As I similarly instructed another poster, "the suspension of the powers vested by this act" refers to the Judiciary Act of 1789, not the "Suspension Clause" in the Constitution.
Harold M. Hyman, in an article about Ex parte Milligan, begins with, "In 1861, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney contrived a possibility of executive-judicial, civil-military clashes (Ex parte Merryman); in 1863 the Supreme Court averted similar confrontations (Ex parte Vallandigham; Prize Cases).
A judge's motivations are important. Especially when his opinion purports to establish precedent. Taney's "bad behavior" should never be mistaken for sound legal reasoning. As as has been demonstrated, Taney's in chambers opinion was not a decision of the Supreme Court - Taney engineered it all on his own.
You are demonstrating your confusion again. The power to grant a writ of habeas corpus is given to the Supreme Court by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Unlike the British common-law courts which evolved from usage and were not created by any written law, the U.S. Supreme Court is created by written law, the Constitution, and Marshall ruled that the power to issue the writ derived from the Legislative Act. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ exists in the Constitution as a limit on the powers of the Legislature.
The suspension of the powers created by the Judiciary Act regarding the privilege of the writ may only be authorized by an Act of Congress in pursuance to the Constitution. Congress may not suspend the privilege of the writ at its discretion, but only "when in Cases of Rebellion if Invasion the public Safety may require it." Congress may suspend the privilege of the writ only in case of a Rebellion or an Invasion, and then only when the public safety may require it.
[cr] Harold M. Hyman, in an article about Ex parte Milligan, begins with, "In 1861, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney contrived a possibility of executive-judicial, civil-military clashes (Ex parte Merryman); in 1863 the Supreme Court averted similar confrontations (Ex parte Vallandigham; Prize Cases).
The opinion of Harold M. Hyman does not change the ruling of the Court. Many believe the Court contrived its ruling in Roe v. Wade. That does not make one scintilla of difference. Roe v. Wade, still stands as the enforceable law.
[cr] A judge's motivations are important. Especially when his opinion purports to establish precedent. Taney's "bad behavior" should never be mistaken for sound legal reasoning. As as has been demonstrated, Taney's in chambers opinion was not a decision of the Supreme Court - Taney engineered it all on his own.
Whatever one opines about the motivation of the judge does not change the ruling. Regardless of the motivation of the justices in Roe v. Wade, the ruling is not changed and it stands as the enforceable law.
The In-Chambers Opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Ex Parte Merryman was valid and there was a legal obligation to comply or to appeal the ruling.
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is clear:
Section 14. That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. --Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
By law, Chief Justice Taney, or any of the associate justices had the legal authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The involvement of all nine justices was not required. In handling a habeas corpus matter on his own, Chief Justice Taney acted lawfully and properly. The defiance of the writ was unlawful and improper.
Nobody had suspended the privilege of the writ before Taney ruled. Lincoln had only (unlawfully) authorized military officers to suspend the privilege of the writ at their discretion. None had actually done so. General Cadwalader had possession of Merryman. A message purporting to grant suspension authority to Cadwalader was not sent until after CJ Taney had ruled.
In response to the writ, General Cadwalader sent his aide to the Court and informed the Court that he, General Cadwalader had been authorized to suspend the writ, but he did not inform the court he had actually done so, and produced no evidence of such "authorization."
Per Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout, the Judiciary Act of 1789 derives from the "suspension" or "habeas corpus" clause of Article I. As for the Judicial Act itself, certainly you know that it takes another law of Congress to repeal, amend, or suspend an existing one. And that is exactly what Taney and all the other judges after him who ruled the exact same way noted.
Hyman is either ignorant or dishonest. If Taney's case was "contrived" it would still fail to explain why four other federal judges (including one supreme) in four other federal courts all around the nation took cases on and reached the same conclusions as Taney in between 1861 and the indemnity bill of 1863.