Victory in Ukraine (and any outcome will be presented to us as a victory) will be Pyrrhic - on the ruins of the Russian army and navy. The day before, on August 21, another drone was shot down in the area of the Olenya strategic bomber base in the Murmansk region - 1,750 km from the Ukrainian border. The Northern Fleet and the world's only nuclear icebreaker fleet are also based in the region. In particular, this is the basis of the Russian nuclear shield, which Russian politicians love to boast about when threatening their Western adversary. If things continue like this, the Northern Fleet will suffer the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, which in total lost more than 20 ships in two years of special operations, including landing ships, submarines and the flagship cruiser Moskva. The fate of the Olenya base is also unenviable, because, having zeroed in, Ukraine is inflicting increasingly painful blows on military facilities.
A source at the Ministry of Defense, for example, commenting on the recent UAV strike on several airfields, noted that this is not the first strike on the Savasleyka airbase in the Nizhny Novgorod region in the last two weeks. According to Western media citing satellite images, the strike resulted in the destruction of a MiG-31K/I interceptor, two Il-76 military transport aircraft, and damage to about five aircraft, the model of which is not specified. Our source also noted that, judging by the effectiveness of the “arrivals,” no conclusions have been drawn, and sabotage along the lines of Shoigu’s old team cannot be ruled out, based on the principle that the worse for Removich [=Min Def Belousov], the better for Kuzhugetovich [=Shoigu].
https://t.me/moscow_laundry/22792
The blame game:
We have talked a lot here, on this platform, about what is happening along our border. One way or another, they heard us, second echelons, reserves appeared. The troops covering the state border, even in the trenches, must prepare daily, constantly train. I was in Kursk Oblast, I saw how minefields are equipped, but they are ineffective without fire cover. Who planned this? Who thought about this? This is serious. Today, it is impossible to plan such serious operations without our knowledge. I do not believe that they did not know about the concentration of enemy troops.
If there is initial data on the enemy, then, probably, we need to think about what is happening. Unfortunately, the composition of the group covering the state border did not have its own reconnaissance assets. They were the last to be provided with everything necessary. Nobody likes the truth in reports. Everyone wants to hear that everything is fine.
The Russian news site Vestka, citing sources in the government and parliament, reports that because of what is happening near Kursk following Ukraine's invasion, where Moscow has lost control over a territory of 1,000 square kilometers (621 square miles) and 82 settlements, criminal cases may be taken out against representatives of the military, security and civilian authorities, who allowed this situation to happen.
One of its contacts said that when the news of the initial stages of Ukraine's move into Kursk took place on Tuesday, Aug. 6, it was met with apathy amongst officials who did not consider it to be a serious threat.
According to a Bloomberg report, Gerasimov had received intelligence on Kyiv’s plans weeks before, but chose to ignore it and did not inform Russian leader Vladimir Putin. The fact that he had fallen out of favor as a result was when Putin first tasked Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and then Secretary of Russia's State Council, Aleksey Dyumin, overall control of the “counter-terrorist operation” to expel Ukraine's forces.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/37500
кто виноват?
Lots of investigations, maybe that is contributing to increased GDP😂
“One of its (The Russian news site Vestka) contacts said that when the news of the initial stages of Ukraine’s move into Kursk took place on Tuesday, Aug. 6, it was met with apathy amongst officials who did not consider it to be a serious threat.”
It is now apparent that the Kursk offensive has caused Russian to redeploy units out of Ukraine and back into Russia. Ukrainian forces have already begun a counter-offensive in an area of Kharkiv, from which Russia pulled forces away to Kursk.
ISW reports (22Aug):
“The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment (56th VDV Regiment, 7th VDV Division), from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts...
…Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment have been operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast since at least Summer 2023. ISW has also observed proprietary, commercially-available data appearing to support reports of these redeployments…
…Russian sources recently amplified footage purportedly showing elements of the 11th VDV Brigade allegedly leading conscripts out of an encirclement in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction in early July 2024.
The scale of the redeployment of the 56th VDV Regiment is unclear from available information in the open source, although this reported redeployment is consistent with ISW’s observation that Russia has been pulling forces from less critical sectors of the frontline such as western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.
The Russian military command notably redeployed elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) and elements of two unspecified VDV battalions from the Kherson direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW has also observed claims that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in June 2024.
The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry elements as “elite” forces (even though many Russian elite units have lost their eliteness over the course of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine) and tends to deploy these forces to prioritized directions. The scale of such redeployments serves as a greater indicator of the Russian military’s prioritization, however. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military will likely continue prioritizing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine – namely in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions.
The Ukrainian General Staff notably observed a decrease in Russian combat operations in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on August 22. The effects of redeploying elements of the 56th VDV Regiment and other elite elements from southern Ukraine will also depend on the scale of the redeployments. The Russian military command may be redeploying limited numbers of elite forces to improve C2 in Kursk Oblast and oversee inexperienced conscripts.
The Russian military command reportedly heavily committed elements initially intended for the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast to the defense of Kursk Oblast…
…Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on August 19 that appeals from relatives on Russian social media, reports about missing soldiers, and OSINT assessments indicate that Russia has committed elements of the following units to fighting in Kursk Oblast: the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 17th and 18th battalions (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD), the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 31st Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]), the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), Nizhnyi Novgorod’s “Kulibin” detachment, the DNR “Pyatnashka” Brigade, “Veterany” 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade’s “Oleg Mamiev” 3rd reconnaissance and assault detachment and “Otvazhnye” assault squad (Russian Volunteer Corps), unspecified BARS volunteer formations, and the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (6th Air Defense Army).
Novaya Gazeta noted that elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, “Veterany” 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade that were committed to Kursk Oblast were either recently deployed or about to deploy to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).
ISW has observed that significant redeployments of elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces (which is responsible for the Kharkiv direction) to Kursk Oblast suggest that the Russian military command has determined that disruption to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is a necessary sacrifice to appropriately respond to the Ukrainian incursion while avoiding redeployments from higher priority sectors of the frontline. (Ukraine has apparently detected the weakening of Russian forces there, and has recently begun a counter-offensive in Kharkiv).
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast will continue to generate theater-wide operational pressures on Russian forces, and it is unlikely that the Russian military will be able to restrict significant disruptions to just the Northern Grouping of Forces particularly if and when it undertakes to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk.”