No. I meant exactly what I said. The larger whole of the founders AS WELL AS those at the convention were in full agreement that the clause applied to Congress as evidenced by the fact that not a single one of them suggested anything otherwise. For further evidence of this you may see the list of quotes I provided some time ago which NC reposted here. It contains statements from both constitutional convention delegates and non-delegates who were prominent founders, such as Jefferson.
In any case, the Framers were not unanimous in their views on the Suspension Clause and its placement in the Constitution.
Then cite me one single framer of the constitution or even one single figure from the entire founding era for that matter who believed that the habeas corpus clause applied to somebody other than Congress. Please note that I will treat you silence on this matter as a concession that you do not have anything.
As you have previously noted, Jefferson, a Founding Father but not a Framer, was initially dubious about the need for the "Suspension Clause."
He doubted its need, but, as I said of all the founders and as I reiterate, he did not have any doubt whatsoever that its placement in the constitution applied to Congress (see his autobiography for this).
(2) Hamdi v Rumsfeld and Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, as I demonstrated in my prior post, were not precedent-setting cases with regard to who might act to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
You demonstrated nothing of the sort. Rather, you made a gratuitous and unfounded claim to the effect that both were items of obiter dictum. As I noted once again, and as you apparently have neglected to address for want of an ability to counter the inescapable, the Bollman passage on Congress' power of the writ is the concept upon which the entire case was settled and the Hamdi passage, which I also quoted, was one of the main issues decided in that case.
(3) That "only Congress may suspend the writ" is not demonstrated by the verbiage of the "Suspension Clause" itself: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety may require it." Had an exclusive congressional power been mandated, the clause may have read, "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended by Congress ..." But it doesn't say that, implicitly leaving open other options.
Bullsh*t. Article I, Section 1 already covers its application: "All legislative Powers herein granted," as in those found in Article I, "shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." To have repeated this would have been redundant. As for your claim of implicit openness, such logic is specious. Applying the same approach, one could similarly conclude the same about the next clause after habeas corpus, "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," or the one after it (which is now partially repealed, sad to say), "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken," which would be an absurdity for the obvious reason that the items they contain are all of a legislative nature.
(4) Because the clause finally ended up in Section I, it is a textural interpretation that the power to suspend resides exclusively with the Congress.
Again, you are simply incorrect. The ONLY way one could ever reach that conclusion is to willfully ignore Article I, Section 1, which states in the plainest of English that the powers in Article I are to be given to Congress. You seem overly enthusiastic to pursue that route of willful ignorance, thus raising the question of your judicial philosophy which, based upon your approach found here, seems not unlike the loose constructionism espoused by the late Jacobin Justice Brennan or, nowadays, Justice Ginsburg.
Clause 6 in Section 9 applies to both the Congress and the President.
Clause 6 reads "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." That is a restriction upon legislative jurisdiction. That the executive may enforce, espouse, and enact policies to that end is as incidental to the clause as is his role in the budget process - that is to say, though it is substantial, NOBODY denies that the constitution gives the specific power of the budget to Congress.
In fact, the writing of Regulations has been traditionally an Executive Branch function.
That tradition is a ceded power to the bureaucracy and almost always walks along a thin line of constitutionality. Nevertheless, nobody doubts that in a showdown between the bureaucracy and Congress over a regulatory matter that Congress' will reigns supreme.
Furthermore, Section 10, Clause 1, in Article I, has nothing to do with Congress
Not so. The purpose of that clause is to protect the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress in certain powers granted to it in Section 8.
And of course, the presidential power of the "veto" is also found in Article I.
Technically speaking, the power itself is not found anywhere in the Constitution. The power itself is implicit upon the procedures set forth for Congress to adopt a bill into law. Far from granting by name a presidential power to veto, Article I states only that (a) a presidential signature is required for a bill of CONGRESS to become law and (b) the process of events that will happen in CONGRESS if a signature is not given.
That again, it not "necessarily so."
Oh but it is. We know that ONLY way for the president to suspend habeas corpus constitutionally is to ask Congress to do it (a fact that has been overwhelmingly affirmed by virtually every court case ever heard on the matter including two by SCOTUS, not to mention all of the early constitutional scholars). So long as this remains true (and to date you have presented no credible evidence as to why it is not), it is indeed necessarily so that he would have to call a special session of congress in order to obtain the suspension he desired.
If Congress is not in session, and war is made upon the country, the President is "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name."
Hollow puffery. To accept that is to accept the notion that the system of checks and balances should be shunned by the inconveniences it may create from time to time. As Hamdi v. Rumsfeld noted, "while we do not question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention to the particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military action, it would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge." The document itself being the contract upon which our government derives its legitimacy, to shun such a fundamental principle in favor of permitting a single branch to exert its unchecked will against the others is nothing short of a revolutionary breech.
Section 4 of proposed Article XI, when debated in convention, was disapproved by the delgations from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.
If you will go back and review what I wrote ("the Framers were not unanimous in their views on the Suspension Clause"), and the construction you put on it ("... believed that the habeas corpus clause applied to somebody other than Congress"), are two differnent things.
Quote it instead.
Well then, explain Art I, Sec 10, Clause 1. How is a constitutional prohibition on a state a "power of congress" Some of the item listed there are already specifcally prohibited to Congress in Article I section 9. Did the Framers repeat themselves???? Or possibly, did the Framers place conveniently "park" some odd clauses?
Your construction of the "Suspension Clause" remains a textural interpretation.
This remains only your opinion. And that is why papers and books have been written on the subject from both perspectives.
USSC - The President is "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name."
GOPc - Hollow puffery. To accept that is to accept the notion that the system of checks and balances should be shunned by the inconveniences it may create from time to time.
I find it hilarious that you can be so insistent that Marshall's dicta be taken at face value, and yet, when presented with a statement of the court, on point, you so cavalierly dismiss it!