Russian authoritieswith large-scale fraud on August 29. The Russian Investigative Committee charged Popov with embezzling money meant for the maintenance of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park, a Russian military exhibition in Moscow.[25] Russian authorities did not disclose how much money Popov is suspected of embezzling personally but noted his case is connected to the large-scale fraud cases of the Patriot Park Head Vyacheslav Akhmedov and MoD Directorate for Innovative Development Deputy Head Major General Vladimir Shesterov, whom Russian authorities arrested on August 5 for embezzling over 40 million rubles (roughly $471,000).[26] Russian state news outlet TASS reported, citing Russian law enforcement sources, that Akhmedov testified against Popov.[27] A Russian source that has previously correctly preemptively reported several command changes within the Russian MoD assessed on August 5 that Popov could be the next high-ranking MoD official to be arrested.[28] Russian sources have previously theorized that the arrests of high-ranking MoD officials who served under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu may be part of an effort to “clean house” of Shoigu’s affiliates within the MoD, which the sources claimed indicates that Shoigu’s influence within the Kremlin may be declining.[29]
Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Kremlin press service announced on August 29 that Putin will travel to Mongolia on September 3, marking his first visit to a state party to the Rome Statute since the ICC issued the arrest warrant in March 2023 for Putin's role in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[30] Putin notably avoided traveling to South Africa for a BRICS summit in August 2023 on similar grounds.[31] Putin's upcoming visit to Mongolia for negotiations on a “strategic partnership” suggests that Mongolian authorities likely will not enforce the ICC arrest warrant.[32] This visit also follows the annual “Selenga” bilateral Russian–Mongolian military exercises which began on August 15, further highlighting the strong bilateral relations between the two countries.[33] Russia has previously stated that it does not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction, and Russian officials have not yet commented on the possibility of Putin's arrest in Mongolia. [34]
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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024
Russian state-owned polling agencies are recognizing limited upticks in Russian domestic discontent towards Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian authorities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Public Opinion Foundation, a Russian state-owned polling institution, published a poll on August 30 that it conducted on August 25 showing that 28 percent of respondents expressed outrage or dissatisfaction with the actions of Russian authorities over the past month.[13] This is up from 25 percent and 18 percent in polls that the Public Opinion Foundation conducted on August 11 and July 28, respectively.[14] Respondents to the Public Opinion Foundation poll have not expressed such high dissatisfaction since polling conducted in November 2022, following the first month of the deeply unpopular partial mobilization in Russia.[15] The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) noted that Putin's approval rating fell by 3.5 percent to 73.6 percent between August 12 and 18 — a record fall in Putin's approval rating, even among Kremlin pollsters, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[16]
VCIOM released its latest polling on Putin's approval rating on August 30, showing an additional 1.2 percent decline to 72.4 percent between August 19 and 25.[17] These polls from Russian state-owned polling agencies do not suggest particularly pronounced discontent nor are they reliable reflections of the actual sentiments in Russian society. The polls do suggest, however, that the Kremlin assesses that it must recognize that societal discontent has risen since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin likely hopes that limited acknowledgment of societal discontent will guard against accusations that it is ignoring Russian society's concern about the Ukrainian incursion. The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing the maintenance of offensive operations in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and limited acknowledgments of discontent may be a part of this campaign.[18]
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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2024