Political Junkie’s Advanced AI Review of the Federal Circuit Court’s Rejection of President Trump’s Tariffs

Here is something relevant pertaining to the regurgitation of AI as legal wisdom.

https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-trial-legal-models-hallucinate-1-out-6-or-more-benchmarking-queries

AI on Trial: Legal Models Hallucinate in 1 out of 6 (or More) Benchmarking Queries
Date: May 23, 2024
HAI
Stanford University
Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
A new study reveals the need for benchmarking and public evaluations of AI tools in law.
Artificial intelligence (AI) tools are rapidly transforming the practice of law. Nearly three quarters of lawyers plan on using generative AI for their work, from sifting through mountains of case law to drafting contracts to reviewing documents to writing legal memoranda. But are these tools reliable enough for real-world use?
Large language models have a documented tendency to “hallucinate,” or make up false information. In one highly-publicized case, a New York lawyer faced sanctions for citing ChatGPT-invented fictional cases in a legal brief; many similar cases have since been reported. And our previous study of general-purpose chatbots found that they hallucinated between 58% and 82% of the time on legal queries, highlighting the risks of incorporating AI into legal practice. In his 2023 annual report on the judiciary, Chief Justice Roberts took note and warned lawyers of hallucinations.
Across all areas of industry, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is seen and promoted as the solution for reducing hallucinations in domain-specific contexts. Relying on RAG, leading legal research services have released AI-powered legal research products that they claim “avoid” hallucinations and guarantee “hallucination-free” legal citations. RAG systems promise to deliver more accurate and trustworthy legal information by integrating a language model with a database of legal documents. Yet providers have not provided hard evidence for such claims or even precisely defined “hallucination,” making it difficult to assess their real-world reliability.
AI-Driven Legal Research Tools Still Hallucinate
In a new preprint study by Stanford RegLab and HAI researchers, we put the claims of two providers, LexisNexis (creator of Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (creator of Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI)), to the test. We show that their tools do reduce errors compared to general-purpose AI models like GPT-4. That is a substantial improvement and we document instances where these tools provide sound and detailed legal research. But even these bespoke legal AI tools still hallucinate an alarming amount of the time: the Lexis+ AI and Ask Practical Law AI systems produced incorrect information more than 17% of the time, while Westlaw’s AI-Assisted Research hallucinated more than 34% of the time.
Read the full study, Hallucination-Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools
To conduct our study, we manually constructed a pre-registered dataset of over 200 open-ended legal queries, which we designed to probe various aspects of these systems’ performance.
Broadly, we investigated (1) general research questions (questions about doctrine, case holdings, or the bar exam); (2) jurisdiction or time-specific questions (questions about circuit splits and recent changes in the law); (3) false premise questions (questions that mimic a user having a mistaken understanding of the law); and (4) factual recall questions (questions about simple, objective facts that require no legal interpretation). These questions are designed to reflect a wide range of query types and to constitute a challenging real-world dataset of exactly the kinds of queries where legal research may be needed the most.
[Figure 1: Comparison of hallucinated (red) and incomplete (yellow) answers across generative legal research tools.]
These systems can hallucinate in one of two ways. First, a response from an AI tool might just be incorrect—it describes the law incorrectly or makes a factual error. Second, a response might be misgrounded—the AI tool describes the law correctly, but cites a source which does not in fact support its claims.
Given the critical importance of authoritative sources in legal research and writing, the second type of hallucination may be even more pernicious than the outright invention of legal cases. A citation might be “hallucination-free” in the narrowest sense that the citation exists, but that is not the only thing that matters. The core promise of legal AI is that it can streamline the time-consuming process of identifying relevant legal sources. If a tool provides sources that seem authoritative but are in reality irrelevant or contradictory, users could be misled. They may place undue trust in the tool's output, potentially leading to erroneous legal judgments and conclusions.
[Figures 2 and 3]
Under the hood, these new legal AI tools use retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to produce their results, a method that many tout as a potential solution to the hallucination problem. In theory, RAG allows a system to first retrieve the relevant source material and then use it to generate the correct response. In practice, however, we show that even RAG systems are not hallucination-free.
We identify several challenges that are particularly unique to RAG-based legal AI systems, causing hallucinations.
First, legal retrieval is hard. As any lawyer knows, finding the appropriate (or best) authority can be no easy task. Unlike other domains, the law is not entirely composed of verifiable facts—instead, law is built up over time by judges writing opinions. This makes identifying the set of documents that definitively answer a query difficult, and sometimes hallucinations occur for the simple reason that the system’s retrieval mechanism fails.
Second, even when retrieval occurs, the document that is retrieved can be an inapplicable authority. In the American legal system, rules and precedents differ across jurisdictions and time periods; documents that might be relevant on their face due to semantic similarity to a query may actually be inapposite for idiosyncratic reasons that are unique to the law. Thus, we also observe hallucinations occurring when these RAG systems fail to identify the truly binding authority. This is particularly problematic as areas where the law is in flux is precisely where legal research matters the most. One system, for instance, incorrectly recited the “undue burden” standard for abortion restrictions as good law, which was overturned in Dobbs (see Figure 2).
Third, sycophancy—the tendency of AI to agree with the user's incorrect assumptions—also poses unique risks in legal settings. One system, for instance, naively agreed with the question’s premise that Justice Ginsburg dissented in Obergefell, the case establishing a right to same-sex marriage, and answered that she did so based on her views on international copyright. (Justice Ginsburg did not dissent in Obergefell and, no, the case had nothing to do with copyright.) Notwithstanding that answer, here there are optimistic results. Our tests showed that both systems generally navigated queries based on false premises effectively. But when these systems do agree with erroneous user assertions, the implications can be severe—particularly for those hoping to use these tools to increase access to justice among pro se and under-resourced litigants.
Responsible Integration of AI Into Law Requires Transparency
Ultimately, our results highlight the need for rigorous and transparent benchmarking of legal AI tools. Unlike other domains, the use of AI in law remains alarmingly opaque: the tools we study provide no systematic access, publish few details about their models, and report no evaluation results at all.
This opacity makes it exceedingly challenging for lawyers to procure and acquire AI products. The large law firm Paul Weiss spent nearly a year and a half testing a product, and did not develop “hard metrics” because checking the AI system was so involved that it “makes any efficiency gains difficult to measure.” The absence of rigorous evaluation metrics makes responsible adoption difficult, especially for practitioners that are less resourced than Paul Weiss.
The lack of transparency also threatens lawyers’ ability to comply with ethical and professional responsibility requirements. The bar associations of California, New York, and Florida have all recently released guidance on lawyers’ duty of supervision over work products created with AI tools. And as of May 2024, more than 25 federal judges have issued standing orders instructing attorneys to disclose or monitor the use of AI in their courtrooms.
Without access to evaluations of the specific tools and transparency around their design, lawyers may find it impossible to comply with these responsibilities. Alternatively, given the high rate of hallucinations, lawyers may find themselves having to verify each and every proposition and citation provided by these tools, undercutting the stated efficiency gains that legal AI tools are supposed to provide.
Our study is meant in no way to single out LexisNexis and Thomson Reuters. Their products are far from the only legal AI tools that stand in need of transparency—a slew of startups offer similar products and have made similar claims, but they are available on even more restricted bases, making it even more difficult to assess how they function.
Based on what we know, legal hallucinations have not been solved. The legal profession should turn to public benchmarking and rigorous evaluations of AI tools.
This story was updated on Thursday, May 30, 2024, to include analysis of a third AI tool, Westlaw’s AI-Assisted Research. Paper authors: Varun Magesh is a research fellow at Stanford RegLab. Faiz Surani is a research fellow at Stanford RegLab. Matthew Dahl is a joint JD/PhD student in political science at Yale University and graduate student affiliate of Stanford RegLab. Mirac Suzgun is a joint JD/PhD student in computer science at Stanford University and a graduate student fellow at Stanford RegLab. Christopher D. Manning is Thomas M. Siebel Professor of Machine Learning, Professor of Linguistics and Computer Science, and Senior Fellow at HAI. Daniel E. Ho is the William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, Professor of Computer Science (by courtesy), Senior Fellow at HAI, Senior Fellow at SIEPR, and Director of the RegLab at Stanford University.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/02/2025-07835/addressing-certain-tariffs-on-imported-articles

Executive Order 14289 of April 29, 2025
Addressing Certain Tariffs on Imported Articles
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862), ), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

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U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8:

Section 8.
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

CITED STATUTES

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1701

50 U.S. Code § 1701 - Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities
(a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.
(Pub. L. 95–223, title II, § 202, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1626.)

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https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/unusual

Unusual: different from others of the same type in a way that is surprising, interesting, or attractive:

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/extraordinary

extraordinary: very unusual, special, unexpected, or strange

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https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1702">

50 U.S. Code § 1702 - Presidential authorities
(a) In general
(1) At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and.[1]
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.
(2) In exercising the authorities granted by paragraph (1), the President may require any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, complete information relative to any act or transaction referred to in paragraph (1) either before, during, or after the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign property, or relative to any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of such paragraph. In any case in which a report by a person could be required under this paragraph, the President may require the production of any books of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, in the custody or control of such person.
(3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same. No person shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this chapter, or any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter.
(b) Exceptions to grant of authority
The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly—
(1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value;
(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 1701 of this title, (B) are in response to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces of the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or [2]
(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 4604 [3] of this title, or under section 4605 [3] of this title to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18; or
(4) any transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from any country, including importation of accompanied baggage for personal use, maintenance within any country including payment of living expenses and acquisition of goods or services for personal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such travel including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.
(c) Classified information
In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.
(Pub. L. 95–223, title II, § 203, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1626; Pub. L. 100–418, title II, § 2502(b)(1), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1371; Pub. L. 103–236, title V, § 525(c)(1), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 474; Pub. L. 107–56, title I, § 106, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 277.)

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The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1601

50 U.S. Code § 1601 - Termination of existing declared emergencies
(a) All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, as a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976, are terminated two years from September 14, 1976. Such termination shall not affect—
(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the words “any national emergency in effect” means a general declaration of emergency made by the President.
(Pub. L. 94–412, title I, § 101, Sept. 14, 1976, 90 Stat. 1255.)

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Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/2483

19 U.S. Code § 2483 - Consequential changes in Tariff Schedules of the United States
The President shall from time to time, as appropriate, embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States the substance of the relevant provisions of this chapter, and of other Acts affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
(Pub. L. 93–618, title VI, § 604, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2073; Pub. L. 100–418, title I, §§ 1213(a), 1214(j)(4), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1155, 1158.)

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Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1862

19 U.S. Code § 1862 - Safeguarding national security
(a) Prohibition on decrease or elimination of duties or other import restrictions if such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair national security
No action shall be taken pursuant to section 1821(a) of this title or pursuant to section 1351 of this title to decrease or eliminate the duty or other import restrictions on any article if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.
(b) Investigations by Secretary of Commerce to determine effects on national security of imports of articles; consultation with Secretary of Defense and other officials; hearings; assessment of defense requirements; report to President; publication in Federal Register; promulgation of regulations
(1)
(A) Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce (hereafter in this section referred to as the “Secretary”) shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or motion.
(B) The Secretary shall immediately provide notice to the Secretary of Defense of any investigation initiated under this section.
(2)
(A) In the course of any investigation conducted under this subsection, the Secretary shall—
(i) consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding the methodological and policy questions raised in any investigation initiated under paragraph (1),
(ii) seek information and advice from, and consult with, appropriate officers of the United States, and
(iii) if it is appropriate and after reasonable notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice relevant to such investigation.
(B) Upon the request of the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the Secretary an assessment of the defense requirements of any article that is the subject of an investigation conducted under this section.
(3)
(A) By no later than the date that is 270 days after the date on which an investigation is initiated under paragraph (1) with respect to any article, the Secretary shall submit to the President a report on the findings of such investigation with respect to the effect of the importation of such article in such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security and, based on such findings, the recommendations of the Secretary for action or inaction under this section. If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the Secretary shall so advise the President in such report.
(B) Any portion of the report submitted by the Secretary under subparagraph (A) which does not contain classified information or proprietary information shall be published in the Federal Register.
(4) The Secretary shall prescribe such procedural regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subsection.
(c) Adjustment of imports; determination by President; report to Congress; additional actions; publication in Federal Register
(1)
(A) Within 90 days after receiving a report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(A) in which the Secretary finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the President shall—
(i) determine whether the President concurs with the finding of the Secretary, and
(ii) if the President concurs, determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
(B) If the President determines under subparagraph (A) to take action to adjust imports of an article and its derivatives, the President shall implement that action by no later than the date that is 15 days after the day on which the President determines to take action under subparagraph (A).
(2) By no later than the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President makes any determinations under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the Congress a written statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take action, or refused to take action, under paragraph (1). Such statement shall be included in the report published under subsection (e).
(3)
(A) If—
(i) the action taken by the President under paragraph (1) is the negotiation of an agreement which limits or restricts the importation into, or the exportation to, the United States of the article that threatens to impair national security, and
(ii) either—
(I) no such agreement is entered into before the date that is 180 days after the date on which the President makes the determination under paragraph (1)(A) to take such action, or
(II) such an agreement that has been entered into is not being carried out or is ineffective in eliminating the threat to the national security posed by imports of such article, the President shall take such other actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security. The President shall publish in the Federal Register notice of any additional actions being taken under this section by reason of this subparagraph.
(B) If—
(i) clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) apply, and
(ii) the President determines not to take any additional actions under this subsection,
the President shall publish in the Federal Register such determination and the reasons on which such determination is based.
(d) [1] Domestic production for national defense; impact of foreign competition on economic welfare of domestic industries
For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and the President shall, in the light of the requirements of national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national security requirements. In the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.
(d) 1 Report by Secretary of Commerce
(1) Upon the disposition of each request, application, or motion under subsection (b), the Secretary shall submit to the Congress, and publish in the Federal Register, a report on such disposition.
(2) Omitted.
(f) Congressional disapproval of Presidential adjustment of imports of petroleum or petroleum products; disapproval resolution
(1) An action taken by the President under subsection (c) to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum products shall cease to have force and effect upon the enactment of a disapproval resolution, provided for in paragraph (2), relating to that action.
(2)
(A) This paragraph is enacted by the Congress—
(i) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedures to be followed in that House in the case of disapproval resolutions and such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(ii) with the full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House.
(B) For purposes of this subsection, the term “disapproval resolution” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress disapproves the action taken under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 with respect to petroleum imports under ______ dated ______.”, the first blank space being filled with the number of the proclamation, Executive order, or other Executive act issued under the authority of subsection (c) of this section for purposes of adjusting imports of petroleum or petroleum products and the second blank being filled with the appropriate date.
(C)
(i) All disapproval resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and all disapproval resolutions introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Finance.
(ii) No amendment to a disapproval resolution shall be in order in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and no motion to suspend the application of this clause shall be in order in either House nor shall it be in order in either House for the Presiding Officer to entertain a request to suspend the application of this clause by unanimous consent.
(Pub. L. 87–794, title II, § 232, Oct. 11, 1962, 76 Stat. 877; Pub. L. 93–618, title I, § 127(d), Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1993; Pub. L. 96–223, title IV, § 402, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 301; Pub. L. 100–418, title I, § 1501(a), (b)(1), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1257, 1259.)

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Section 301 of title 3, United States Code

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/3/301

3 U.S. Code § 301 - General authorization to delegate functions; publication of delegations
The President of the United States is authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform such functions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writing, shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable at any time by the President in whole or in part.
(Added Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 10, 65 Stat. 712.)

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-10384/pdf/COMPS-10384.pdf<./a>

TRADE ACT OF 1974

SEC. 122. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS AUTHORITY.
(a) Whenever fundamental international payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports—
(1) to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits,
(2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or
(3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium,
the President shall proclaim, for a period not exceeding 150 days (unless such period is extended by Act of Congress)—
(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in the form of duties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on articles imported into the United States;
[...]

IEEPA Congressional Research Service Report

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45618

CRS Report R45618 - The International Emergency Economic Powers Act - Origins, Evolution, and Use
R45618
January 30, 2024
Christopher A. Casey,
Coordinator
Analyst in International
Trade and Finance
Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney
91 pp.

At 13-15: (footnotes omitted)

The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages. In the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that it was, as originally intended, only applicable “during a time of war.” Second, Congress expanded the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to Section 5(b) of TWEA. Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to confer “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”
The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an “emergency” in its “new approach” to international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President’s discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA’s Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.
These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately” transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register. The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.
In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA. Once the President declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to Congress specifying
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.
The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised. As per the NEA, the emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.

So it seems that President Trump is on solid legal ground?

Your legal acumen is unmatched. Trump has been thrashed in three different courts that opined on the matter. It seems Trump's case is buried six feet under legal ground. When absolutely all else fails, read the court opinions.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cit.17080/gov.uscourts.cit.17080.55.0.pdf

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, USCIT (28 May 2025), OPINION of the Court, unanimous, judges Gary S. Katzman, Timothy M. Reif, and Jane A. Restani.

at 48-49 of 49:

CONCLUSION
The court holds for the foregoing reasons that IEEPA does not authorize any of the Worldwide, Retaliatory, or Trafficking Tariff Orders. The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariff Orders exceed any authority granted to the President by IEEPA to regulate importation by means of tariffs. The Trafficking Tariffs fail because they do not deal with the threats set forth in those orders. This conclusion entitles Plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law; as the court further finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment will enter against the United States. See USCIT R. 56. The challenged Tariff Orders will be vacated and their operation permanently enjoined.
There is no question here of narrowly tailored relief; if the challenged Tariff Orders are unlawful as to Plaintiffs they are unlawful as to all. “[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and “[t]he tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.” Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884); see also Siemens Am., Inc. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n v. Baker 10 CIT 517, 521, 643 F. Supp. 626, 630–31 (1986) (noting “the statutory and constitutional mandate of uniformity in the interpretation of the international trade laws”).
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment are granted, and their Motions for Preliminary Injunction are denied as moot. Judgment will enter accordingly.
By the panel.
Dated: May 28, 2025 New York, New York

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69888953/68/vos-selections-inc-v-united-states/

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, CAFC (29 August 2025) OPINION of the Court

At 4-6:

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST, REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE, DYK, REYNA, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK.
Additional views filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM, joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TARANTO, in which Chief Judge MOORE, and Circuit Judges PROST and CHEN, join.
PER CURIAM.
The Government appeals a decision of the Court of In-ternational Trade setting aside five Executive Orders that imposed tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods from nearly every country in the world, holding that the tariffs were not authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. Because we agree that IEEPA’s grant of presidential authority to “regulate” imports does not authorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders, we affirm.
I
A
This case involves the extent of the President’s authority under IEEPA to “regulate” importation in response to a national emergency declared by the President. For many years, Congress has carefully constructed tariff schedules which provide for, in great detail, the tariffs to be imposed on particular goods. Since taking office, President Donald J. Trump has declared several national emergencies. In response to these declared emergencies, the President has departed from the established tariff schedules and imposed varying tariffs of unlimited duration on imports of nearly all goods from nearly every country with which the United States conducts trade. This appeal concerns Five Executive Orders imposing duties on foreign trading partners to address these emergencies: Executive Orders Nos. 14193, 14194, 14195, 14257, and 14266 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Challenged Executive Orders). We summarize the history of the Challenged Executive Orders by first discussing the national emergencies in response to which they were issued and then addressing the nature of the measures directed by the Challenged Executive Orders.
On January 20, 2025, the President declared the existence of a national emergency at the United States’ southern border with Mexico under sections 201 and 301 of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651). See Proclamation No. 10886, Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,327, 8,327 (Jan. 20, 2025). In the Proclamation, he identified the presence of “cartels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers, smugglers, unvetted military-age males from foreign adversaries, and illicit narcotics that harm Americans” at and around the southern border as threats to the country’s territorial sov-ereignty. Id. Shortly thereafter, the President faulted Mexico for “afford[ing] safe havens for the cartels to engage in the manufacturing and transportation of illicit drugs” to the United States. Executive Order No. 14194, Imposing Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,117, 9,117 (Feb. 1. 2025).

At 18-21

In 1976, Congress pared back the scope of TWEA and enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA). Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621–22, 1631, 1641, 1651). The NEA limited presidential power and placed restrictions on the use of authorities granted by TWEA. As relevant to this appeal, the NEA ended within two years “[a]ll powers and authorities possessed by the President . . . as a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976,” 50 U.S.C. § 1601(a), and placed new restrictions on the declaration and termination of future national emergencies. Id. §§ 1621–22.
The NEA did not explicitly address section 5(b) of TWEA; however, the NEA’s legislative history indicates Congress’s intent “to study section 5(b) [of TWEA] and propose such revisions as might be found necessary” to limit the President’s exercise of authority granted in section 5(b) during peacetime. S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977). IEEPA is the result of this legislative effort and is consistent with Congress’s stated goal “to revise and delimit the President’s authority to regulate international economic transactions during wars or national emergencies.” Id. In drafting IEEPA, Congress adopted the same list of authorities as in TWEA—including the power to “regulate . . . importation”—but Congress explicitly limited the President’s authority under IEEPA by substituting authorities “which [we]re both more limited in scope than those of [TWEA] section 5(b) and subject to various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 2, 19 (1977). The House Report also mentioned the Yoshida II decision in its background section, stating:
[S]ection 5(b) came into play when, on August 15, 1971, President Nixon declared a national emergency with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis and under that emergency imposed a surcharge on imports. In that case, section 5(b) was not among the statutes cited in the President’s proclamation as authority for the surcharge[] but was so cited later by the Government in response to a suit brought in Customs Court by Yoshida International challenging the surcharge. The court’s decision then rested on whether section 5(b) authorized imposition of duties. Although the lower court held that it did not, the Appeals Court reversed on the grounds that the existence of the national emergency made section 5(b) available for purposes which would not be contemplated in normal times.
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
IEEPA provides that, after declaring a national emergency pursuant to the NEA, the President may “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any . . . importation or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Notably, IEEPA does not use the words “tariffs” or “duties,” nor any similar terms like “customs,” “taxes,” or “imposts.” IEEPA also does not have a residual clause granting the President powers beyond those which are explicitly listed.
E
In addition to the President’s authority to adjust tariffs by international agreement and the limited authority conferred by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132), Congress has passed numerous other statutes that authorize the President and the executive branch to impose or modify tariffs on imports in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71- 361, § 338, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2497b). Notably, every Congressional delegation to the President of the core legislative power to impose tariffs includes well-defined procedural and substantive limitations. For example, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President to adjust the importation of certain articles if the Secretary of Commerce finds that they pose a threat to national security. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). The statute provides the President must, within ninety days, determine whether he concurs with the Secretary’s report, and if he does concur, “determine the nature and duration of the action that . . . must be taken . . . so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.” Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
The President must take any such action within fifteen days of his determination. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). In all instances, section 232 requires the President to “submit to the Congress a written statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take action, or refused to take action.” Id. § 1862(c)(2).
Provisions of the Trade Act similarly authorize the executive branch to impose tariffs on imports, but only once certain conditions set forth by statute have been met. Section 201 allows the President to “take all appropriate and feasible action within his power,” including imposing tariffs (often called “safeguard” tariffs) if the ITC finds that imports are causing or threatening “serious injury” to a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Under Section 301 of the Trade Act, the President may specifically direct the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to respond to unfair trade practices which violate trade agreements, or burden or restrict United States commerce, including by “impos[ing] duties or other import restrictions” on foreign countries responsible for the harmful conduct. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a), (c)(1)(B). While the USTR may take any action “within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign country,” id. § 2411(a), the USTR must complete various steps before taking such action. For example, before imposing duties pursuant to section 301, the USTR must initiate an investigation, id. § 2412; consult with the foreign country regarding the practices being investigated, id. § 2413; determine whether the requisite conditions for action are met, and if so, publish its proposed action and the factual findings on which it is based, id. § 2414; and allow for public comment regarding both the proposed investigation and the final action, id. § 2412(a)(4). As interpreted by the Government, IEEPA, unlike these other statutes, would impose no such limitations on the President’s authority.

At 44-45:

VI
We affirm the CIT’s holding that the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA’s text. We also affirm the CIT’s grant of declaratory relief that the orders are “invalid as contrary to law.” V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 1383–84. We vacate the CIT’s grant of a permanent injunction universally enjoining the enforcement of the Trafficking and Recipro-cal Tariffs and remand for the CIT to reevaluate the pro-priety of granting injunctive relief and the proper scope of such relief, after considering all four eBay factors and the Supreme Court’s holding in CASA.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED-IN-PART
COSTS
No costs.

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025cv1248-37

Learning Resources, Inc v Donald Trump, DDC (29 May 2025) MEMORANDUM OPINION

https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11332/LSB11332.1.pdf

Congressional Research Service

Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

July 3, 2025

At 3-4:

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Donald Trump
On April 22, 2025, Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc., affiliated companies that make educational toys and products for children, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging both the trafficking tariffs and the worldwide tariffs (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Donald Trump). On May 30, the district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from collecting the challenged tariffs from the plaintiffs and denied the government’s motion to transfer the case to the CIT.
The district court in Learning Resources held that U.S. district courts—not the CIT—have jurisdiction over lawsuits challenging tariffs imposed under IEEPA. The district court rejected the argument that only the CIT may hear lawsuits challenging the imposition of tariffs. Based on the statutory grant of exclusive CIT jurisdiction over a civil action against the government “that arises out of any law of the United States providing for” tariffs, the district court concluded that “the jurisdictional hook is the nature of the statute that a case arises out of”—in this case, IEEPA. Thus, the court determined that “[t]he jurisdictional question is tantamount to the principal merits question: whether IEEPA authorizes (or ‘provid[es] for’) tariffs.” Because the district court held that “IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs,” it concluded both that the CIT lacked jurisdiction and that the challenged tariffs were unlawful.
The district court set forth several reasons for its holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not include the authority to impose tariffs. The court observed that the Constitution separately grants Congress the power to impose “taxes” and “duties” and the power to “regulate” foreign commerce, indicating that regulation and tariffs are “not substitutes.” The court further reasoned that the plain meaning of “regulate” does not encompass tariffs. Alluding to the major questions doctrine, the court observed that IEEPA could not have given the President “the power of taxing ordinary commerce from any country at any rate for virtually any reason” without a clear statement to that effect.
In addition, the district court reasoned, incorporating tariff authority into IEEPA would effectively repeal “comprehensive statutory limitations” that Congress had written into specific tariff authorities. Such limitations include Section 122’s restrictions on the level and duration of tariffs the President may impose to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits.” The court also cited historical practice, observing that no President used IEEPA to impose tariffs from its 1977 enactment until 2025.
Regarding Yoshida’s holding that the text “regulate . . . importation” in TWEA provided authority for some tariffs, the district court in Learning Resources explained that it was not bound by Yoshida and did not find it persuasive. The court characterized Yoshida as interpreting statutory text in light of Congress’s purpose rather than the text’s plain meaning—an approach to statutory interpretation at odds with more recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The court also reasoned that Congress would not have passed Section 122 if it had understood TWEA to provide the “same tariffing authority” as Section 122.
The district court’s holding in Learning Resources was broader than that of the CIT in V.O.S. Selections. While the CIT had held that IEEPA did not authorize the trafficking tariffs or worldwide tariffs, the district court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose any tariffs. Nevertheless, the scope of the district court’s injunction was narrower than that of the CIT in V.O.S. Selections. While the CIT permanently enjoined the tariffs entirely, the district court entered only a preliminary injunction not to collect the tariffs from the named plaintiffs in the case before it.
The government has appealed the district court’s order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the district court has stayed its preliminary injunction pending that appeal. The D.C. Circuit has scheduled oral argument for September 30, 2025—two months after the Federal Circuit’s scheduled oral argument in V.O.S. Selections. On June 17, the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed a petition for the Supreme Court to grant review of the case in advance of the D.C. Circuit’s judgment, to resolve the question of whether IEEPA authorizes tariffs.The plaintiffs argued this question was of “paramount importance” and that “[i]t will inevitably fall to this Court to resolve it definitively.” On June 20, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

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