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[cr #323] Your entire post is nothing more than an ad hominem smear. You don't refute the substance of what has been quoted, but rather, you attack the people who made the observations.

[cr #323] And you don't read very well, because you continue to mischaracterize what I said. Case in point, you stated, "In your #226 you repeated the known falsehood that the Act of August 1861 ratified Lincoln's habeas corpus violations." My #226 says nothing of the sort. It say that in August 1861 and March 1863 Congress retrospectively ratified Lincoln's emergency actions taken early in the war. This is a true statement.

[cr #226 to nc #212] The actions were lawful, and were approved of, and ratified by the Congress (in the acts of August 1861 and March 1863). End of story.

[nc #212]

To: capitan_refugio
[cr] Lincoln had called Congress back into session by his proclamation in April 1861, to assemble on July 4, 1861. But events were escalating rapidly. His actions to protect the constitutional union, the enforce the laws, and to suppress the rebellion were both prudent and lawful. I realize that is unpleasant for the Lincoln-hating cabal to here, but it is a fact.
The Constitution reserves the power of authorizing suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to the Legislative Branch. I realize this is unpleasant, but it is a fact and quoting history professors, philosophers, and specialists in metaphysics will not change that fact. Unless you can cite a LAW, rather than a Lincoln apologist, Lincoln's actions will remain UNLAWFUL. The Constitution contains no Paludan/Jaffa/Farber clause granting Lincoln the power to suspend habeas corpus. Further, nobody even pretends that a president has the power to authorize military officers to suspend the privilege of the writ at their discretion. That is what Lincoln actually caused to happen -- you might not like it, but it is a fact.
Lincoln could have convened Congress at any time. He kept them OUT of session as long as he could without losing the militia.
And Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the supreme court in the case of Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, uses this decisive language, in 4 Cranch [8 U. S.] 95: 'It may be worthy of remark, that this act (speaking of the one under which I am proceeding) was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared 'that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.' Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means, by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.' And again on page 101: 'If at any time, the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide; until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws.' I can add nothing to these clear and emphatic words of my great predecessor.
-- Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, Ex Parte Merryman,/i>, In Chambers Opinion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
"Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause's placement in Article I."
-- Justice Antonin Scalia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696. Argued April 28, 2004 - Decided June 28, 2004
"The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case. If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide."
-- Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the majority in Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout, United States Supreme Court, 1807
"And who could hold for a moment, when the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended by the legislature itself, either in the general government or most of the States, without an express constitutional permission, that all other writs and laws could be suspended, and martial law substituted for them over the whole State or country, without any express constitutional license to that effect, in any emergency? Much more is this last improbable when even the mitigated measure, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, has never yet been found proper by Congress, and, it is believed, by neither of the States, since the Federal Constitution was adopted."
-- Justice Levi Woodbury, dissent in Luther v. Borden, United States Supreme Court, 1849
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"That every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof, if unlawful; and that such inquiry and removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when, on account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
-- Act of Ratification of the Convention of the State of New York
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"The Constitution seems to have secured this benefit [habeas corpus] to the citizen by the description of the writ, and in an unqualified manner admitting its efficacy, while it declares that it shall not he suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require it. This writ is believed to be known only in countries governed by the common law, as it is established in England; but in that country the benefit of it may at any time be withheld by the authority of parliament, whereas we see that in this country it cannot be suspended even in cases of rebellion or invasion, unless the public safety shall require it. Of this necessity the Constitution probably intends, that the legislature of the United States shall be the judges. Charged as they are with the preservation of the United States from both those evils, and superseding the powers of the several states in the prosecution of the measures they may find it expedient to adopt, it seems not unreasonable that this control over the writ of habeas corpus, which ought only to be exercised on extraordinary occasions, should rest with them. It is at any rate certain, that congress, which has authorized the courts and judges of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases within their jurisdiction, can alone suspend their power"
-- William Rawle, "A View of the Constitution of the United States of America," 1826
"It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body."
-- Justice Joseph Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States," Book 3, Chapter XXXII, § 1336, 1833
"In England the benefit of this important writ can only be suspended by authority of parliament. It has been done several times of late years, both in England and in Ireland, to the great oppression of the subject, as hath been said. In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of congress; but not whenever congress may think proper; for it cannot be suspended, unless in cases of actual rebellion or invasion. A suspension under any other circumstances, whatever might be the pretext, would be unconstitutional, and consequently must be disregarded by those whose duty it is to grant the writ."
-- Tucker's Blackstone, Section 12 - Restraints on Powers of Congress, paragraph 2.
"There has been much discussion concerning the question whether the power to suspend the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" is conferred by the Constitution on Congress, or on the President. The only judicial decisions which have been made upon this question have been adverse to the power of the President.Still, very able lawyers have endeavored to maintain -- perhaps to the satisfaction of others -- have maintained, that the power to deprive a particular person of the "privilege of the writ," is an executive power. For while it has been generally, and, so far as I know, universally admitted, that Congress alone can suspend a law, or render it inoperative, and consequently that Congress alone can prohibit the courts from issuing the writ, yet that the executive might, in particular cases, suspend or deny the privilege which the writ was designed to secure. I am not aware that any one has attempted to show that under this grant of power to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," the President may annul the laws of States, create new offences unknown to the laws of the United States, erect military commissions to try and punish them, and then, by a sweeping decree, suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to all persons who shall be "arrested by any military authority." I think he would make a more bold than wise experiment on the credulity of the people, who should attempt to convince them that this power is found in the habeas corpus clause of the Constitution. No such attempt has been, and I think none such will be made. And therefore I repeat, that no other source of this power has ever been suggested save that described by the President himself, as belonging to him as commander-in-chief."
-- Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, "Executive Power," 1862
"The safest and best restriction, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in which Congress are authorized to exercise that power [of suspending habeas corpus] at all, namely, in those of rebellion or invasion. These are clear and certain terms, facts of public notoriety, and whenever these shall cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also."
-- Judge Francis Dana, presenting the Constitution to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention
212 posted on 08/28/2004 1:13:46 AM CDT by nolu chan
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[nc #229]

To: capitan_refugio
[cr] The actions were lawful, and were approved of, and ratified by the Congress (in the acts of August 1861 and March 1863). End of story.
Only in your imagination. This is vividly demonstrated by the Congressional record of the Act of 1861 which I have shown you many times. Apparently you have forgotten yet again, and need a reminder.
The debate of the precise language occurred on S-70. That was tabled and the precise same language, having already been debated, was placed in S-72. This all happened in the Senate on the same day.
Congress did NOT approve "all the acts of the President." What they approved was "all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting the Army and Navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States...."
The Congressional debate made the issue at hand clear. Lincoln had no authority to increase the size of the standing army without Congressional approval. Volunteers had been enlisted. Said volunteers, now facing a full-blown civil war instead of the 90-day pep rally that had induced them to join, were claiming, correctly it would seem, that Lincoln had no authority to enlist them and they should be released from military service. Congress retroactively approved Lincoln's actions with regard to increasing the size of the military and funded his actions. Had they not done so, Lincoln's army threatened to melt away.
The Senate debate makes clear in unmistakeable, explicit terms that habeas corpus was NOT included. A proponent of the bill, Senator Fessenden explained it as follows: "The bill avoids all questions with regard to the habeas corpus and other matters, and refers simply to the military appropriations; and it is necessary we should do this in order to place that subject upon the right ground.
Below is an extract from the Senate debate.
The bill (S. No. 70) in relation to the Army and volunteer militia of the United States was read a first time by its title.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will now receive its second reading, if there be no objection.
Mr. PEARCE. I should like to hear the bill read at length before I consent that it shall have its second reading now. I do not think it is treating the Senate with proper consideration to have a bill read twice in one day before we know what it is. Let us see what it is; and if it be not objectionable, of course there will be no opposition to it.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be read at length for the information of the Senate.
PAGE 442
The Secretary read it as follows:
Be it enacted &c, That all the acts, proclamations and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March 1861, respecting the Army and Navy of the United States, and calling out, or relating to the militia, or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved, and in all respect legalized and made valid, to the same intent and with the same effect as if they had been done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States. Mr. PEARCE. I must object to its second reading to-day.
Mr. FESSENDEN. I hope my friend from Maryland will hear what I have to say before he objects. This bill takes up a single point only in the resolution that was introduced into the Senate, and upon which there has been considerable debate. It refers simply to the proclamations that were made for, and the employment of volunteers. We have since authorized the employment of the volunteers. But some of the volunteers now make a point that although they have enlisted for three years, yet the President having had no authority at that time, and no legal authority having been conferred upon him by Congress, they are discharged, and cannot be held under that enlistment. That idea will occasion considerable difficulty, and it is necessary that we should, so far as we have the power, legalize the acts of the President upon that particular point. The bill avoids all questions with regard to the habeas corpus and other matters, and refers simply to the military appropriations; and it is necessary we should do this in order to place that subject upon the right ground.
Now, sir, with regard to this bill, there can certainly be no objection that Senators can raise to it, unless they are desirous that a difficulty -- I will no say that --- but unless they fail to see the force of the position in which we are placed with reference to many of these volunteers. I hope, therefore, the Senator from Maryland will withdraw his objection. It takes but a single point, and avoids the points of debate in the joint resolution that was before the Senate, and simply legalized the action of the President which we have already indorsed, by giving him the authority. It refers merely to a point which it is very necessary for us to consider.
Mr. PEARCE. If it refers purely and solely to the volunteers, which I did not exactly understand at first, I withdraw the objection.
Mr. FESSENDEN. Entirely so; to those acts only.
* * *
Mr. SAULSBURY. I should like to accomodate my friend from New York; certainly he is very accommodating himself; but if gentlemen on the other side will indulge me a moment, I will say why it was that interposed the objection.
Mr. President, in the earlier state of this session, a joint resolution was introduced approving, in general terms, the acts of the President of the United States. For one, had not such a resolution been introduced, I never would have attacked the President of the United States for his course. I am one of those men who stand in a peculiar position on this point. I am one of those who approve of certain acts of the President, and disapprove of others. As this bill seemed to be only a mode of getting rid of a direct vote upon that joint resolution, by way of substitute, without knowing what was contained in the bill. I felt it incumbent on me to object to its consideration. If there is anything in this bill that looks to the toleration of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, I never will, under any circumstances, vote for it. Sir, that is the bulwark of the freedom of the citizen. If there is nothing in the bill, except to approve the calling out of volunteers --
Mr. KING. If the Senator will read it, he will see that there is nothing else in it.
Mr. FESSENDEN. There is nothing in the world in it except what relates to the Army and Navy volunteers. The Senator from Maryland has just read it, and says he is perfectly satisfied.
Mr. SAULSBURY. Then on the assurance of the Senator from Maine, I will withdraw the objection.
* * *
229 posted on 08/28/2004 5:51:10 AM CDT by nolu chan
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