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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024

Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean “elite special forces” had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total.[1] Bloomberg also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that “several thousand” North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast.[2] The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces’ task in Kursk oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21.[3] The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2024

Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapon
The Bulsae-4, also called M-2018, is an advanced North Korean Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) combat vehicle designed to conduct combat operations against armored threats. This system is part of North Korea's ongoing efforts to modernize its military technology and improve the effectiveness of its infantry units in combat scenarios.

The development of the Bulsae-4 M-2018 reflects North Korea's continuous innovation in military technology. The vehicle is based on a North Korean-made M-2010 6x6 wheeled armored vehicle. The missile mounted on the vehicle is an advanced version of the earlier Bulsae series, featuring improvements in range, guidance, and firepower. The Bulsae-4 entered service in the late 2010s, offering enhanced anti-armor capabilities.

With its advanced guidance systems, extended range, and mobility, the Bulsae-4 significantly enhances the anti-armor capabilities of North Korean ground forces. Its design and deployment reflect a strategic emphasis on versatility and precision in modern warfare scenarios.

The use of the M-2010 wheeled armored vehicle as its platform underscores the system's mobility and adaptability, making it a formidable asset in North Korea's military arsenal. The combination of modern guidance technology, robust mobility, and integrated protection measures ensures the Bulsae-4 remains a significant threat to armored targets on the battlefield.

Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapon

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2024

Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term. The Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is “in danger of overheating,” noting that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining competitive with Russia's high military salaries.[1] The Washington Post quoted Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina, who warned in July 2024 that Russia's labor force and production capacity are “almost exhausted.” The Washington Post noted that private Russian companies are struggling to keep up with Russian military salaries and are increasingly having to offer wages several times higher than the typical industry averages. ISW has recently reported that Russian regional authorities are significantly increasing the one-time signing bonuses for Russian contract servicemembers in order to sustain Russia's rate of force generation (roughly 30,000 troops per month), which underscores the fact that Russia does not have an indefinite pool of manpower and must financially and socially reckon with the ever-growing costs of replenishing its frontline losses via various force-generation avenues.[2] The Washington Post also noted that Russia's stringent migration policies, particularly after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, have further depleted Russia's labor pool and amplified economic frictions. This has particularly become the case as migrant workers are increasingly identifying Russia as a hostile and unattractive place to relocate for work.[3] ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[4]

Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. The recent appearance of North Korean troops in Russia, and their reported deployment to the combat zone in Kursk Oblast, further suggests that Putin's entire force-generation system is very tenuous.[5] The costs of fueling the war will increase as Russia continues to burn through manpower and materiel on the frontline. Russian resources are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely. Russia's economy will reach a burnout point. That burnout point will inflict great costs on Russian society, which may force Putin to make major decisions about how to resource Russia's war or change Russia's mode of warfighting to preserve his regime's stability.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024