"The decision in the Taney Court in the Stader case, being simply a refusal to accept jurisdiction, did not impinge significantly upon Dred Scott's cause before the high court of Missouri. Indeed, it was irrelevant unless the Missouri judges decided against him and he attempted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Even then, the two cases would be far from parallel. For Scott's claim to freedom rested upon several years of residence on free soil, rather than a brief visit, and residence not only in a free state but in free federal territory ...
"Taney's Stader opinion, if accepted as precedent, would have a controlling effect on the future disposition of any similar cases in the United States Supreme Court. it amounted to a declaration of judicial self-restraint, promising noninterference by the federal judiciary with state court decisions on the subject. This meant, however, that the effect of the opinion on a case being heard in a state court was permissive rather than controlling.... Taney's remarks, even if relevant to Dred Scott's case, indicated neither that Scott was free no that he was still a slave, but only that his condition depended solely on Missouri law." (Pg 260-262)
"The Stader decision had turned on the Court's finding that the Northwest Ordinance was no longer operative in Ohio and that accordingly there was no federal question at issue to justify review of the state court decision. But Dred Scott claimed his freedom by virtue of an operative federal law, and the claim had been denied by the Missouri court. These circumstances plainly qualified his case for appeal under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and Taney's emphatic pronouncement to the contrary was preposterous." (Pg 269)
First of all, it is Strader, not Stader. And you did not respond regarding The Slave, Grace, or the Lemmon case. You chose not to explain how Sanford purportedly bought Scott from a corpse.
Your first two quotes are from Chapter 10 of Fehrenbacher's book. Look at the chapter title. "Versus Emerson" Try to get the right case. I am discussing Scott v. Sandford, not Scott v. Emerson. All your quotes refer to the wrong case. If you are going to pose as an expert on the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, could you please at least find the right case?
Strader found that every state had the authority to determine the status of people in its jurisdiction. See also The Slave, Grace and Lemmon v. The People.
In Scott, Nelson's draft of the original "Opinion of the Court" became his concurring opinion. He asserted that Scott was not free because his status turned on Missouri law and that Missouri had already declared Scott to be a slave.
[cr quoting] "The decision in the Taney Court in the Stader case, being simply a refusal to accept jurisdiction, did not impinge significantly upon Dred Scott's cause before the high court of Missouri. [nc - Dred Scott v. Emerson] Indeed, it was irrelevant unless the Missouri judges decided against him and he attempted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Even then, the two cases would be far from parallel. For Scott's claim to freedom rested upon several years of residence on free soil, rather than a brief visit, and residence not only in a free state but in free federal territory ... [nc - p. 260]
Apparently you fail to understand what is being said. In Strader, the former slaves had been briefly in Ohio and later escaped from Kentucky to Canada. Strader was a suit for damages against men who allegedly aided the escape. In Scott, the case involved a slave domiciled in a slave state, seeking freedom, and litigants domiciled in different states.
Your apparent inference that the Court could have found a lack of jurisdiction to hear the case [in Scott v. Sandford] would have left the Missouri decision standing and would not have changed the result of the case. Scott would still have been a slave. The Supreme Court of Missouri having ruled against him, Scott's only hope for freedom was to have the Supreme Court find jurisdiction to hear the case.
In the Opinion of the Court, in Scott v. Sandford, Taney wrote "...the plea in abatement is necessarily under consideration; and it becomes, therefore, our duty to decide whether the facts stated in the plea are or are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States."
[cr quoting] "Taney's Stader opinion, if accepted as precedent, would have a controlling effect on the future disposition of any similar cases in the United States Supreme Court. it amounted to a declaration of judicial self-restraint, promising noninterference by the federal judiciary with state court decisions on the subject. This meant, however, that the effect of the opinion on a case being heard in a state court was permissive rather than controlling.... Taney's remarks, even if relevant to Dred Scott's case, [nc - Dred Scott v. Emerson] indicated neither that Scott was free no that he was still a slave, but only that his condition depended solely on Missouri law." (Pg 260-262)
On March 22, 1852 the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled, in the case of Scott v. Emerson, that under Missouri law, Dred Scott was still a slave. The interpretation of State Law by the highest court of a State is not subject to review by the Supreme Court.
[cr quoting] "The Stader decision had turned on the Court's finding that the Northwest Ordinance was no longer operative in Ohio and that accordingly there was no federal question at issue to justify review of the state court decision. But Dred Scott claimed his freedom by virtue of an operative federal law, and the claim had been denied by the Missouri court. These circumstances plainly qualified his case for appeal under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and Taney's emphatic pronouncement to the contrary was preposterous." (Pg 269)
This remark is in reference to Dred Scott v. Emerson, not Dred Scott v. Sandford. See the paragraph preceding the one from which you quoted: "In short, an appeal was the only proper way to have proceeded in 1852, and it would have been useless." See these two sentences from further down in the paragraph from which you quoted: "Taney took a more extreme position, however. He insisted that the Judiciary Act had not authorized -- and that the Strader precedent would have forbidden -- even acceptance of jurisdiction by the Court in Dred Scott v. Emerson."
As Fehrenbacher notes, no such appeal was attempted. "It is very doubtful that Dred himself could have fared any better by undertaking an appeal; for the Court, if it had accepted jurisdiction, would in all probability have upheld the Missouri court decision."
With regard to Dred Scott v. Sandford:
Justice Wayne wrote the he concurred "entirely in the opinion of the court, as it has been written and read by the Chief Justice -- without any qualification of its reasoning or its conclusions...."
Justice Nelson wrote, "These principles fully establish, that it belongs to the sovereign State of Missouri to determine by her laws the question of slavery within her jurisdiction, subject only to such limitations as may be found in the Federal Constitution; and, further, that the laws of other States of the Confederacy, whether enacted by their Legislatures or expounded by their courts, can have no operation within her territory, or affect rights growing out of her own laws on the subject. This is the necessary result of the independent and sovereign character of the State. The principle is not peculiar to the State of Missouri, but is equally applicable to each State belonging to the Confederacy. The laws of each have no extra-territorial operation within the jurisdiction of another, except such as may be voluntarily conceded by her laws or courts of justice. To the extent of such concession upon the rule of comity of nations, the foreign law may operate, as it then becomes a part of the municipal law of the State. When determined that the foreign law shall have effect, the municipal law of the State retires, and gives place to the foreign law."
Justice Grier wrote: "I also concur with the opinion of the court as delivered by the Chief Justice, that the act of Congress of 6th March, 1820, is unconstitutional and void; and that, assuming the facts as stated in the opinion, the plaintiff cannot sue as a citizen of Missouri in the courts of the United States. But, that the record shows a prima facie case of jurisdiction, requiring the court to decide all the questions properly arising in it; and as the decision of the pleas in bar shows that the plaintiff is a slave, and therefore not entitled to sue in a court of the United States, the form of the judgment is of little importance; for, whether the judgment be affirmed or dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it is justified by the decision of the court, and is the same in effect between the parties to the suit."