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I recently picked up a copy of Chosen But Free by Norman Geisler, which purports itself to be a "balanced" view of divine election. It posits that 5-point Calvinism is "extreme" Calvinism, and "moderate" Calvinism (Amyrauldian 4-point Calvinism) is the 'middle ground' between "extreme" Calvinism and Arminianism. (Insert eye-rolling gif here.) Of course, he manages to hide the statement that he is a 'moderate' Calvinist pretty well inside the book, but that's really beside the point. One of the appendices the man has in his book is on Edwards' "Freedom of the Will." Here's what he says:

Edwards argued that all actions are caused, since it is irrational to claim that things arise without a cause. But for him a self-caused action is impossible, since a cause is prior to an effect, and one cannot be prior to himself. Therefore, all actions are ultimately caused by a First Cause (God). "Free choice" for Edwards is doing what one desires--but God gives the desire to do good. Hence, all good human actions are determined by God. Evil actions are determined by the strongest desires of an evil nature left to itself. ...Jonathan Edwards saw a dilemma for all those who reject his view: Either there is an infinite regress of causes or else there is no motive to act....As we shall see, Edwards has posed a false dilemma, since the actions can be caused by the Self and not by another. True, every action is caused. But from this it does not follow that every actor is caused to act by another actor. This is not true of God's free actions; they are self-caused (i.e., caused by His Self). Likewise, creatures made in God's image have the God-given power to cause their own moral actions. This alternative is not only logically possible, but it is the only one that can explain how [Satan] and Adam were able to sin. On Edwards' view that God could not have given them the desire to sin, nor did they have a sinful nature to determine their actions, then they must have been the first cause of their own evil actions. But this is the very view of freedom that Edwards rejects.
Opponents to Edwards' determinism respond as follows. First, defining free choice as "doing what one desires" is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do (cf. Rom. 7:15-16).
Second, Edwards also misunderstands self-determinism as free acts caused by other free acts. Rather, it means simply that a self can cause something else to happen. That is, a free agent can cause a free action without that free action needing another cause ad infinitum.
Third, Edwards has a faulty, mechanistic view of human personhood. He likens human free choice to balancing scales in need of more pressure in order to tip the scales one way or the other. But humans are not machines; they are persons made in the image of God (Gen. 1:27).
Fourth, Edwards wrongly assumes that self-determinism is contrary to God's sovereignty. But God pre-determined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it. Even the Calvinistic Westminster Confession of Faith declares that "although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (V, ii).

As far as my own response, I would choose my terms more carefully. "Free will" is not a philosophical term, for literally, it means "free want," or the freedom to want. Thus, though Edwards is right, technically, he is right only because he is using the term 'free will' in a different sense (the proper sense) than what most Arminians do. When an Arminian says "free will," he really means "free agency," for that is the proper term for the ability to choose without internal or external coersion or necessitating influence between two or more choices. See also the threads here and here.