Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told POLITICO on September 10 that the PRC is giving Russia's defense industry “very substantial” support in exchange for secretive Russian military technologies.[6] Campbell emphasized that the PRC is not just supplying dual-use products to Russia but is instead engaged in a “substantial effort....to help sustain, build, and diversify elements of the Russian war machine.” Campbell warned that Russia is sending the PRC safeguarded submarine, aeronautical design, and missile technologies in return, which Russia has previously been reluctant to share with Beijing. PRC officials continue to deny their support for the Russian war effort and claim that the PRC remains “impartial” when it comes to Russia's war in Ukraine, despite frequent Western reporting of the PRC's material support for Russian defense industrial output and geospatial intelligence capabilities.[7] Reports of more direct PRC support to Russia come against the backdrop of the Russia-led “Okean-2024” international naval exercises, which are currently taking place in the Pacific and Arctic oceans and Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic seas with the involvement of three ships, one vessel, and 15 aircraft of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA).[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of Okean-2024 on September 10 and accused the US of placing pressure on Russia and the PRC, necessitating the conduct of joint naval exercises.[9] PLA and Russian forces are also currently conducting the “Northern/Interaction-2024” joint “strategic collaboration” exercise, comprised of air force and naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, and a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific.[10]
The German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a report on September 9 warning that Russia has significantly increased its defense industrial base (DIB) capabilities since 2022 and that depleting weapons and equipment stockpiles may not significantly impact future Russian DIB production.[74] The Kiel Institute reported that between the final quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2024, Russia increased tank production by 215 percent from 123 to 387 per quarter; armored vehicle production by 141 percent from 585 to 1,409 per quarter; artillery gun production by 149 percent from 45 to 112 per quarter; short-range air defense systems by 200 percent from nine to 38 per quarter; medium- and long-range air defense systems by 100 percent from six to 12 per quarter; and Lancet loitering munitions by 475 percent from 93 to 535 per quarter. The Kiel Institute caveated these statistics with the fact that 80 percent of Russian armored vehicle and tank production thus far has been a result of retrofitting existing tank hulls from pre-existing stockpiles rather than producing new vehicles, but warned that Russian armored vehicle production may not significantly decrease when Russia's existing stockpiles run out. The Kiel Institute assessed that Russia's armored vehicle production rate will likely decrease beginning in 2026 as Russia burns through its Soviet-era stockpiles but that Russia will likely open new production lines in the coming years to prepare to mitigate that effect. The Kiel Institute estimated that Russia will likely produce 350 modern tanks per year after 2026 even if Russia does not open additional production lines. The Kiel Institute also warned that Russia is working to increase domestic production of “rear systems” such as artillery and air defense and reduce its reliance on pre-existing stockpiles of such systems. The Kiel Institute also credited North Korean ammunition provisions with giving Russia a “strong oversupply” of artillery ammunition and reported that Russian forces are firing 10,000 shells per day.
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2024
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in St. Petersburg on September 11 and reiterated that the PRC will continue to promote its own vision to end Russia’s war in Ukraine and will aim to convince other countries to support the PRC’s peace plan.[21] Shoigu reiterated Russia’s support for the joint PRC-Brazilian peace plan during the meeting.[22] PRC officials have routinely promoted the PRC-Brazilian peace plan and allowed Russian officials to posture themselves as willing to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith despite consistent Kremlin statements outright rejecting negotiations or otherwise indicating that Russia will only negotiate on terms that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation.[23]
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11. Erdogan gave a virtual speech to the Fourth Summit of the International Crimea Platform on September 11 in which he reiterated support for Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, independence, and autonomy and asserted that Crimea “must be returned” to Ukraine under international law.[24]