February, 1851,-three 97,849.73 months and seventeen days. 7,139.51 Interest on this amount at 6 per cent. per annum, ___ from 26th February, 1851, to 14th May, 1852, $104,989.24 -one year, two months, and eighteen days. Calculation No.4. $95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U.S., for New York, rendered 1st April, 1850. 6,076.15 Interest, at 7 per cent. per annum, from 1st April, ___ 1850, to 26th February, 1851,-ten months $101,931.53 and twenty-six days. 7,440.99 Interest on this amount, at 6 per cent. per annum, ___ from 26th February, 1851, to 14th May, 1852, $109,372.52 -one year, two months, and eighteen days. And Mr. Vinton having filed the following exceptions, namely:--
The defendant in error, M. X. Harmony, excepts to the report of the clerk, touching the computation of interest on the above-named judgment of the Circuit Court, U. S., for the Southern District of New York, in this, namely:--
1st. That, by the act of Congress of the 23d of August, 1842, the said defendant in error is entitled to the same rate of entitled to if said judgment had been rendered in a State entitled to if said judgment had been rendered in a State court of the State of New York; whereas, the said computation allows 6 per cent. only on said judgment. See 5 Statutes at Large, 518.
2d. That the said interest ought to be computed, on said judgment, from the 1st Monday in April, 1850, instead of from the 9th of November of that year. See printed record, pages 19 and 20.
S. F. VINTON, For Defendant in Error.
May 14, 1852.
And the said defendant in error, also, at the same time, moves the court to open up the judgment of affirmance (rendered in this court at its present term) of said judgment of said Circuit Court, touching the damages allowed in said judgment of affirmance; and in lieu of 6 per cent. per annum, therein given on said judgment below, to allow 7 per cent. per annum therein, to be computed from the ___ day of _____ 1850, in conformity to said act of Congress, of the 23d of August, 1842.
S. F. VINTON, For Defendant in Error.
It is thereupon now here ordered by the court, that the said report and exceptions be set down for argument next Monday, the 17th instant.
The court declined to hear any argument on the motion of Mr. Vinton, and the exceptions filed by him to the clerk's report, and took the same under advisement.
On consideration of the motion made by Mr. Attorney-General Crittenden, on the 13th instant; of the report by the clerk, filed the 14th instant; of the exceptions to said report, by Mr. Vinton, filed the same instant; and of the motion filed by Mr. Vinton, the 15th instant, it is the opinion of the court, that the first calculation by the clerk in his report is the proper mode of calculating the damages given under the rule of court. Wherefore, it is now here ordered by the court, that the judgment entered in this case, on the 12th instant, do stand as the judgment of this court. Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages, at the rate of six per centum per annum.
[capitan_kerryfugio] By their insurrection, the southern rebels forsook their claim to United States citizenship. I do not see how they could assert legal protections, if those protections were even applicable, from the document and country they renounced.
Actually, the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rejected precisely what you claim. As the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT maintained that all acts of secession were null and void, it was legally as if they never happened. As such, the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT maintained that none of the states in secession, so-called, had ever ceased to be a citizen of the United States.
Of course, if you want to argue that the DID, IN FACT secede, then you have one heck of an illegal war.
When your sources are false or do not exist, there is no substance, only lies.