It is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it, And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a pre-requisite of such decree.
It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect "out of the world," Jn. xv: 19, and out of the "same lump" with the vessels of dishonor, Rom. ix: 21. They were then regarded as being, along with the non-elect, in the common state of sin and misery.
Our election is in Christ our Redeemer, Eph. i: 4; iii: 11, which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ, I Pet. i: 2; 2 Thess. ii: 13.
Election is declared to be an act of mercy: Rom. ix: 15, 16; xi: 5, 6, and preterition is an act of justice, Rom. ix: 22. Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestinated as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestinated. The language of Turrettin is informative, Loc. p, Qu. 18, section 5. 1. "By this hypothesis, the first act of God's will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God's ineffable goodness.
"It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.
"It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination. of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they presuppose their object, do not make it.
"It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them."
Hence, it's useless to you as a rebuttal.
Why don't you try re-reading what I wrote, and re-reading what Dabney wrote, and see if you can figure it out on the second go-round. OR, try to explain just precisely why you think my point disagrees with Dabney's. Care to make a go of it?