Commentary: Truth blown away in sugarcoated 'Gone With the Wind'

They never had the chance. He deported once congressional leader (Vallandigham) for speaking critically of his war and got another expelled from the senate (Bright) for suggesting they peacefully separate.

Lincoln got him expelled? The Senate had nothing to do with it? If I'm not mistaken it's the Senate that votes to expel membersI'm surprised that you didn't blame Lincoln for the other 14 or so senators that were expelled from the Senate for the same reason as Bright, supporting the cause of the southern rebellion.

nolu chan, add this one to your list:

[cr quoting Farber] and partly because the rule of law in not an inflexible concept.
[Gianni] Is this the sort of thing that California Conservatives buy into?
[cr] It is something any conservative should remember about crisis situations. The ultimate goal is the preservation of the peoples' liberties and of the Union.

The rule of law is flexible.
Every conservative should consider the rule of law flexible in crisis situations.
The ultimate goal is preservation of the Union.

A union where the rule of law takes a backseat.

You mean you aren't being clear

We were discussing the use of the word tyrant.

My response was clear. By taking it out of context, it made no sense. Just like when you pull your head out of your rear, there's a brief period of bewilderment.

Those days existed only in your dreams. What I remember is WP posting material which left the DSs sputtering in impotence.

What I remember:

Flexibility is the genius of the Constitution - Whiskeypapa

No wonder you two got along so well.

An astounding case of philosophical blindness!

An astounding case of philisophical dishonesty.

Honestly, it's been explained three times now. Even someone from California should've gotten it by now. Run up to UC Berkeley and have someone run through it for you.

The word tyrant has a political implication.

In 1850, Merryman lived almost 15 miles from Baltimore, near Cockeysville, MD. In 1860, Merryman STILL lived near Cockeysville, MD.

I just came across that as well.

I found another reference that says when Taney was in Baltimore he stayed at the house of his son-in-law and daughter named Campbell. Taney's memoir, as completed by Samuel Tyler in 1872, states very clearly that Taney was residing with Campbell the morning in 1861 that he left for the Masonic Hall where the courtroom was to hear Merryman's case.

In short, Roger Taney and John Merryman were NOT neighbors and could not have been neighbors by any reasonable definition of the word as 15-20 miles separated their Baltimore County residences from each other. Once again Capitan and the New York Times lied.

The allegation that Taney knew Merryman personally, and was his neighbor, stands unrefuted.

17.2 miles says otherwise:

Merryman lived in Cockeysville. Taney, when he was in Baltimore, lived at his son in law's house downtown. The rest of the time he lived in Washington.

I have provided proof by quoting the Chief Justice. The allegation that Taney knew Merryman personally, and was his neighbor, stands unrefuted.

nolu chan, add another.

Capitan did not quote the Chief Justice saying that Taney and Merryman were neighbors, or knew each other personally. He cited the Chief Justice quoting a NYT editorial as example of Northern opinion.

The Chief justice lends no credibility to the claim that Merryman and Taney were neighbors.

Only Capitan could pretend as much.

I replied to your comment, "Slave owners were not political leaders." I said nothing about tyranny.

Check back with your high school and get a book on reading comprehension.

[capitan kerryfugio]

"The NYT editorial of May 29, 1861 is totally refuted by the historical fact that Taney sold his house in Maryland in 1855 and was, at the time of the Merryman case, living in Washington, D.C., while Merryman lived in Maryland."
Not true. One must ask himself where Taney lived while he was hearing case on Circuit in Baltimore.
Answer, at his relative's home there. Remember he married the sister of Francis Scott Key. Baltimore was "home" to Taney, even if he kept a place in D.C. during his later years.
Try again. Misrepresentation? or just another goof on you part?
1,896 posted on 12/01/2004 11:27:17 AM CST by capitan_refugio
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MORE LIES, DIVERSIONS, AND MINDLESS BLATHERING BY CAPITAN KERRYFUGIO

capitan_refugio #1896 serves as proof that he is a living example of "Blue State Culture" ignorance and gross public dumb.

No, stupid, Baltimore was not "home" to Chief Justice Taney. He was born in FREDERICK Maryland, and he is buried in FREDERICK Maryland. Taney never lived in Baltimore until he was almost 46 years old.

Unlike capitan_kerryfugio, one who has any intellect must ask not only where Taney lived, but where John Merryman lived, in order to determine if they were "neighbors." capitan_kerryfugio needs only to mindlessly blather.

At the time of the Merryman case, Taney LIVED in Washington, D.C. at 23 Blagden's Row. That was his ONLY residence. Taney's widowed daughter Sophia and her son Roger stayed there, as did Taney's daughter Ellen who was an invalid much of her life.

When Taney went to Baltimore for the Merryman case, he stayed at the house of his daughter Anne, and his son-in-law James Campbell at what was then No. 55 Franklin Street, in the second block west of Charles.

John Merryman was a resident of Baltimore COUNTY, not Baltimore CITY. John Merryman was at his home, sleeping, when Lincoln's storm troopers arrived to unlawfully arrest him.

John Merryman's home was near COCKEYSVILLE. From Franklin Street in Baltimore City to COCKEYSVILLE is a distance of 23 MILES.

Following his arrest, John Merryman was brought to Baltimore by train.

John Merryman was not a neighbor to Chief Justice Taney's Washington address.

When Chief Justice Taney stayed at his daughter's home 23 MILES FROM COCKEYSVILLE, he did not magicly become a neighbor to John Merryman, despite capitan_kerryfugio's mindless blathering.

Baltimore City was an independent city, and not part of Baltimore County.

When Chief Justice Taney stayed in his daughter's house in Baltimore City, he was not even in the COUNTY of Merryman's residence, you prime example of Blue State Cultural ignorance and gross public dumb.

John MERRYMAN was born on 9 Aug 1824. He died on 15 Nov 1881. He was buried in Cockeyville, MD.

Chief Justice TANEY was born March 17, 1777. In 1861, Merryman was 36 years old. Taney was 84 years old.

All of this is a matter of public record and has been known for more than a century.

Damn, you're dumb and incompetent.

Lewis = Walker Lewis, "Without Fear of Favor, A Biography of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney," 1964-1965, first printing.

Taney

1777 born (Frederick, MD) (March 17, 1777)

1823 moved to Baltimore (Feb)

1831 became U.S. Attorney General. Rented house in D.C.

1836 Sworn in as Chief Justice (March 28, 1836)

1855 House in Baltimore sold. Soon rented a row house on Indiana Avenue, near the present District Courthouse, in what was known as No. 23 Blagden's Row.

1861 During Merryman case, while in Baltimore stayed with daughter and son-in-law at what was then No. 55 Franklin Street, in the second block west of Charles.

1864 Died in Washington, D.C. home.

1864 Services and burial in Frederick, MD.

"[I]n February 1823, Taney sold his home on Bentz Street and moved to Baltimore." (Lewis, p. 80)

"In Baltimore they first rented a house on South Gay Street, then the fashionable center of the town, but soon purchased a home on Lexington Street, opposite the court House and in the area where most lawyers lived and had their offices." (Lewis, p. 80)

Taney became U.S. Attorney General in 1831.

"Taney realized that living in Baltimore would impose too great a physical strain, and he rented a handsome three and one half story brick residence on Madison Place, overlooking Lafayette Square. Commodore John Rodgers, senior officer of the Navy, had just built it for himself, but his family preferred to remain at their river-front estate at Greenleaf Point. He was a fellow Marylander (a brother-in-law of William Pinkney) and wasglad to rent to the Taneys. The building no longer stands, having been torn down in 1895 to make way for the Lafayette Square Opera House, which was in turn demolished in 1964." (Lewis, p. 125)

"It was in this house that Anne Arnold Taney was married on May 27, 1834, to James Mason Campbell, a Baltimore lawyer who had been honor man in his class at Dickinson." (Lewis, p. 126)

"The Taylors had a boy, Roger Taney Taylor, but in June of 1855, Colonel Taylor sent Sophia and her son back to live with her parents under circumstances that were tantamount to abandonment; he himself died in 1858, in an outbreak of yellow fever at Fort Brown, Texas. Sophia and her son, whom they called "Roger," made their home with the Chief Justice, and Roger ultimately died without issue." (Lewis, p. 255)

"Ellen was an invalid much of her life, and never married." (Carl Brent Swisher, "Roger B. Taney," page 455)

"In the spring of 1864 Attorney General Bates remarked that Taney, Wayne, Catron, and Gried were obviously failing, and that he thought they would resign from the Supreme Court if Congress would provide for an adequate pension. A bill for this purpose was much discussed but it failed to pass, and no resignations were submitted. Taney, almost too feeble to walk, remained most of the time at his home, in one of the stucco houses in Blogden's Row in Indiana Avenue, where he lived with Ellen, his semi-invalid daughter." (Carl Brent Swisher, "Roger B. Taney," page 575-6)

"While his wife was living, Taney boarded in Washington and returned home to Baltimore when the Court was not in session, or when he was not on circuit duty in Virginia or Delaware. After her death, he sold the Baltimore house to St. George W. Teackle, for $15,100, and moved to Washington. For a time he occupied cramped quarters over a confectionery store with Ellen, Sophia and young Roger, but later he rented a row house on Indiana Avenue, near the present District Courthouse, in what was known as No. 23 Blagden's Row. It was here that he died, in 1864." (Lewis 257)

"After the move to Washington, when he had to visit Baltimore on circuit duty, Taney stayed with the Campbells at what was then No. 55 Franklin Street, in the second block west of Charles." (Lewis, p. 257)

Regarding the Merryman case specifically:

"While in Baltimore, the Chief Justice stayed at the Campbells' home on Franklin Street. On the morning of Monday, May 27, leaning on the arm of his grandson, Taney Campbell, he entered the old Masonic Hall at St. Paul and Fayette streets, where the United States Court was then held...." (Lewis, page 451)

-----------------------------------

MERRYMAN WAS A RESIDENT OF BALTIMORE COUNTY, NOT BALTIMORE CITY

"1. On the 25th May 1861, the petitioner, a citizen of Baltimore county, in the state of Maryland, was arrested by a military force, acting under orders of a major general of the United States army, commanding in the state of Pennsylvania, and committed to the custody of the general commanding Fort McHenry, within the district of Maryland; on the 26th May 1861...."

Ex Parte Merryman

MERRYMAN WAS ARRESTED IN HIS RESIDENCE AND TRANSPORTED BY TRAIN TO BALTIMORE

LINK

Early on the morning of May 25th, Lieutenant Abel of the Pennsylvania troops arrived at the Merryman residence, roused Merryman, and informed him he was under arrest. He was removed to the train station where he boarded a train for Baltimore. By 9 a.m. he was secure in Fort McHenry.

Patrick S. Poole, "An Examination of Ex Parte Merryman"

MERRYMAN'S RESIDENCE WAS NEAR COCKEYSVILLE

I previously posted this to capitan_kerryfugio several times. He should have taken the time to read it at least once. Then he would not be mindlessly blathering that John Merryman was a neighbor to someone in Baltimore City.

LINK

OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 2, vol 1, Part 1 (Prisoners of War)

Page 574

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS,

Baltimore, May 27, 1861.

Lieutenant Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,

Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

COLONEL: On the 25th instant Mr. John Merryman was arrested near Cockeysville to the northward of the city of Baltimore, by the order of Colonel Yohe acting under instructions from Major General William H. Keim. I inclose a copy of the instructions given by Colonel Yohe to Captain Heckman under which the arrest was made and also a copy of the written statement made by Adjt. James Miltimore and Lieutenant William H. Abel of the circumstances attending the arrest which was made on their arrival at Fort McHenry with the prisoner. You are aware that neither Colonel Yohe nor General Keim are within the limits of the department under my command. I do not know the address of Colonel Yohe. General Keim is I think in the neighborhood of Harrisburg.

I directed the officers named who brought the prisoner here to have more specific charges and specifications furnished against the accused with the names of witnesses by which it was expected to prove them and the nature of their testimony, which hen it was my intention to forward to you for the instruction of the general-in-chief.

I regret to say that I have not as yet been furnished with this information. I was yesterday evenign served with a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Honorable Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, commanding me to be and appear at the U. S. court-room in the city of Baltimore on Monday (this day), the 27th day of May, 1861, at 11 o'clock in the morning, and that I have with me the body of John Merryman of Baltimore County now in my custody, and that I certify and make known the day and cause of the capture and detention of the said John Merryman and that I do submit to and receive whatsoever the said court shall determine upon concerning me in this behalf.

I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of said writ together with a copy of my reply thereto which will be handed to the court at 11 o'clock this day, the hour named in said writ.

Requesting to be furnished with further instructions as to the course I am to pursue in this case,

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

GEO. CADWALADER,

Brevet Major-General, Commanding.

----------------------------------------

Regarding the mindless diversion about Francis Scott Key, he was not from Baltimore either. capitan_kerryfugio was merely engaged in more mindless blather.

LINK

Francis Scott Key was born on August 1, 1779, in western Maryland. His family was very wealthy and owned an estate called "Terra Rubra."

When Francis was 10 years old, his parents sent him to grammar school in Annapolis. After graduating at the age of 17, he began to study law in Annapolis while working with his uncle's law firm. By 1805, he had a well-established law practice of his own in Georgetown, a suburb of Washington, D.C. By 1814, he had appeared many times before the Supreme Court and had been appointed the United States District Attorney.

Francis Scott Key was a deeply religious man. At one time in his life, he almost gave up his law practice to enter the ministry. Instead, he resolved to become involved in the Episcopal Church. Because of his religious beliefs, Key was strongly opposed to the War of 1812. However, due to his deep love for his country, he did serve for a brief time in the Georgetown field artillery in 1813.

During the War of 1812, Dr. William Beanes, a close friend of Key's was taken prisoner by the British. Since Key was a well-known lawyer, he was asked to assist in efforts to get Dr. Beanes released. Knowing that the British were in the Chesapeake Bay, Key left for Baltimore. There Key met with Colonel John Skinner, a government agent who arranged for prisoner exchanges. Together, they set out on a small boat to meet the Royal Navy

On board the British flagship, the officers were very kind to Key and Skinner. They agreed to release Dr. Beanes. However, the three men were not permitted to return to Baltimore until after the bombardment of Fort McHenry. The three Americans were placed aboard the American ship and waited behind the British fleet. From a distance of approximately eight miles, Key and his friends watched the British bombard Fort McHenry.

Thank you for providing the history lesson from the economist Walter Williams. Williams needs to avoid straying too far from his field of expertise.

Walter Williams serves as good counterpoint to all the philosophy lessons you serve up from Harry Jaffa.

[capitan_kerryfugio #1900] I got that far before I realized you had coughed up another purposeless hairball. Bollman was about what treason.

CAPITAN_KERRYFUGIO LYING AGAIN

As capitan_kerryfugio knows well, the issue before the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bollman was not "treason" as he repeatedly but falsely claims. It was about a motion for a grant of habeas corpus.

One may search the Opinion of the Court in vain looking for even the appearance of the word "treason." It is not there.

The term "habeas corpus" appears over two dozen times.

Chief Justice Marshall defines the issue at the outset, "The inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swarthout, has been given to this court."

The issue is decided, "If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws. The motion, therefore, must be granted.

Contrary to the mindless blather of capitan_kerryfugio, in the grip of "blue-state culture" as such is described and advocated by ftD, before the Supreme Court the case of Ex Parte Bollman addresses and decides a motion regarding habeas corpus.

LINK

U.S. Supreme Court

EX PARTE BOLLMAN, 8 U.S. 75 (1807)

MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
As preliminary to any investigation of the merits of this motion, this court deems it proper to declare that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States.
Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common law, until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to state the reasoning on which this opinion is founded, because it has been repeatedly given by this court; and with the decisions heretofore rendered on this point, no member of the bench has, even for an instant, been dissatisfied. The reasoning from the bar, in relation to it, may be answered by the single observation, that for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law.
This opinion is not to be considered as abridging the power of courts over their own officers, or to protect themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions. It extends only to the power of taking cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the government and individuals.
To enable the court to decide on such question, the power to determine it must he given by written law.
The inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court.
The 14th section of the judicial act (Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 58.) has been considered as containing a substantive grant of this power.
It is in these words: 'That all the before mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs, not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.'- The only doubt of which this section can be susceptible is, whether the restrictive words of the first sentence limit the power to the award of such writs of habeas corpus as are necessary to enable the courts of the United States to exercise their respective jurisdictions in some cause which they are capable of finally deciding.
It has been urged, that in strict grammatical construction, these words refer to the last antecedent, which is, 'all other writs not specially provided for by statute.'
This criticism may be correct, and is not entirely without its influence; but the sound construction which the court thinks it safer to adopt, is, that the true sense of the words is to be determined by the nature of the provision, and by the context.
It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared 'that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it.'
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
It has been truly said, that this is a generic term, and includes every species of that writ. To this it may be added, that when used singly- when we say the writ of habeas corpus, without addition, we most generally mean that great writ which is now applied for; and in that sense it is used in the constitution. The section proceeds to say, that 'either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.'
It has been argued that congress could never intend to give a power of this kind to one of the judges of this court, which is refused to all of them when assembled.
There is certainly much force in this argument, and it receives additional strength from the consideration, that if the power be denied to this court, it is denied to every other court of the United States; the right to grant this important writ is given, in this sentence, to every judge of the circuit, or district court, but can neither be exercised by the circuit nor district court. It would be strange if the judge, sitting on the bench, should be unable to hear a motion for this writ where it might be openly made, and openly discussed, and might yet retire to his chamber, and in private receive and decide upon the motion. This is not consistent with the genius of our legislation, nor with the course of our judicial proceedings. It would be much more consonant with both, that the power of the judge at his chambers should be suspended during his term, than that it should be exercised only in secret.
Whatever motives might induce the legislature to withhold from the supreme court the power to award the great writ of habeas corpus, there could be none which would induce them to withhold it from every court in the United States; and as it is granted to all in the same sentence and by the same words, the sound construction would seem to be, that the first sentence vests this power in all the courts of the United States; but as those courts are not always in session, the second sentence vests it in every justice or judge of the United States.
The doubt which has been raised on this subject may be further explained by examining the character of the various writs of habeas corpus, and selecting those to which this general grant of power must be restricted, if taken in the limited sense of being merely used to enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction in causes which it is enabled to decide finally.
The various writs of habeas corpus, as stated and accurately defined by judge Blackstone, (3 Bl. Com. 129.) are, 1st. The writ of habeas corpus ad respondendum, 'when a man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court; in order to remove the prisoner and charge him with this new action in the court above.'
This case may occur when a party having a right to sue in this court, ( as a state at the time of the passage of this act, or a foreign minister,) wishes to institute a suit against a person who is already confined by the process of an inferior court. This confinement may be either by the process of a court of the United States, or of a state court. If it be in a court of the United States, this writ would be inapplicable, because perfectly useless, and consequently could not be contemplated by the legislature. It would not be required, in such case, to bring the body of the defendant actually into court, as he would already be in the charge of the person who, under an original writ from this court, would be directed to take him into custody, and would already be confined in the same jail in which he would be confined under the process of this court, if he should be unable to give bail.
If the party should be confined by process from a state court, there are many additional reasons against the use of this writ in such a case.
The state courts are not, in any sense of the word, inferior courts, except in the particular cases in which an appeal lies from their judgment to this court; and in these cases the mode of proceeding is particularly prescribed, and is not by habeas corpus. They are not inferior courts because they emanate from a different authority, and are the creatures of a distinct government.
2d. The writ of habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum, 'when a prisoner hath had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with process of execution.'
This case can never occur in the courts of the United States. One court never awards execution on the judgment of another. Our whole juridical system forbids it.
3d. Ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum, &c. 'which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute, or bear testimony, in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed.'
This writ might unquestionably be employed to bring up a prisoner to bear testimony in a court, consistently with the most limited construction of the words in the act of congress; but the power to bring a person up that he may be tried in the proper jurisdiction is understood to be the very question now before the court.
4th, and last. The common writ ad faciendum et recipiendum, 'which issues out of any of the courts of Westminster-hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the superior court, commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his caption and detainer , (whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas corpus cum causa,) to do and receive whatever the king's court shall consider in that behalf. This writ is grantable of common right, without any motion in court, and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below.'
Can a solemn grant of power to a court to award a writ be considered as applicable to a case in which that writ, if issuable at all, issues by law without the leave of the court?
It would not be difficult to demonstrate that the writ of habeas corpus cum causa cannot be the particular writ contemplated by the legislature in the section under consideration; but it will be sufficient to observe generally that the same act prescribes a different mode for bringing into the courts of the United States suits brought in a state court against a person having a right to claim the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. He may, on his first appearance, file his petition and authenticate the fact, upon which the cause is ipso facto removed into the courts of the United States.
The only power then, which on this limited construction would be granted by the section under consideration, would be that of issuing writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The section itself proves that this was not the intention of the legislature. It concludes with the following proviso, 'That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless where they are in custody under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.'
This proviso extends to the whole section. It limits the powers previously granted to the courts, because it specifies a case in which it is particularly applicable to the use of the power by courts:-where the person is necessary to be brought into court to testify. That construction cannot be a fair one which would make the legislature except from the operation of a proviso, limiting the express grant of a power, the whole power intended to be granted.
From this review of the extent of the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus, if the section be construed in its restricted sense; from a comparison of the nature of the writ which the courts of the United States would, on that view of the subject, be enabled to issue; from a comparison of the power so granted with the other parts of the section, it is apparent that this limited sense of the term cannot be that which was contemplated by the legislature.
But the 33d section throws much light upon this question. It contains these words: 'And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death; in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and of the usages of law.'
The appropriate process of bringing up a prisoner, not committed by the court itself, to be bailed, is by the writ now applied for. Of consequence, a court possessing the power to bail prisoners not committed by itself, may award a writ of habeas corpus for the exercise of that power. The clause under consideration obviously proceeds on the supposition that this power was previously given, and is explanatory of the 14th section.
If, by the sound construction of the act of congress, the power to award writs of habeas corpus in order to examine into the cause of commitment is given to this court, it remains to inquire whether this be a case in which the writ ought to be granted.
The only objection is, that the commitment has been made by a court having power to commit and to bail.
Against this objection the argument from the bar has been so conclusive that nothing can be added to it.
If then this were res integra, the court would decide in favour of the motion. But the question is considered as long since decided. The case of Hamilton is expressly in point in all its parts; and although the question of jurisdiction was not made at the bar, the case was several days under advisement, and this question could not have escaped the attention of the court. From that decision the court would not lightly depart. (United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17.)
If the act of congress gives this court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the constitution.
In the mandamus case, (ante, vol. 1. p. 175. Marbury v. Madison,) it was decided that this court would not exercise original jurisdiction except so far as that jurisdiction was given by the constitution. But so far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate jurisdiction, that which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly appellate. It is the revision of a decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has been committed to jail.
It has been demonstrated at the bar, that the question brought forward on a habeas corpus, is always distinct from that which is involved in the cause itself. The question whether the individual shall be imprisoned is always distinct from the question whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to be tried, and therefore these questions are separated, and may be decided in different courts.
The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature.
But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case.
If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.
That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws.
The motion, therefore, must be granted.

The South was basically an agrarian economy. This input-producing region's major crops were tobacco, rice, and cotton, with much of the latter intended for export or for the textile mills of the North. Southerners had to earn their revenue to buy finished goods from the North and from abroad through the export of raw materials. Since tariffs on finished goods, such as textiles and luxuries, and on capital goods, such as machinery, raised the prices paid by Southerners, they believed correctly that the "terms of trade" were set against them by high protectionist tariffs. Thus, from the earliest days of the nation, the tariff issue was paramount to Southerners.
Naturally, some Northern interests had a different perspective. Some entrepreneurs supported high protective tariffs on the basis of import substitution, using an "infant industry" argument popularized by a number of American and European writers. Industries, in this view, need to be protected by high tariffs on imported products until the domestic industry "grows up." Naturally, such tariffs did not benefit all Northerners; Northern consumers were also harmed due to these tariffs. But among those who prospered from protection were some Northern laborers as well as the broader interests of the region, some of them urban, from the spillover effects of the protective tariff.
The idea that protection in the form of tariffs, subsidies, and quotas should be accorded to "infant industries" in developing nations is an old one. The German politician-economist Friedrich List (1789-1846) was one of the most important originators of the argument in the nineteenth century. List, who came to America, influencing writer-economist Henry Carey (1793-1879) on the matter, argued that free trade that displaces either population or domestic industry is undesirable. In effect, he and Carey (and Alexander Hamilton before them) maintained that economic resources must be safeguarded so that their future existence and development are assured. Modern variants of the idea of protection relate to the famous argument based on "economies of scale," which exist when, as plant size increases up to a point, long-run unit costs decline (which occurs when certain workers become more proficient at narrowly defined tasks) and machines are more closely tailored to individual processes. Careful econometric study shows that the role of "learning by doing" in the antebellum textile industry did not justify protection, which was almost exclusively in the interests of textile producers. [11] The "infant industry" argument is basically just a veil for protectionist interests and policies.
FOOTNOTE:
11. Paul A. David, "Learning by Doing and Tariff Protection: A Reconsideration of the Case of the Ante-Bellum United States Cotton Textile Industry," Journal of Economic History 30 (September 1970): 521-601.

SOURCE: Mark Thornton and Robert B. Ekelund Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 2004, Scholarly Resources, p. 16-7

Mark Thornton has a Ph.D in economics from Auburn University. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute and Book Review Editor of the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.

Robert B. Ekelund Jr. has a Ph.D. in economics from Louisiana State University.

[capitan kerryfugio #1947] Your attempts to disassociate Taney from Maryland, and Balitmore in particular, are comical! He was born and Maryland and he is planted in Maryland. He lived there almost his whole life. Your so-called "refutation" fails.

MORE LIES, DIVERSIONS, AND MINDLESS BLATHER BY CAPITAN KERRYFUGIO

capitan_refugio #1947 serves as further proof that he is a living example of "Blue State Culture" ignorance and gross public dumb.

Your attempts to falsely claim that Taney and Merryman were "neighbors" because Taney sometimes stayed at his daugher's house, 23 MILES FROM MERRYMAN'S HOME, are comical.

Your new comical desperate position is that everyone born in Maryland is a "neighbor" to everyone else born in Maryland.

Baltimore was not "home" to Chief Justice Taney. He was born in FREDERICK Maryland, and he is buried in FREDERICK Maryland. Taney never lived in Baltimore until he was almost 46 years old.

Unlike capitan_kerryfugio, one who has any intellect must ask not only where Taney lived, but where John Merryman lived, in order to determine if they were "neighbors." capitan_kerryfugio needs only to mindlessly blather.