Lincoln's authority to do so were part of his constitutional duties. As Jaffa observed, ""Lincoln has already shown that in construing any one provision of the Constitution in its relationship with other provisions with which it may appear to be in conflict, the dominating purpose of the constitution, as distinct from its instrumental purposes, must provide the guide to its interpretation. There can hardly be any question but that the provision for suspending the writ of habeas corpus is placed in the Constitution to enable the government to provide for the public safety in the case of rebellion. Where in the constitution it is placed is wholly subordinate to why it is there at all. Lincoln's suspension of the writ is therefore lawful. Q.E.D."
Jaffa is a literature professor with absolutely no legal training or qualifications. Citing him as an authority on the law is thus fallacious.
Where in the constitution it is placed is wholly subordinate to why it is there at all. Lincoln's suspension of the writ is therefore lawful.
Garbage. Jaffa appears not to even understand why it is in the constitution (it's there as a protection of the Great Writ by imposing strict and specific limitations upon its suspension, not the other way around - see Bollman for the court's oldest and strongest precedent on this issue), thus he cannot make a claim upon whether or not other clauses are subordinate to it.
As a philospher who opines about what he thinks the law should be, according to Jaffa, he is without authority regarding what the law actually is.
From Storm Over the Constitution, by Harry V. Jaffa, (1999), p. 142-3. Afterword by Charles Cooper.
He [nc - Jaffa] acknowledged that his view is unorthodox, confessing that he is "probably the only living soul who has written on original intent who agrees with [this] central thesis" (p. 395). When one follows Jaffa's thesis where it leads -- indeed, where he takes it himself, as we shall see -- it is not surprising that is has attracted so few adherents."
[nc - The page reference is to Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent.]
It is not an ad hominem attack to point out that Jaffa himself wrote that he is "probably the only living soul who has written on original intent who agrees with [his] central thesis."
There is no problem refuting the logic, so-called, behind Professor Jaffa's statement.
Lincoln's authority to do so were part of his constitutional duties. As Jaffa observed, "Lincoln has already shown that in construing any one provision of the Constitution in its relationship with other provisions with which it may appear to be in conflict, the dominating purpose of the constitution, as distinct from its instrumental purposes, must provide the guide to its interpretation. There can hardly be any question but that the provision for suspending the writ of habeas corpus is placed in the Constitution to enable the government to provide for the public safety in the case of rebellion. Where in the constitution it is placed is wholly subordinate to why it is there at all. Lincoln's suspension of the writ is therefore lawful. Q.E.D."
The first sentence of the quoted Jaffa paragraph, which you eliminated, states, "It is true that the clause dealing with habeas corpus is in Article I, which sets forth the powers of Congress, and not in Article II, which concerns the executive."
"Lincoln's authority to do so were part of his constitutional duties." This statement is categorically false. The debate surrounding SR-1 leaves no doubt, as well as the various judicial decisions which had been rendered.
As Jaffa observed, ""Lincoln has already shown...."
There goes Jaffa's logic out the window. Lincoln may have shown whatever to the satisfaction to Harry Jaffa, but when it stands on its own in conflict with judicial opinions, it does not count for diddly squat except in Jaffa's realm of political philosophy. Such jabberwocky is a legal non-entity. Jaffa's piece of philosophical trash is notably missing any citation to any judicial ruling (or legal authority) which agrees with his unique philosophy.
According to legal authorities, the right to suspend habeas corpus belongs to the Legislature. No judicial authority has ever supported the absurd notion that a military officer can be authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at his discretion. Judicial rulings have consistently ruled that suspension of the privilege of the writ requires Congressional authorization.
As the venerable Chief Justice Roger B. Taney wrote and had delivered to President Lincoln,
And Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the supreme court in the case of Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, uses this decisive language, in 4 Cranch [8 U. S.] 95: 'It may be worthy of remark, that this act (speaking of the one under which I am proceeding) was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared 'that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.' Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means, by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.' And again on page 101: 'If at any time, the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide; until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws.' I can add nothing to these clear and emphatic words of my great predecessor.
"Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause's placement in Article I."
-- Antonin Scalia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696. Argued April 28, 2004 - Decided June 28, 2004
"In England the benefit of this important writ can only be suspended by authority of parliament. It has been done several times of late years, both in England and in Ireland, to the great oppression of the subject, as hath been said. In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of congress; but not whenever congress may think proper; for it cannot be suspended, unless in cases of actual rebellion or invasion. A suspension under any other circumstances, whatever might be the pretext, would be unconstitutional, and consequently must be disregarded by those whose duty it is to grant the writ."
-- Tucker's Blackstone, Section 12 - Restraints on Powers of Congress, paragraph 2.
"That every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof, if unlawful; and that such inquiry and removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when, on account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
-- Act of Ratification of the Convention of the State of New York
Mr. J. Randolph said, "The Writ of habeas corpus is the only Writ sanctioned by the Constitution. It is guarded from every approach, except by the two Houses of Congress." (3d vol. Benton's Debates, pp. 520-540.)
On January 14, 1843, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Hunt said (after quoting the ninth section of the first Article of the Constitution, which provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it), "Who was to be the judge of that necessity? Was it the President of the United States, or any subordinate officer in command? No; it was the Legislature of the country that was the judge, and the only judge of that necessity. He supported the position by citing the practice of Mr. Jefferson, who, in 1807, as President of the United States, applied to Congress for a temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for three months; which, however, was refused by the House of Representatives, where the bill was defeated, which had passed the Senate for that purpose."
In the House of Representatives, in the debate on the bill to indemnify General Jackson, January 2, 1844, Mr. Barnard said, " The Constitution gave Congress authority to pass laws for the regulation of the army and navy of the United States, and under that, Congress have passed laws for the government of the army and navy and the militia. That code was applicable to the officers and soldiers, and to the militia, when in service; but it was not applicable to any other human being. Congress itself could not proclaim martial law. It might suspend the habeas corpus act, but it could not suspend the Constitution. A proclamation of martial law by the Congress of the United States would, of itself, be a violation of the Constitution." (Vol. XIV. Benton's Debates, p. 657.)
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Attorney-General Cushing, upon the subject of martial law, and the suspension of the habeas corpus, in February, 1857, growing out of a proclamation of martial law by the Governor of Washington Territory, in order to suspend the habeas corpus, this language is used : "The opinion is expressed by commentators on the Constitution, that the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and also that of judging when the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to Congress.
It may be assumed, as a general doctrine of constitutional jurisprudence in all the United States, that the power to suspend laws, whether those granting the writ of habeas corpus, or any other, is vested exclusively in the Legislature of the particular State."
-- (Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. VIII, p. 365.)
In 1842, in the debate on the bill to idemnify Gen. Jackson for the fine imposed on him by Judge Hall, at New Orleans, Mr. Bayard said, "Congress may indeed suspend the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus, but cannot declare martial law to be the law of the United States, or any part of them...... The Constitution says, Congress shall have power to declare war, to raise armies, to provide a navy, to provide arms and munitions of war, and to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces. On these limited and specific powers it has been inferred that Congress may declare martial law. To avoid this very conclusion there is an express provision in the very next section, among the restrictions on the powers of Congress, declaring that the remedy of the Writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion or invasion. All Congress can do, even in cases of rebellion or invasion, is to suspend the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus; and that can be done by Congress only -- not by an officer of the Government -- without its authority." (Vol. XIV Benton's Debates, pp. 627.)
posted on 12/28/2003 1:05:00 AM CST by GOPcapitalist
"The privileges and benefit of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government, in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding months."
-- Charles Pickney, announcing the proposal to limit the suspension of habeas corpus, Constitutional Convention, 1787
"The people by adopting the federal constitution, give congress general powers to institute a distinct and new judiciary, new courts, and to regulate all proceedings in them, under the eight limitations mentioned in a former letter; and the further one, that the benefits of the habeas corpus act shall be enjoyed by individuals." - Richard Henry Lee, Anti-Federalist #16, "Federal Farmer"
"In the same section it is provided, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may require it." This clause limits the power of the legislature to deprive a citizen of the right of habeas corpus, to particular cases viz. those of rebellion and invasion; the reason is plain, because in no other cases can this power be exercised for the general good."
-- Robert Yates, delegate to the Constitutional Convetion, Anti-Federalist #9, "Brutus"
"The safest and best restriction, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in which Congress are authorized to exercise that power [of suspending habeas corpus] at all, namely, in those of rebellion or invasion. These are clear and certain terms, facts of public notoriety, and whenever these shall cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also."
-- Judge Francis Dana, presenting the Constitution to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention
"In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of congress; but not whenever congress may think proper; for it cannot be suspended, unless in cases of actual rebellion, or invasion. A suspension under any other circumstances, whatever might be the pretext, would be unconstitutional, and consequently must be disregarded by those whose duty it is to grant the writ."
-- St. George Tucker, Commentaries, 1803
"The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case. If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide."
-- Justice John Marshall, writing for the majority in Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout, United States Supreme Court, 1807
"Those respecting the press, religion, & juries, with several others, of great value, were accordingly made; but the Habeas corpus was left to the discretion of Congress, and the amendment against the reeligibility of the President was not proposed by that body."
-- Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 1821
"The Constitution seems to have secured this benefit [habeas corpus] to the citizen by the description of the writ, and in an unqualified manner admitting its efficacy, while it declares that it shall not he suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require it. This writ is believed to be known only in countries governed by the common law, as it is established in England; but in that country the benefit of it may at any time be withheld by the authority of parliament, whereas we see that in this country it cannot be suspended even in cases of rebellion or invasion, unless the public safety shall require it. Of this necessity the Constitution probably intends, that the legislature of the United States shall be the judges. Charged as they are with the preservation of the United States from both those evils, and superseding the powers of the several states in the prosecution of the measures they may find it expedient to adopt, it seems not unreasonable that this control over the writ of habeas corpus, which ought only to be exercised on extraordinary occasions, should rest with them. It is at any rate certain, that congress, which has authorized the courts and judges of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases within their jurisdiction, can alone suspend their power"
-- William Rawle, "A View of the Constitution of the United States of America," 1826
"It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body."
-- Justice Joseph Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States," Book 3, Chapter XXXII, § 1336, 1833
"And who could hold for a moment, when the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended by the legislature itself, either in the general government or most of the States, without an express constitutional permission, that all other writs and laws could be suspended, and martial law substituted for them over the whole State or country, without any express constitutional license to that effect, in any emergency? Much more is this last improbable when even the mitigated measure, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, has never yet been found proper by Congress, and, it is believed, by neither of the States, since the Federal Constitution was adopted."
-- Justice Levi Woodbury, dissent in Luther v. Borden, United States Supreme Court, 1849
"With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too clear to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for supposing that the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the judicial power. He certainly does not faithfully execute the laws, if he takes upon himself legislative power, by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and the judicial power also, by arresting and imprisoning a person without due process of law."
-- Justice Roger B. Taney, Ex Parte Merryman, US Circuit Court of Appeals, 1861
"There has been much discussion concerning the question whether the power to suspend the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" is conferred by the Constitution on Congress, or on the President. The only judicial decisions which have been made upon this question have been adverse to the power of the President.Still, very able lawyers have endeavored to maintain -- perhaps to the satisfaction of others -- have maintained, that the power to deprive a particular person of the "privilege of the writ," is an executive power. For while it has been generally, and, so far as I know, universally admitted, that Congress alone can suspend a law, or render it inoperative, and consequently that Congress alone can prohibit the courts from issuing the writ, yet that the executive might, in particular cases, suspend or deny the privilege which the writ was designed to secure. I am not aware that any one has attempted to show that under this grant of power to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," the President may annul the laws of States, create new offences unknown to the laws of the United States, erect military commissions to try and punish them, and then, by a sweeping decree, suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to all persons who shall be "arrested by any military authority." I think he would make a more bold than wise experiment on the credulity of the people, who should attempt to convince them that this power is found in the habeas corpus clause of the Constitution. No such attempt has been, and I think none such will be made. And therefore I repeat, that no other source of this power has ever been suggested save that described by the President himself, as belonging to him as commander-in-chief."
-- Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, "Executive Power," 1862
In 1861, Senator Wilson brought a proposed Joint Resolution to the Senate, SR-1. It was batted around throughout the special session called by Ayotollah Abe.
It read as follows:
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all of the extraordinary acts, proclamations, and orders hereinbefore mentioned, be, and the same are hereby, approved and declared to be in all respects legal and valid, to the same intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.
The items "hereinbefore mentioned" were:
First. He did, on the fifteenth day of April last, issue his proclamation calling upon the several States for seventy-five thousand men to suppress such insurrectionary combinations, and to cause the laws to be faithfully executed.
Secondly. He did, on the nineteenth day of April last, issue a proclamation setting on foot a blockade of the ports within the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.
Thirdly. He did, on the twenty-seventh day of April last, issue a proclamation establishing a blockade of the ports within the States of Virginia and North Carolina.
Fourthly. He did, by an order of the twenty-seventh day of April last, addressed to the commanding general of the army of the United States, authorize that officer to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington.
Fifthly. He did, on the third day of May last, issue a proclamation calling into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers, increasing the regular army by the addition of twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fourteen men, and the navy by an addition of eighteen thousand seamen.
Sixthly. He did, on the tenth day of May last, issue a proclamation authorizing the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, if necessary.
This pertained to Lincoln authorizing Scott to suspend habeas corpus and was shot down in flames. It never even attempted to justify Scott authorizing other military officers to suspend habeas corpus.
The battle continued down to the final day of the session, August 5, 1861. During the session, which started in July, the tide turned against this attempted rape of the Constitution.
Right near the end of the session, Mr. Wilson rose and implored the body one more time, "Let us have a vote."
A brave Senator, a true Patriot, a common-sense lover of the Law and the Constitution, rose up to smite the usurping infidel and told Mr. Wilson for the last time, NO! You may not defile and rape our beloved Constitution.
OK, what he really said was more polite and went like this, "Now, my friend is clamorous. He cannot keep still. He says, 'let us have a vote.' I am not disposed to vote upon the resolution. I will tell the Senator from Kentucky I am not prepared to vote for the resolution, and it is not going to pass without consideration. It is not going to pass in the shape it is by my approbation."
Yea, verily, that brave Senator, that true Patriot, that common-sense lover of the Law and the Constitution who rose up so bravely to slam-dunk infidel Senator Wilson and his bill into eternity was none other than ILLINOIS SENATOR LYMAN TRUMBULL.
QUOTES FROM THE SENATE RECORD REGARDING SR-1
Pages : [64] , [137] , [138] , [139] , [140] , [141] , [142]
[333] , [334] , [392] , [395] , [453]
Mr. President, in the State of Missouri, there was no "Law of the United States opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed by combinations of men too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Indeed, sir, there was no resistance of any United States law. Yet Missouri, peaceful and law abiding, without cause, against law and in defiance of the Constitution , was invaded by United States troops, by troops from Illinois, by troops from Iowa, and by troops from Kansas. Indeed, sir, it seems that from the very moment in which the administration resolved upon this policy of coercion, the State of Missouri was marked as a victim for sacrifice, for invation, and subjugation.
~ Mr. Polk, July 11, 1861, page 64 ~
The joint resolution would seem, upon the face of it, to admit that the acts of the President were no performed in obedience to the Constitution and the laws. If that be true, I should be glad to hear some reasons assigned by gentlemen showing the power of the Congress of the United States, by joint resolution, to cure a breach of the Constitution or to indemnify the President against violations of the Constitution and the laws. If, in any respect that officer has violated the laws, he has also violated the Constitution; because one clause of that instrument declares that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." It confers on him the power to see that they are executed; but no power to violate them.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 137 ~
I deny, Mr. President, that one branch of this Government can indemnify any other branch of the Government for a violation of the Constitution or the laws. The powers conferred upon the General Government by the people of the States are the measure of its authority. Those powers have been confided to different departments, and the boundaries of those departments determined with perfect exactitude. The President has his powers and rights conferred on him by the Constitution; the legislative authority its powers and rights; the judicial authority its powers and rights; the judicial authority its powers and rights; and I deny that either can encroach upon the other, or that either can indemnify the other for a usurpation of powers not confided to it by the Constitution. Sir, Congress, by a joint resolution, has no more right, in my opinion, to make valid a violation of the constitution and the laws by the President, than the President would have by an entry upon the executive journal to make valid a usurpation of the executive power by the legislative department. Congress has no more right to make valid an unconstitutional act of the President, than the President would have to make valid an act of the Supreme Court of the United States encroaching upon executive power; or than the Supreme Court would have the right to make valid an act of the executive encroaching upon the judicial power.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 137-8 ~
It is proposed, sir, to approve and make valid the act of the President in enlisting men for three and five years. I ask you by what authority of Constitution or law he has done this act? The power is not conferred in the constitution; it has not been granted by the law. it is, therefore an unconstitutional and illegal act of executive power. The President, of his own will -- and that is one of the acts enumerated in this joint resolution which is propowed to approve and ratify -- has added immensely to the force of the regular Army. The Constitution says that Congress shall raise armies, and a law now upon your statute book limits the number of the regular force, officers and men. Hence, sir, that is an act in derogation both of the Constitution and of the laws.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 138 ~
The President has added immensely to the Navy of the United States. The Constitution says that Congress shall provide and maintain a navy; and there is now a law upon the statute book limited the number of men to be employed in the Navy. That, like the rest, sir, will not bear argument. I doubt if an attempt will be made to defend it upon constitutional or legal grounds. I pronounce it a usurpation.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 138 ~
I need not say to the Senate that in england, whence we derive this right, the legislative power alone can suspend it. We all know, sir, that the monarch of England cannot suspend it. We all know, sir, that the monarch of england cannot suspend that writ; but transatlantic freemen seem to be eager to approve and ratify acts which a European monarch would not dare to perform. Mr. President, it needs no elaborate argument to show that the executive authority of the United States has no right to suspend the write of habeas corpus.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 138 ~
I enumerate what I regard as usurpations of the Executive to go upon the record as a protest of those of us who are not willing to see the Constitution subverted, and the public liberty trampled under foot, under whatever pretest, of necessity or otherwise.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 139 ~
: I remember to have read, not long since, a speech made by the present able Secretary of War, in this city, in which he said that the southern States must be subdued, and that at the end of this contest there would be no more Virginians as such, or Carolinians as such; but only Americans all. Sir, the name of American is a proud one, and I lvoe it; but it is the preservation of the names of Virginians and Pennsylvanians, and the distinctive existence of all these States, which alone can keep the name of American a proud one. I never want to see them blotted out. I said, sir, that in my opinion, the tendency was to change our character of government, and that the purpose, if not avowed, is acted upon to conduct those proceedings without regard to the limitation of the Constitution. these things I have enumerated go to show it. This Joint Resolution goes to show it. I call upon Senators to defend the constitutionality of these acts, or else to admit that we intend to conduct this contest without regard to the Constitution.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 140 ~
In the course of the same speech to which I have referred, that eminent Senator declared that not only must that country be ravaged by armies, but that unless the people of those States paid willing and loyal obedience to the Federal Government, their State form must be changed, and they must be reduced to the condition of Territories; to be governed by Governors sent from Massachusetts and Illinois. This was said seriously; and afterwards, when referred to by my colleague on a subsequent day, reaffirmed by that eminent Senator. If necessary, reduced to the condition of Territories! Is there authority in the Constitution to do it?
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 140-1 ~
We can only hope that this flash of frenzy may not assume the form of chronic madness, and that in any event Divine providence may preserve for us and for posterity, out of the wreck of a broken Union, the priceless principles of constitutional liberty and of self-government. [Applause in the galleries.]
~ Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, pp. 142 ~
The suspension of the privilege of the habeas corpus by executive authority is a violation of the principles of public freedom which have been consecrated for centuries. These principles were dear to our Anglo-Saxon forefathers before the period of Magna Charta. From the days of Magna Charta, which, seeking to restore ancient rights, provided that no freeman should be taken or imprisoned without the lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, down to the declaration of our independence, that principle has been dear to the freemen of England and America.
~ Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 333 ~
If necessity, whichg is an odious plea, known for hundreds of years as "the tyrant's plea" -- a plea by which you may overthrow all constitutional provisions -- if that plea is efficient here; if that is a justification for a violation of one provision of the Constitution, it is equally a justification for any and all violations of it.
~ Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 333 ~
So too, sir, these domiciliary visits, which are equally in violation of a provision of the Constitution, are sought to be justified by necessity. Now, let us see where these things are done. Nowhere, so far as I am informed, except in the State of Maryland, unless there be some exceptions in the State of Missouri.
~ Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 334 ~
My objection to taking up this resolution I will state in a word. I believe it is in order to state briefly the objection. This resolution which the Senator from Massachusetts seeks to take up is germane to the bill which is the unfinished business. The resolution proposed to declare legal the acts which have been done by the President in the recess of Congress. Will our declaration make them legal if they are not legal? Will it make them so if they were unconstitutional and void?
~ Mr. TRUMBULL, August 2, 1861, page 392 ~
The Senator from Maine evidently entertains a very sincere conviction that the action of the President has not been in violation of the constitution or the laws; because he has asserted it six or seven times in the ocurse of the brief speech he has made to the Senate. His convictions are evidently deep and sincere. All I have to say in reply to that is, that it will be a very great comfort to the President to be assured of that fact; forhe himself has been under the impression that he has been transcending both; and, indeed, he admits it in his message, and puts it expressly on the ground of a popular demand and what he deemed to be a public necessity. It has also been admitted by many Senators on the other side of the chamber. I have not believed, all along, that the resolution was going to be voted by the Senate. I do not believe it now. It may be; but I think not. My deliberate judgment is, that in some mode the Senate will avoid putting itself on record in favor of the principles contained in this resolution. It is indifferent to me whether it does or not. Of course, every Senator will vote his own convictions if brought to a vote; but I do not think there are many Senators who want their names to go upon history in favor of this resolution.
~ Mr. Breckinridge, August 2, 1861, page 392 ~
The President issued a proclamation calling into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers. It was clearly illegal; I am not satisfied it was necessary. I am inclined to think it was not.
~ Mr. Howe, August 2, 1861, page 395 ~
I cannot consent to give my approval to the fourth and sixth acts enumerated in the resolution, by which the President authorized the commanding General to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I do not rise to make a speech; but to give the reason why I cannot vote for the resolution.
~ Mr. Thomson, August 2, 1861, page 395 ~
MR. WILSON. Let us have a vote.
MR. TRUMBULL. Now, my friend is clamorous. he cannot keep still. he says "let us have a vote." I am not disposed to vote upon the resolution. I will tell the Senator from Kentucky I am not prepared to vote for the resolution, and it is not going to pass without consideration. It is not going to pass in the shape it is by my approbation.
~ Messrs. Wilson and Trumbull, August 5, 1861, page 453. ~