Posted on 11/13/2004 11:12:00 AM PST by LouAvul
I don't know the answer to your first question. For your second, it does not appear that Louallier got his habeas corpus. Apparently he was held in jail by Jackson even after being found innocent by a Court Marshal and was only freed after news of the end of the war reached New Orleans. I don't think Louallier was held in jail very long since it appears that the offense for which he was held occurred some two months after the Battle of New Orleans.
From an 1841 New Orleans City Directory:
The war with Great Britain followed immediately afterwards. With all its incidents, ending in the GLORIOUS 8th of JANUARY, our readers are familiar.
About two months after the British had retired, Louallier, a member of the Legislature, made a publication against an order of General Jackson, removing to one hundred and twenty miles beyond the city, a number of Frenchmen, who, after joining bravely in the defense of the country, had obtained certain certificates of their national character, from the French Consul, for the purpose of leaving the army, which was still kept under arms, and returning to their families.
This was immediately followed by a writ of habeas corpus, issued by Hall, the Judge of the United States court, for the release of Louallier. Whereupon, Judge Hall, in turn, was also imprisoned. Louallier was acquitted by a Court Martial; but neither he nor the Judge were released until official news of the peace had arrived.
Hall had no sooner gained his authority as Judge, than he punished Jackson for a contempt of Court, by fining him one thousand dollars, which was paid by the people of the City.
Years later, the US Congress paid Jackson's fine with interest. I wonder whether the people of New Orleans ever got their money back.
Marshal = Martial
How is it that the Indian tribes can issue passports and tribal members can travel internationally using said passports?
HARVARD GAZETTE ARCHIVESFinalists for American Indian awards announced
The first-ever American Indian tribally operated eagle sanctuary that helps meet a pueblo's religious and ceremonial needs, an internationally recognized Native American lacrosse team whose members travel abroad using passports issued by their Indian nation, and a tribal wellness program that prevents and combats diabetes are among the 16 finalists in the University's American Indian tribal governance awards program for the year 2002.
See my #1602.
If Merryman and Taney were neighbors, it must have been a miracle.
Taney sold his home in Maryland in 1855 and moved to Washington, D.C. More specifically, he was living at 23 Blogden's Row, on Indiana Avenue, near the Court House. See Carl Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney, pp. 471 and 472.
DOW v. JOHNSON, 100 U.S. 158 (1879) (at 194-5)
It is impossible in discussing this matter that memory should fail to recall a very famous case of historical interest, involving many of the same principles, which occurred about half a century before this, and of which the same city was the theatre. During what has been called the siege of New Orleans, at the close of the last war with Great Britain, the commanding general of our forces declared martial law in that city. This was unpleasant to many citizens, and to others who claimed to be foreigners domiciled there at the time. Some of these becoming restive under its restraints, made publications of a seditious character in the newspapers, for which they were arrested by order of General Jackson. When Judge Hall, of the proper civil court, issued a habeas corpus for their release, the general tore up the writ and sent the judge by force beyond his lines. Within a very few days after this, the victory of the 8th of January, 1815, was achieved, and on the receipt of the news of the treaty of peace the declaration of martial law was revoked. Judge Hall, on resuming his judicial functions, issued a process against General Jackson for contempt of court in his action in reference to the writ of habeas corpus. That distinguished man, though in the midst of the adulation consequent on the great victory, did not act as the defendant in this case did, by paying no attention to the process, but came to the court in citizen's dress, attended only by a single member of his military family and with his legal adviser. He offered to read the same paper which his counsel had read against issuing the process for contempt, and when the court declined to hear it, submitted himself to its judgment. At this there was such a demonstration of ill-feeling in the crowded court-room that the judge said he could not proceed, and would adjourn the court. But the noble defender of the city declared that he was equally ready to defend the court, and begged that the judge would proceed without fear to do what he might think his duty required. A fine of $1,000 was entered up against the general, which he paid at once, and used his authority, which was needed, to disperse the mob, who were inclined to violence against the judge.
I confess I have always been taught to believe that Judge Hall was right in imposing the fine, and that General Jackson earned the brightest page in his history by paying it, and gracefully submitting to the judicial power. Such I believe is the judgment of history and of thoughtful judicial inquirers; though a grateful country very properly refunded to her favorite general the sum he had paid for a necessary but unauthorized exercise of military power. I have no doubt that General Dow had good reasons for all he did, and I think he would have acted more wisely if, respecting the courts in the proper exercise of their functions, he had made his defence at the right time before the appropriate tribunal.
In March 1815, while New Orleans was still under martial law, Louis Louillier was tried by a general court-martial for a number of alleged offenses, including spying. (8) The court-martial found it only had jurisdiction over the spying offense, of which Louillier was acquitted. (9)(8.) Winthrop, app. XII, American Articles of War of 1806, 56 and 57, 981; Ibid., 101, sec. 2, 985. Articles 104 (aiding the enemy), 106 (spies), and 106a (espionage) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), enacted in 1950, track these early Articles of War provisions closely (10 USC, secs. 904, 906, 906a (2002); Winthrop, 822.
(9.) John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 226-27.
Foreign countries can accept a cereal boxtop as a passport, if their laws allow. However the U.S. government does not recognize Indian-issued passports as legal.
Then you mean that do have international status?
If they are not recognized by the U.S. government, however are they entering and exiting the U.S.?
No.
If they are not recognized by the U.S. government, however are they entering and exiting the U.S.?
Just a guess but I'm thinking by airplane or car. Maybe train. They might drive, if they are going to Mexico or Canada, but neither of those countries requires a passport.
I thank you for the back-handed compliment - even if it wasn't intended. However, I believe I am philosophically more in line with Madison than Hamilton.
"Fanatical hatred of Jeffersonianism and the spirit of republic, of the South and its defenders, and a panoply of useful lies and sand-in-the-eyes tricks."
Jefferson was a tepid constitutionalist to begin with. However, constitutional principles seemed to grow on him with age and, especially, the responsibilities of the Presidency. I think we agree he was much more of a revolutionary at heart, earlier in his life.
Neither Madison nor Jefferson condoned unilateral secession. Both would have recognized Calhounianism as contrary to republicanism.
You are a broken record. Lincoln acted in a crisis and his warpowers were upheld by the Supreme Court.
The key statements in the Scalia passage you quote:
"Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause’s placement in Article I."
"During the Civil War, Congress passed its first Act authorizing Executive suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, to the relief of those many who thought President Lincoln’s unauthorized proclamations of suspension unconstitutional."
If these are not equivocal statements, I don't know what are. Scalia hedges his bets by stating what the "understanding" is, and relates what people "thought" - without passing judgment himself.
Makes you wonder whether the South had any forward thinkers in the leadership. The Confederacy was doomed at birth and the South paid a particularly awful price for its arrogance.
The next Congress made amends, and Lincoln prosecuted the war against the insurrectionists as he was necesarily required to.
Now you've taken to lying outright. No supreme court ruling has ever upheld Lincoln's claimed power to suspend habeas corpus unilaterally. Two supreme court rulings have rejected the notion that the power he exercised belongs to the president though, and five federal courts ruled directly that Lincoln's suspension itself was unconstitutional.
That would be true if it were a written authorization. Whether the General would have, or should have, submitted it to the court is pure supposition on your part.
"As usual, you have your head firmly planted in your butt. Merryman was not subject to the articles of war. Did you have a war in Baltimore at that time?
"An officer of the Maryland Militia acting under orders is not guilty of committing sabotage.
"An officer of the Maryland Militia acting on his own, in his home state, not in uniform, is not subject to the laws of war.
The only attempt at litigation was in the CIVILIAN courts."
A most stirring defense of Merryman's treason. I don't know if the record reflects whether Merryman was in uniform when he burned the railroad bridges. The act, however, was clearly directed against the Union forces assembling to protect Washington, D.C. Merryman's action were essentially military and were carried out by a military, or paramilitary, unit.
Taney thought not to inquire into Merryman's military status - it would have just ruined the second part of his diatribe.
That would be true if it were a written authorization. Whether the General would have, or should have, submitted it to the court is pure supposition on your part. Merryman was indicted for treason, but Taney blocked any Federal judge from hearing the case. Hey, that's better than having a top notch defense lawyer!
"As usual, you have your head firmly planted in your butt. Merryman was not subject to the articles of war. Did you have a war in Baltimore at that time?
"An officer of the Maryland Militia acting under orders is not guilty of committing sabotage.
"An officer of the Maryland Militia acting on his own, in his home state, not in uniform, is not subject to the laws of war.
The only attempt at litigation was in the CIVILIAN courts."
A most stirring defense of Merryman's treason. I don't know if the record reflects whether Merryman was in uniform when he burned the railroad bridges. The act, however, was clearly directed against the Union forces assembling to protect Washington, D.C. Merryman's action were essentially military and were carried out by a military, or paramilitary, unit.
Taney thought not to inquire into Merryman's military status - it would have just ruined the second part of his diatribe.
...so claims the king of equivocation.
Returning to Scalia's dissent, though, we find that his recognition of Congress as the sole authority that may suspend Habeas Corpus is downright unequivocal regardless of what equivocation-boy says. From Scalia:
"It follows from what I have said that Hamdi is entitled to a habeas decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus."
"If the situation demands it, the Executive can ask Congress to authorize suspension of the writ–which can be made subject to whatever conditions Congress deems appropriate, including even the procedural novelties invented by the plurality today. To be sure, suspension is limited by the Constitution to cases of rebellion or invasion. But whether the attacks of September 11, 2001, constitute an “invasion,” and whether those attacks still justify suspension several years later, are questions for Congress rather than this Court."
You are correct. I used the wrong term. The process I was referring to was the transferral of criminal custody. Whoever held Merryman at the time was responsible for notifying Taney of the suspension. That fell to Cadwalader.
Those guys were tough hombres. The Benavides turned back Yankee invaders at Laredo in late 1863 or 1864.
Hey capitan, do you pronounce Refugio the Texas way ("refurio")?
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