Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2024
Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[10] UK outlet The Times, citing a Ukrainian military intelligence source, reported on September 6 that a Russian ship delivered the Fateh-360 missiles to an undisclosed port in the Caspian Sea on September 4. US and European officials recently confirmed that Iran began supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, and ISW assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter.[11]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2024
Iranian Ballistic Missiles Have Arrived In Russia: Reports
The long-feared development comes as Western allies pledge more weapons to Ukraine but with no movement on the issue of using some of them to strike targets deep in Russia.
https://www.twz.com/news-features/iranian-ballistic-missiles-have-arrived-in-russia-reports
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024
Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine. Burns stated during a panel with United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief Richard Moore on September 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to issue periodic threats of direct confrontation against the West but that these threats should not intimidate the West.[1] Burns stated that the CIA had assessed that Russian forces may have considered using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and that he was in contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin on the matter.[2] The CIA’s assessment of possible Russian readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 corresponded with intensified Russian rhetoric about nuclear confrontation amid the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts.[3] This rhetoric was likely more a part of a routine information operation designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine than an indicator of Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons, however.[4] The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked thinly veiled threats of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine, such as in the fall of 2022, to induce fear among decision makers.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[6]
Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia.
The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however.
The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship.
The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a “mass brawl” between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia.
Details + map https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024