Posted on 03/10/2022 4:49:25 PM PST by CDR Kerchner
In every effort to discuss the correct meaning of "natural born citizen", you keep dragging out the 14th amendment for some reason. One can only infer that you link the two subjects when you want to make your argument, and then you deny linkage when I point out your effort to cite the 14th.
Rather than being a "straw man", it's feeling more like a "schizoid man".
However, in so doing, your claim about the 14th Amendment is absurdly false as a matter of law.
My "claim" is that an amendment created in 1868 does not redefine the meaning of a term of art understood and used in 1787.
That doesn't seem absurd at all.
While they were at it, the people, acting in their sovereign capacity could amend the Constitution in any way of their choosing.
They can amend the qualifications of the Presidency if that is their intent, but an Amendment for the purpose of granting freed slaves citizenship cannot be construed to make unforeseen and unintended changes to other parts of the constitution.
Even changing the qualifications cannot change the meanings of terms as they existed at the time they were incorporated into the Constitution. We cannot revoke all past slavery by declaring the word "slave" to mean "free."
The sovereigns can change anything they want, in any way they want.
In the world of make believe, they can pretend a man is a woman, but in reality they cannot. They can make the powers that be enforce their ridiculous claims, but this still does not make them true or correct.
Being unable, or stubbornly unwilling, to cite United States law to support your brain farts, you must again resort to an absurd Straw Man Argument, Nobody argued that the 14th Amendment altered the qualifications to be President.
"Brain farts." Attempts to insult usually don't work on me, but if it makes you feel better to engage in them, go ahead. I generally don't reciprocate with insults when I am trying to have a reasonable discussion.
As for you saying ..."Nobody argued that the 14th Amendment altered the qualifications to be President." It seems obvious to me that if the 14th amendment grants people "citizen" status, and *YOU* argue this is the exact same thing as "natural born citizen" status, then giving "citizen" status to people who were not previously regarded as "natural born citizens" is indeed changing the qualifications for the office of the Presidency.
It does not state a bleeping word about parents.
The second amendment does not mention "guns" but they are inherent in the understanding of "arms" at the time.
The constitution does not take the time to define many things, and Madison puts it more eloquently than I ever could.
"What can he mean by saying that the Common law is not secured by the new constitution, though it has been adopted by the State Constitutions. The common law is nothing more than the unwritten law, and is left by all the constitutions equally liable to legislative alterations. I am not sure that any notice is particularly taken of it in the Constitutions of the States. If there is, nothing more is provided than a general declaration that it shall continue along with other branches of law to be in force till legally changed. The Constitution of Virga. drawn up by Col Mason himself, is absolutely silent on the subject. An ordinance passed during the same Session, declared the Common law as heretofore & all Statutes of prior date to the 4 of James I. to be still the law of the land,4 merely to obviate pretexts that the separation from G. Britain threw us into a State of nature, and abolished all civil rights and Obligations. Since the Revolution every State has made great inroads & with great propriety in many instances on this monarchical code. The “revisal of the laws” by a Committe[e] of wch. Col. Mason was a member, though not an acting one, abounds with such innovations. The abolition of the right of primogeniture, which I am sure Col. Mason does not disapprove, falls under this head. What could the Convention have done? If they had in general terms declared the Common law to be in force, they would have broken in upon the legal Code of every State in the most material points: they wd. have done more, they would have brought over from G.B. a thousand heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines, and even the ecclesiastical Hierarchy itself, for that is a part of the Common law. If they had undertaken a discrimination, they must have formed a digest of laws, instead of a Constitution. "
Also, note his reference to the "monarchical code"?
This Jus Soli idea is completely feudal, and based on the needs of a King to command allegiance over as many people as possible, but it is not well suited to the needs of a Republic.
"...and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, ..."
Lafayette was a citizen, nay a natural born citizen, before the adoption of the Constitution.
I feel a bit sheepish about having to point out to you that deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, does not mean "is."
When a family adopts, the new addition can be "deemed, adjudged, and taken to be," a member of the family, but the DNA will say otherwise.
Granting people the rights of a natural child does not make of them a natural child.
I will say my legal argument is going to derive from William Lewis of Pennsylvania. He was a member of the Pennsylvania legislature when the US Constitution was ratified by Pennsylvania, and he ought to have known what was meant by "natural born citizen" in the context of the Framer's intent.
Whatever secret and unshared thoughts or opinions William Lewis may have had, they were not ratified as a part of the Constitution or United States law. When you progress from what your argument is going to be, all the way to what your argument is, get back to me.
Congressional Research Service,
Citizenship is membership in a political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency.The Supreme Court in 1929, in United States v. Schwimmer, had stated in a similar manner that "Except for eligibility to the Presidency, naturalized citizens stand on the same footing as do native born citizens," and noted again in 1931 that, "The alien, when he becomes a naturalized citizen, acquires, with one exception, every right possessed under the Constitution by those citizens who are native born."
Although a small faction of advocates now apparently attempt to cast doubt as to whether every so-called "native" born U.S. citizen (having been born within the borders of this country) is a "natural born" citizen under the Constitution, all doubt in the judicial arena has been resolved for more than a century in favor of "natural born" status of such individuals who are citizens "by birth" or "at birth." As discussed in more detail in the following section of this report, there have been some legitimate legal arguments and varying opinions about the status of foreign born children of U.S. citizens as being either "natural born" citizens under common law principles, or citizens who are, arguably, "naturalized" or made U.S. citizens by statute. There appears, however, to be no legitimate legal issue outstanding concerning the eligibility of all citizens of the United States who are born in the country to be President. The case law in the United States, as well as the clear historical record, does not support the argument or contention that there is some further or additional "subcategory" of "citizen" of the United States who, although born in the country and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, is neither a "natural born" citizen nor a "naturalized" citizen. Rather, as the cases discussed above demonstrate, the categories uniformly recognized and referred to in case law in the United States as "citizens" of the United States are "natural born" citizens, that is, those who are citizens "at birth," as opposed to "naturalized" citizens, that is, those who are aliens at birth and must go through naturalization to become citizens.
As the 14th Amendment nowhere uses the term natural born citizen, and nobody has said that it does, to your shame you have resorted to the Straw Man Argument.In every effort to discuss the correct meaning of "natural born citizen", you keep dragging out the 14th amendment for some reason. One can only infer that you link the two subjects when you want to make your argument, and then you deny linkage when I point out your effort to cite the 14th.
I have repeatedly denied that the 14th Amendment even attempts to define the term natural born citizen. That specific term is not used in the 14th Amendment. Nor does anything else in the Constitution make any attempt to define the term natural born citizen.
The 14th Amendment, for all persons born in the United States, defined who is born a citizen of the United States.
Natural born in the common law term natural born subject, and natural born in the American term natural born subject are identical in meaning. It means born a citizen, not naturalized.
If you have a definition of natural born citizen and would like to share it for purposes of debate, now would be the time. If you are unwilling or unable to share your personal definition of natural born citizen, take the last word and consider the conversation closed.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside," contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
The term "citizen" as understoood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people—and he who before was a "subject of the king" is now "a citizen of the State." State v. Manuel (1838)
The 14th Amendment "provides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to control the status of citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United States...." Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).
"All sources rouitinely used to interpret the Constitution confirm that the phrase 'natural born Citizen' has a specific meaning: namely, someone who was a U.S. citizen at birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time. And Congress has made equally clear from the time of the framing of the Constitution to the current day that, subject to certain residency requirements on the parents, someone born to a U.S. citizen parent generally becomes a U.S. citizen without regard to whether the birth takes place in Canada, the Canal Zone, or the continental United States." Neal Katyal and Paul Clement, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 161 (March 11, 2015).
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/natural_born_citizen
"A natural-born citizen refers to someone who was a U.S. citizen at birth, and did not need to go through a naturalization proceeding later in life."
"Under the 14th Amendment's Naturalization Clause and the Supreme Court case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US. 649, anyone born on U.S. soil and subject to its jurisdiction is a natural born citizen, regardless of parental citizenship. This type of citizenship is referred to as birthright citizenship."
"What was the original public meaning of the phrase that establishes the eligibility for the office of President of the United States? There is general agreement on the core of its meaning. Anyone born on American soil whose parents are citizens of the United States is a "natural born citizen." Anyone whose citizenship is acquired after birth as a result of naturalization is not a natural born citizen."
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, Michigan Law Review, First Impressions, December 2008, Vol. 107, No. 3, 2008.
A person is either born a citizen or an alien. Only aliens may be naturalized. Persons who acquire U.S. citizenship at birth are natural born citizens. President Chester Arthur, born of an alien father, was a natural born U.S. citizen. Kamala Harris, born of alien parents in California is a natural born U.S. citizen. Barack Obama, born in Hawaii of an alien parent, is a natural born U.S. citizen.
Arthur and Obama served as President, and Harris is serving as Vice President, which entails the same eligibility requirements as President. Regardless of whatever secret definition of natural born citizen you may have but will not share, United States law and history are clear that it means someone who became a United States citizen at birth.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Liacakos v. Kennedy, 195 F. Supp. 630 (D.D.C. 1961)
Vassilios LIACAKOS, a/k/a William G. Lias, Plaintiff,
v.
Robert F. KENNEDY, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant.Civ. A. No. 5249-55.
United States District Court District of Columbia.
June 29, 1961.
Jack Wasserman and David Carliner, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., E. Riley Casey, Gil Zimmerman and William A. Matthews, Sp. Assts. to U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for defendant.
HOLTZOFF, District Judge.
This is the trial of an action brought by the plaintiff, William Lias, to set aside an order directing his deportation as an alien illegally in the United States. The plaintiff, in addition to questioning the validity of the deportation proceeding itself and the final order therein, also challenges the ruling of the Immigration authorities that he is an alien. The plaintiff claims to be a natural born citizen of the United States and seeks a declaration of his nationality. In effect, this proceeding combines two distinct causes of action: a cause of action for a declaratory judgment establishing citizenship *631 of the United States; and a cause of action to review and set aside the deportation order made in the administrative proceeding.
It is well established that an action for a declaratory judgment lies to secure an adjudication that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S. Ct. 884, 83 L. Ed. 1320; Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, D.C., 122 F. Supp. 709. The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has further held that an action for a declaratory judgment to establish citizenship may be combined with an action to review the validity of the administrative proceeding. Frank v. Rogers, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 253 F.2d 889.
An action for declaratory judgment differs in important respects from an action to review the validity of the administrative proceeding. The latter is limited to a consideration of the administrative record, and the only questions open are whether there is any error of law in the proceeding and whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the findings of fact. An action for a declaratory judgment, however, involves a trial de novo. A ruling of an administrative official denying citizenship has no prima facie effect or any other effect except to serve as a basis for establishing a justiciable controversy. What is being tried now is the cause of action for a declaratory judgment to establish citizenship. In such an action the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. This burden of proof, however, need not be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely by a fair preponderance of the evidence, for naturally, the proceeding is of a civil nature.
The plaintiff claims that he is a natural-born citizen of the United States, having been born in Wheeling, West Virginia, on July 14, 1900. He claims that when he was two or three years of age his parents returned to their native Greece, where his father later died. He further claims that in 1909 his widowed mother came back to the United States with the plaintiff's two older sisters and himself. Admittedly, the plaintiff has been living in Wheeling, West Virginia, continuously since 1909. The Government contends, however, that he was born in Cythion, Greece, and that he was brought here by his mother in 1909, instead of having been previously born here, taken back to Greece and returned here in 1909.
The case is not free from doubt. There are many discrepancies in the testimony. In weighing evidence, it is well to bear in mind the well-known statement of Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer, 1 Cowper 63, 66, 98 English Reports 969, 970, to the effect that:
"It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted."This maxim has been often quoted. It was referred to favorably by the Supreme Court in Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 51, 48 S. Ct. 1, 72 L. Ed. 137, and by Judge Parker in the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Henderson v. Richardson Co., 25 F.2d 225, 228.
We start with the important fact that there is no contemporaneous record of the plaintiff's birth, either in Wheeling, West Virginia, or in Cythion, Greece. Necessarily, a record of birth contemporaneously made by governmental authority in official records would be almost conclusive evidence of birth. There is no such record in Wheeling, West Virginia. The Government, through its counsel, conducted an exhaustive and very able investigation in Greece, that resulted in uncovering many very old records in which the plaintiff's forebears are named, but again there is no record of the plaintiff's birth. Neither side, in other words, has been able to produce anything like a contemporaneous birth certificate.
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the United States, at least, until recent years there were many localities that did not maintain comprehensive *632 and complete vital statistics or birth records, and that even in those metropolitan centers in which such records were maintained some have been lost or destroyed accidentally, from time to time, either by fire or flood or other casualties. Consequently, too much significance cannot be attached to the absence of a birth certificate, although this circumstance creates additional problems both for counsel and for the Court. While there was no burden on the Government to show that the records of Wheeling, West Virginia, listing births that occurred in that city in the year 1900 are extant and complete, nevertheless, it is a fair inference, in view of the very thorough investigation that was made by the Government, that if this were the fact the Government would have ascertained it to be so. Consequently, we have to decide the case on other evidence, no one item being conclusive, weighing it in the light of Lord Mansfield's famous maxim, to which reference has been made.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the evidence it should be observed that the ground on which deportation is sought is a highly technical one. The Government does not seek to deport the plaintiff as an alien because of any crimes that he may have committed or because he is a subversive individual or for any reason going to his merits or demerits. The ground of deportation is that on one occasion he crossed to Canada, from Detroit to Windsor, for a social visit, remained there about a day and returned without presenting, as the regulations required in respect to an alien, either a reentry permit or a border-crossing pass. If he was a citizen, of course, such a document was not required. If he was an alien, such a document was needed and his entry without it was technically illegal. If his entry was illegal, in the eyes of the law he is deportable, and it is on this rather tenuous ground that deportation is sought.
It may be read between the lines that this incident is used as a reed on which to lean the deportation proceeding, because the plaintiff, according to the evidence, has been engaged over the years in a series of criminal and unsavory activities. He was convicted at least three times for violations of the national prohibition laws, which involved two sentences to Atlanta penitentiary. He was convicted of a misdemeanor in connection with the operation of a policy lottery. Further, apparently, in addition to operating a race track, which in and of itself is a legitimate occupation, he has been engaged in certain activities that were on the fringe of morality. But the duty of the Court is to decide the question of law and fact, and nothing else, that is presented in this proceeding, and not to pass judgment upon the morality of his life.
We start the consideration of the evidence with what is sometimes known as a delayed birth certificate issued by the proper authorities of the State of West Virginia. One was issued on October 28, 1946 by the Clerk of the County Court of the County of Ohio, State of West Virginia, in which the City of Wheeling is located, and the other was issued on November 1, 1946 by the Director of Health of the State of West Virginia and State Registrar of Vital Statistics. Each of these certificates attests to the fact that the plaintiff was born on July 14, 1900 in Wheeling, West Virginia.
Naturally, the same weight is not attached to a birth certificate of a delayed nature, such as these, as would be accorded to a contemporaneous birth record. Nevertheless, it is sufficient, without anything else, to establish a prima facie case. Delayed birth certificates are issued pursuant to State statutes. Such State statutes were enacted because of the difficulties that many Americans born in this country have in obtaining birth certificates due to the circumstances to which the Court has already adverted. In fact, very frequently it is much harder for a natural-born citizen of the United States to obtain proof of his citizenship than it is for a naturalized citizen, because the naturalized citizen always has a *633 naturalization certificate. The Passport Bureau of the State Department recognizes this by its willingness to accept affidavits in lieu of birth certificates.
We now turn to some of the records unearthed in Greece. What is called an extract of a penal record of the plaintiff of the Office of The Ministry of Justice refers to the fact that he was born in the United States in 1899 and that his penal status is nil. There is a certificate from the Mayor of Cythion to the effect that plaintiff's name is carried in the Males Register of the Municipality as having been born in America of Greek citizen parents and as having come to Greece with his parents. There are other documents showing that he, together with other members of his family, has been carried on the Males Register of this Greek Municipality.
The evidence tends to show that citizenship in Greece is based on jus sanguinis rather than on jus soli and that, consequently, a person born abroad of Greek parents is regarded by Greece as a subject of Greece,this, of course, is true of many Continental countries and that his name is carried on what is known as the Males Register, which is used as a basis for listing persons who are subject to military duty. There appears to be no Greek record specifically attesting to the fact that the plaintiff was born in that country.
In 1926 the plaintiff was married, and the marriage license issued by the County of Brooke in West Virginia recites that the place of the husband's birth was Wheeling, West Virginia. When he arrived at the Atlanta penitentiary as a prisoner on June 24, 1926, he was required to sign a statement containing answers to certain questions and gave West Virginia as an answer to the inquiry as to his place of nativity. He had a son born on January 2, 1936, and the father's birthplace in the son's birth certificate is recorded as Wheeling, West Virginia. A daughter was born on November 3, 1939, and her birth certificate also recites the father's birthplace as being Wheeling, West Virginia. In 1940 he obtained a number of small insurance policies on the lives of his two children, and in each application signed by him he gives Wheeling, West Virginia, as the place of his birth. On April 18, 1932, he was back in the Atlanta penitentiary and again he gave the place of his nativity as West Virginia. In addition, his application for parole, dated November 15, 1932, states that he was born and raised in Wheeling, West Virginia. In 1940 he was carried on local registration lists as an eligible voter.
The plaintiff supplemented this documentary evidence by testimony to the effect that his mother had told him that he was born in Wheeling, West Virginia. Such evidence is admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule relating to pedigree. While the Court does not attach too much weight to it, nevertheless, it is some corroboration of the documentary evidence, which to the Court appears to be much more weighty.
If this array of documentary evidence stood alone, the Court would have no question about the case whatever. However, as stated by the Court at the opening of its remarks, the case is not free from doubt, because on two important occasions it appears that the plaintiff represented himself as an alien. The first occasion is in connection with his registration for the draft in the First World War. His draft registration card contains the answer "No" to the question whether he is a citizen of the United States. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff challenging the genuineness of his signature to the draft registration card. The Court is not satisfied with that evidence. The Court is inclined to draw the inference that, very likely, the plaintiff was desirous of dodging the draft and used this means of avoiding liability to military service. He did not report for military service in Greece and he avoided it in this country. This Court, however, is not trying him on a charge of evading the draft during the First World War.
*634 The other important statement is in connection with the marriage certificate on the occasion of his second marriage, which took place in 1935 in Brooklyn, New York. The affidavit attached to the license to marry purporting to be signed by the plaintiff recites that the country of his birth was Greece. The explanation adduced in his behalf is that actually the groom and his prospective bride went to the marriage license bureau in a festive mood, accompanied by a number of close relatives, and that in fact the information contained in the affidavit was given by one or two of the relatives while the plaintiff and his prospective bride stood aside and, according to the deposition of the plaintiff, somewhat under the influence of alcoholic beverages, as is not unlikely on an occasion such as that. While this explanation is not completely convincing, nevertheless, the fact remains that on every occasion in which the plaintiff was called upon to state the place of his birth, except the two just mentioned, he gave Wheeling, West Virginia, as his birthplace, and that information to that effect appears in the record of the Greek Municipality in which his family had its origin.
It must be borne in mind that citizenship of the United States is a very precious thing; that natural-born citizens very frequently have a great deal of difficulty in proving their status due to uncertainties of birth records and that this circumstance should not lead to a lack of stability of citizenship because, if it did, many a legitimate citizen of the United States would find himself deprived of it.
The Court is of the opinion that, weighing the evidence on both sides, the plaintiff has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he is a natural-born citizen of the United States, and the Court so finds.
A transcript of this oral opinion will constitute the findings of fact and the conclusions of law.
Counsel may submit a proposed judgment in accordance therewith.
Having determined that plaintiff was born in Wheeling, West Virginia, the court declared that "the plaintiff has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he is a natural-born citizen of the United States, and the Court so finds."
With birth in West Virginia, he was a natural born citizen, a citizen at birth.
That is an assumption, and without proof. Firstly, his thoughts may not be secret, they may just be unknown to us, or more specifically you. Secondly, they may have been shared by all members of the Pennsylvania legislature (which is a good bet) and they may very well have been ratified as part of the US Constitution.
Congressional Research Service,
I don't care what the Congressional Research Service says. Error built on top of error is unlikely to yield any accurate result.
Unless it emanates from primary sources, it is just a repeated opinion.
Rawle taught a lot of people incorrectly about US Citizenship, and the damage is widespread. Everything tainted by his influence is simply wrong.
Then why do you keep bringing it up? I certainly have no interest in talking about the 14th amendment. I see it as completely irrelevant to "natural born citizen", yet you keep mentioning it in the context of this discussion.
I have noticed that you seem to regard this issue with some degree of passion. Do you have a vested interest in seeing it the way you do? Would accepting the Vattel definition somehow undermine your own citizenship status or that of your descendants/friends/relatives?
As with the Civil war, I have no subjective interest in the result.
I am currently arguing with Semimojo and others regarding large corporations censoring speech on their massive communications platforms, and with him and others I get the impression that they are arguing from a position of self interest. I suspect they have an income stream that derives from some entity of a similar sort, and so therefore they wish to protect it and justify it.
Is this a similar sort of situation to your own, or are you like myself, simply interested in knowing what is the truth?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.