And I don't want to upset your purple haze induced stupor, but the section quoted ("If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.") has nothing at all to do with the Suspension Clause in the Constitution. Marshall was referring to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was the act that gave the Court the power to issue the writ. Just a few paragaphs earlier in the decision, Marshall made this prefacing statement, "If the act of congress gives this court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the constitution."
Like Law Prof. Freedman observed,
"In approaching Suspension Clause issues, the Court, like scholars, proceeds on the assumption that the Clause originally protected only federal, not state, prisoners.... The origin of the mistake is that, according to dicta inserted by Chief Justice John Marshall into Ex parte Bollman, Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 withheld from state prisoners access to the federal writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of their confinements. Since it is implausible that the First Judiciary Act violated the Clause, acceptance of Marshall's reading of the statute has stood as conclusive evidence for the proposition that state prisoners' habeas corpus rights were not originally protected by the Constitution."
Freedman notes, "Marshall's suggestion -- sheer dictum in the case at hand and unsupported by any authority -- that Congress could suspend the writ by doing nothing at all certainly would have come as a shock to all of the debaters over the Suspension Clause." He also refers to other sections of the decision, "[T]he heart of the Ex parte Bollman opinion for present purposes is not its holding, but rather its pronouncement that the proviso in clause of Section 14 (the limitation on granting the writ to those in state custody) 'extends to the whole section,' that is, restricts the exercise of power both by courts and by their individual judges. This statement is arrant dictum -- since the case at hand involved federal, not state, prisoners and, indeed, ones who secured their release after full judicial investigation into the justification for their confinement."
So although Bollman maybe a habeas case, it is not now, nor ever was, a case about what body might suspend the writ. Whatever you believe you have gleaned from Bollman remains, at best "arrant dictum," and at worst, illusionary.
Indeed it is, as are the passages from both cases and the definition of the term "therefore" for you. As my previous post demonstrated, you have failed to substantiate your charge of obiter dictum and by all appearances seem not to grasp the concept itself. Reaching in your @ss for a fancy sounding word, looking up its definition, then arbitrarily asserting that definition's application to any and all court rulings you personally do not like simply does not suffice for a valid argument.
And I don't want to upset your purple haze induced stupor, but the section quoted ("If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.") has nothing at all to do with the Suspension Clause in the Constitution. Marshall was referring to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was the act that gave the Court the power to issue the writ.
I'm uncertain, capitan, where you obtained your alleged copy of the Bollman decision but you might want to inform its publisher as it contains several glaring omissions. In reality Marshall's statement referred to BOTH the suspension clause AND the Judicial Act of 1789, which he noted was made under the authority of the suspension clause. From the decision itself:
It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it." Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
Just a few paragaphs earlier in the decision, Marshall made this prefacing statement, "If the act of congress gives this court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the constitution."
Indeed, which was a major point of the decision. As you may see above, Marshall turned directly to the constitution's suspension clause to make that determination.
Like Law Prof. Freedman observed,
Back to your crank revisionist law prof of choice, I see.
"In approaching Suspension Clause issues, the Court, like scholars, proceeds on the assumption that the Clause originally protected only federal, not state, prisoners....
That seems to be this Freedman fellow's beef with the entire case, and considering that his argument runs counter to 200 years of academic acceptance of Bollman, it's safe to say that his is a fringe argument. Freedman may not personally like it, but what Marshall was noting of that clause at the time is no different than what the early supreme court held on similar matters, the most famous being Barron v. Baltimore.
The origin of the mistake is that, according to dicta inserted by Chief Justice John Marshall into Ex parte Bollman, Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 withheld from state prisoners access to the federal writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of their confinements.
...and thus we come to discover how you happened upon this Freedman fellow. Seeking an authority to appeal your knowingly unsubstantiated claim of obiter dictum, you did a google search for Bollman and the term "dicta." That search naturally produced Freedman's garbage where the term dicta appears in the same text as Bollman, albeit on a wholly unrelated and irrelevant part of the case (specifically, the part that is Freedman's beef with the case). Though that does not pass the smell test for obvious reasons, seeing the two words, dicta and Bollman, within the same article was good enough for you so you've been dropping Freedman all over this subject ever since.
And how do I know all this you might be asking? Very simple. Non-Sequitur did the exact same thing while making the exact same absurd argument you are today about a year prior. You seem to have happened upon his egg, be it knowingly or inadvertantly, and now share the distinction with him of having it smeared all over your face.